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 I explore the intersection of the woman suffrage movement and minority voting 
rights in Texas, a state that did not require voters to be citizens but disfranchised all 
servicemen for the length of their enlistment during World War I. I scrutinize 
congressional and legal records, newspapers, and correspondence to show how the 
Nineteenth Amendment, which removed sex as a legal barrier to voting, ultimately 
strengthened white political control in the state. My dissertation analyzes how Anglo, 
black, Mexican American and Mexican immigrant women, working separately or 
collectively, participated in and at times benefitted from the woman suffrage movement, 
which caused unforeseen relaxations of minority voting restrictions before the legislature 
acted to further restrict voting rights. I analyze how laws regulating elections affected 
women differently based on race and citizenship status.  I maintain that politicians pass 
enfranchising legislation when it in some way benefits those already in power, and 
likewise they deploy fears of unethical or illegal voting when it benefits them as well. I 
argue that from WWI through the early 1920s, full citizenship was increasingly defined 
by the ability or right to vote.  
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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION: “THE FIRST SOUTHERN STATE TO RATIFY”: THE SUCCESS 
OF WOMAN SUFFRAGE IN TEXAS 
 
 After years of exhausting work leading the Texas Equal Suffrage Association 
(TESA), white suffragist and Texan Minnie Fisher Cunningham paused to contemplate 
the sweet victory of being able to register to legally vote in the 1918 Texas primary: 
I registered today. And honey you’ll never know how I felt when I walked out 
with that piece of paper. But I know how a mocking bird feels when he perches 
on the top most swaying bough and fast tells his hearts [sic] secrets to the world. 
But for a hundred and sixty pounds excess baggage and the trifling matter of lack 
of voice, I could have done it myself!1 
 
More than 250 miles away, African American suffragist Christia Adair had a very 
different experience come election day. Adair had led a group of black women working 
alongside white suffragists circulating petitions and pressuring Texas politicians to pass 
the 1918 primary suffrage bill that gave Texas women the right to vote in primary 
elections two years before the Susan B. Anthony Amendment banned voting 
                                                
 1 Minnie Fisher Cunningham (hereafter MFC) to Jane McCallum, undated 
[Monday, 1918], Box 3K84, File: Jane Y. McCallum: Women’s Suffrage, 
Correspondence, Letters Received, 1918-1921 & Undated, Jane Y. and Arthur N. 
McCallum Papers, Dolph Briscoe Center, University of Texas, Austin, Texas (hereafter 
Jane & Arthur McCallum Papers); Sections of this chapter are reprinted with permission 
from, “‘Without Us, It is Ferguson with a Plurality: Woman Suffrage and Anti-Ferguson 
Politics,” in Impeached: The Removal of Texas Governor James E. Ferguson, A 
Centennial Examination, eds. Jessica Brannon-Wranosky & Bruce A. Glasrud (College 
Station, TX: Texas A&M University Press), Copyright 2017 (Texas A&M University 
Press). 
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discrimination based on sex. Expecting to take advantage of the fruits of her labor, Adair 
went to the polls on primary election day in 1918:  
And so the first election that they had after the bill passed…the white women 
were going to vote. And we dressed up and went to vote, and when we got down 
there, well, we couldn’t vote. They gave us all different kinds of excuses why, 
but we just stayed. We stayed, we asked, ‘We want to know why we couldn’t 
vote.’ The answers to the questions were so invalid, we were not satisfied. So 
finally one woman, a Mrs. Simmons said, ‘Are you saying that we can’t vote 
because we’re Negroes? And he said, ‘Yes, Negroes don’t vote in primary in 
Texas.’ So that just hurt our hearts real bad and we went on. There was nothing 
we could do about that but just take it as it was.2 
 
That same day in San Antonio, a Spanish-language newspaper reported on women 
voters’ preparations for election day concluding “Today, we will see them go to their 
respective precincts, proud to finally make the dream of many years a reality.”3 As 
people of Mexican descent were legally considered white in Texas, they were not 
routinely prevented from voting in the Democratic Party’s all white primary in the 
1910’s. The legal identity of Mexicans as white was convenient for the system of boss 
rule in South Texas, a system in which political bosses controlled the votes of working 
class Mexican immigrants and Mexican-Americans. While Texas allowed non-citizens, 
or legal resident aliens, to vote, women’s derivative citizenship status, in which women 
were forced to automatically assume the citizenship status of their spouse, meant that 
few if any female immigrant aliens were legally able to vote under the primary woman 
                                                
 2 Black Women Oral History Project Interviews; Christia Adair interview, April 
25, 1977, Schlesinger Library, Radcliffe Institute, Harvard University, Cambridge, 
Mass, 15-16. 
 3 “Día de intensa lucha será éste en que por primera vez las mujeres van a 
ejercitar el derecho del sufragio” in La Prensa: Diario Popular Independiente, Saturday 
July 27, 1918; accessed through America’s Historical Newspapers Database. 
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suffrage law. Few immigrant women were single, twenty-one years or older, and applied 
for naturalization independently of any family members. Alien immigrant men who filed 
their intention to become citizens, were eligible to vote, although they had not completed 
the naturalization process. The wives of such men did not experience a change in legal 
status until their husbands became citizens; women were not allowed to vote based on 
their husbands’ intention to become citizens.4   
 The 1918 primary woman suffrage law is a classic example of how a law 
appearing to be racially neutral affected women very differently depending on their race 
and citizenship status.5 The Texas woman suffrage movement resulted in numerous 
changes to election laws, many of which appeared on the surface to be racially neutral 
despite their intentions or consequences. Sometimes these disparate outcomes were 
intentional, as when legislators purposefully drafted laws targeting a specific group of 
people. Other times tampering with election laws caused unforeseen consequences, 
which left legislators scrambling to stop the unintended changes to other groups’ voting 
                                                
 4 Evan Anders, Boss Rule in South Texas: The Progressive Era (Austin: 
University of Texas Press, 1982), 272; I use the phrase “Mexican American” to refer to 
American citizens of Mexican descent. I use the term “Mexican immigrant” to refer to 
people who emigrated from Mexico to the United States. I use the term “Mexican,” 
“Mexicans,” “people of Mexican descent” and “brown” to refer to both groups 
collectively or to those whose citizenship status is unclear. “African American” and 
“black” are used interchangeably. “Anglo” refers to non-Hispanic whites. 
 5 For intersectionality theory, see: Kimberlé Crenshaw, “Demarginalizing the 
Intersection of Race and Sex,” University of Chicago Legal Forum (1989): 139-167; and 
Sumi Cho, Kimberlé Williams Crenshaw and Leslie McCall, “Toward a Field of 
Intersectionality Studies: Theory, Applications and Praxis,” Signs: Journal of Women in 
Culture and Society, Vol. 38, No. 4 (2013): 705-810.  
  4 
rights or privileges. The voting rights of all peoples were connected, and changes to one 
group impacted the rights of other groups as well.  
 Texas in the 1910s was the site of a strange confluence of laws regulating voting 
rights. Here, the Jim Crow restrictions of the poll tax and all-white primary met boss 
rule, a system in which political bosses controlled the votes of many Mexican 
immigrants and Mexican-Americans, which was based on non-citizen (or legal resident 
alien) voting, which was further complicated by women’s dependent citizenship. Texas 
added to this mix a peculiar disfranchisement of servicemen for the length of their 
military service, and usually a while beyond that as those who returned after the poll tax 
window closed on February 1, had to wait another year in order to pay the tax and vote. 
It was within this convergence of voting laws that suffragists sought the ballot in the 
1910s.  
In Texas, the twentieth century white woman suffrage movement was 
inextricably linked to minority voting rights and civil rights, both those of African 
Americans and Mexicans. As one population gained ground, others gained or lost as 
well. When the voting rights of one group became fluid, all people’s voting rights ceased 
to be static. This could have resulted in an expansion of suffrage for multiple groups. 
However, as voting rights expanded to include women, Texas politicians ensured that 
they retracted further to restrict black and brown voting rights. In 1919 and 1921, voters 
choosing to extend rights or privileges to women would, through the very same piece of 
legislation, simultaneously seek to deny those rights and privileges to the Latino 
population.  
  5 
Voting rights were constantly in flux in Texas during the Progressive Era. Voting 
was still considered a privilege, not an inherent right of citizens. However, by the end of 
the era, experts, politicians, and most Americans began referring to voting as a right, at 
least as a right of white citizens. Texas law contained only two Jim Crow voting 
restrictions, the all-white primary and the poll tax, which had to be paid by February 1 in 
order to vote in that year’s elections. Black men who could afford the poll tax were 
usually barred from voting in the Democratic Party’s all white primary, but could vote in 
general and special elections. Mexican immigrants and Mexican-Americans were 
considered legally white in Texas and were not routinely turned away by the all-white 
primary. Citizenship was not a requirement for voting in Texas, and immigrants who 
filed their intention to eventually become citizens could vote. Progressives and reform 
Democrats abhorred voting on “first papers,” and they fought to outlaw it, while south 
Texas political machine bosses depended upon non-citizen voters to remain in power. 
German and Mexican immigrant voting would become particularly troubling to reform-
minded Texans during World War I (WWI) and after the release of the Zimmerman 
Telegram.6  
                                                
 6 Handbook of Texas Online, O. Douglas Weeks, "Election Laws," accessed 
March 12, 2017, http://www.tshaonline.org/handbook/online/articles/wde01; Handbook 
of Texas Online, Sanford N. Greenberg, "White Primary," accessed March 12, 2017, 
http://www.tshaonline.org/handbook/online/articles/wdw01; Handbook of Texas Online, 
Evan Anders, "Boss Rule," accessed March 22, 2017, 
http://www.tshaonline.org/handbook/online/articles/wmb01; The Zimmerman Telegram 
was “a secret telegram transmitted in code to the German ambassador in Washington for 
transmittal to the president of Mexico. It promised Mexico that if she would join 
Germany and encourage Japan to join the Central Powers, Germany would assist Mexico 
to regain her lost territories in Texas, Arizona, and New Mexico by conquest.” See: 
  6 
 While election laws discriminated based on race and socio-economic status, 
women were completely barred from voting in government elections in Texas. Texas 
and American women in the early 20th century were also restricted by dependent 
citizenship. Their legal status as citizens depended upon the citizenship status of their 
fathers or husbands. In 1855, the United States congress passed a Naturalization Act 
allowing immigrant women to automatically assume the citizenship status of their citizen 
husbands.7 Immigrant women who wished to maintain their previous citizenship status 
were denied the ability to do so. Instead, their citizenship was entirely dependent upon 
that of their husbands. Girls, whose fathers naturalized while they were underage, 
likewise became citizens through their dependant legal status.  
 In 1907, Congress acted again, this time automatically expatriating or 
denaturalizing any American woman who married an alien, regardless of where they 
resided.8 Once again, women’s actual desire for citizenship did not alter the automatic 
change of citizenship status upon marriage. With this act, women were officially 
dependent citizens. While most vestiges of coverture were slowly dying off, the 
Congress’ efforts to enforce dependent citizenship “appeared to be a statutory reassertion 
                                                                                                                                           
Handbook of Texas Online, Ralph W. Steen, "World War I," accessed April 02, 2017, 
http://www.tshaonline.org/handbook/online/articles/qdw01.  
 7 Candice Lewis Bredbenner, A Nationality of Her Own: Women, Marriage, and 
the Law of Citizenship (Berkeley, Los Angeles, & London: University of California 
Press, 1998), 15. 
 8 Bredbenner, A Nationality of Her Own, 4.  
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of the single-identity theory of marriage.”9 While the Congress appeared to be acting 
against the trend of women gaining legal protections and independence at the turn of the 
century, they were in fact in line with another prevailing trend of the early twentieth 
century: nativism.  
 The Expatriation Act of 1907 was one of a set of laws aimed at curbing 
immigration and immigrants’ rights in early twentieth century America. Because it was 
out of step with concurrent laws, court decisions, and the common law, many women’s 
rights advocates expected it to be struck down. However, in 1915 the Supreme Court 
upheld the law, signaling their acquiescence to Congress in regulating immigration and 
citizenship.10 Women’s rights advocates and suffragists began working for women’s 
independent citizenship, rightfully seeing it as crucial to the success of the woman 
suffrage movement and the other reforms they sought. Independent citizenship was one 
of the original goals of the League of Women Voters when it formed.11 This 
convergence of women’s rights with immigration and citizenship law existed both in 
Texas and in the United States. As political efforts to reinforce white supremacy and 
                                                
 9 Coverture was the legal process in which women suffered civil death upon 
marriage and became one legal entity with their husbands; See: Bredbenner, A 
Nationality of Her Own, 5.  
 10 Bredbenner, A Nationality of Her Own, 6. 
 11 The goal was “direct citizenship for women, not citizenship through marriage, 
as a qualification for the vote.” See: “The Official Program of the Committee on 
American Citizenship of the League of Women Voters,” by Mrs. Frederick P. Bagley, 
Chairman, in Box 7, Folder 29, Minnie Fisher Cunningham Papers, UH Special 
Collections [hereafter MFC Papers]. 
  8 
suppress black voting dictated the strategy of southern suffragists in earlier decades, 
nativism would inform the strategy of suffragists particularly during WWI.12  
Black Texans legally maintained the privilege of voting, but the all white primary 
and the poll tax effectively disfranchised most black Texans. The all white primary was 
established when the Democratic Party required participants to swear that they were 
white and would support the Democratic Party candidate. The direct primary was 
adopted in 1903 and the state left it to the parties to determine membership qualifications 
to vote, which were understood to exclude black voters. Historian Darlene Clark Hine 
notes, “The white primary was, ironically, a mutant form of the direct primary that had 
been widely heralded as an instrument to purge southern elections of the corruption that 
had typically disgraced them.”13  
Like other voting reforms in the Progressive Era, laws that were instituted under 
the guise of limiting election fraud often disfranchised black and brown voters.14 
                                                
 12 For more on southern suffragists’ strategies of arguing for woman suffrage as a 
way to reinforce white supremacy and suppress black voting in earlier decades, see: 
Marjorie Spruill Wheeler, New Women of the New South: The Leaders of the Woman 
Suffrage Movement in the Southern States (New York & Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 1993). 
 13 Darlene Clark Hine, Black Victory: The Rise and Fall of the White Primary in 
Texas (Columbia: University of Missouri Press, 2003), 70. The direct primary was 
adopted in Texas in 1903 after the poll tax had been adopted in the general election in 
1902. 
 14 Progressivism started as a social reform movement and became a political 
movement in the early twentieth century. Progressives tended to be educated and reside 
in cities. They supported a series of reforms to varying degrees including prohibition, 
woman suffrage, worker’s rights, and limits on corporations. Progressives usually 
supported segregation as well, and progressive President Woodrow Wilson was 
responsible for segregating the federal government. See: William A. Link, The Paradox 
of Southern Progressivism: 1880-1930 (Chapel Hill & London: The University of North 
  9 
Progressives considered these voters to be easily bribed into voting for certain politicians 
or causes and disfranchising them was part of the progressive plan to clean up elections. 
Progressive Texas Democrats viewed both the white primary and the direct primary as 
“purifying” and improving elections. Allowing political parties to determine 
membership qualifications in primary elections left open considerable loopholes, as not 
all local party officials excluded black voters and in close elections, some white 
politicians even campaigned for the black vote.15 When white Texans most feared the 
expansion of black voting, they strengthened the all white primary.  
Finally, a poorly phrased section of the original Texas constitution, intended to 
prevent military service in the state from qualifying out-of-state servicemen for 
residency, carried over into all subsequent constitutions.16 The wording barred members 
of the United States military from voting in the state of Texas for the length of their 
enlistment, despite their state of residency. This became particularly important during 
WWI. Servicemen were absolutely disfranchised for the length of their service, and then 
effectively disfranchised upon returning home until the next poll tax window opened in 
the fall. They would then pay the poll tax to vote in the coming year’s elections. It was 
into this confusing mélange of voting rights that woman suffrage activists worked for the 
right to vote in Texas.  
                                                                                                                                           
Carolina Press, 1992); Handbook of Texas Online, Lewis L. Gould, "Progressive Era," 
accessed March 22, 2017, http://www.tshaonline.org/handbook/online/articles/npp01.  
 15 Merline Pitre, “In Retrospect: Darlene Clark Hine’s Black Victory,” in Darlene 
Clark Hine, Black Victory: The Rise and Fall of the White Primary in Texas (Columbia: 
University of Missouri Press, 2003), 25; Hine, Black Victory, 84 and 92. 
 16 Texas Constitution of 1845, Article III, Sec. 1; Debates of the Convention, 
1845; page 159. http://tarlton.law.utexas.edu/constitutions/texas1845/debates/jul21. 
  10 
Historian Aileen Kraditor argues in The Ideas of the Woman Suffrage Movement 
that suffragists mainly used arguments based on “justice” in the nineteenth century and 
arguments based on “expediency” in the Progressive Era. Justice arguments emphasized 
natural or universal rights. The expediency arguments emphasized how women would 
use the vote to better society, end corruption in politics, and improve social services.17 
Historians continue to distinguish between the two types of suffrage arguments, although 
most argue against the idea that there was a particular moment when suffragists switched 
primarily from one argument to the other. Historians have expounded the ways in which 
the expediency or instrumental arguments “often contained racist assumptions about 
white women’s superiority.”18 According to Historian Louise M. Newman, “Kraditor’s 
fundamental insight [is] that a political movement devoted to the extension of 
democracy contained within it antidemocratic and racist elements.”19 In analyzing “how 
white suffragists articulated egalitarian statements about women’s equality alongside 
racist assertions about white supremacy,” Kraditor led scholars to analyze how “pro-
suffrage arguments were infused with ethnocentric, xenophobic, and antidemocratic 
sentiments.”20 According to Newman, Kraditor “definitively showed how one of the 
                                                
 17 Aileen S. Kraditor, The Ideas of the Woman Suffrage Movement, 1890-1920 
(New York: Columbia University Press, 1965; repr., New York: Norton, 1981); Louise 
M. Newman, “Reflections on Aileen Kraditor’s Legacy: Fifty Years of Woman Suffrage 
Historiography, 1965-2014” The Journal of the Gilded Age and Progressive Era 14 
(2015), 294. 
 18 Newman, “Reflections on Aileen Kraditor’s Legacy,” 290. 
 19 Ibid. 
 20 Newman, “Reflections on Aileen Kraditor’s Legacy,” 291-293. 
  11 
nation’s most dramatic movements for democracy had both antidemocratic motivations 
and consequences.”21 
Marjorie Spruill Wheeler was one of the first historians to take issue with 
Kraditor’s argument that suffragists abandoned justice arguments for expediency 
arguments in the Progressive Era. Wheeler argues that elite white suffragists used racist 
strategies in an unsuccessful attempt to get woman suffrage passed in southern states in 
the late nineteenth century.22 Louise Newman also rejects Kraditor’s framework and 
argues that egalitarianism or feminism and racism were “fundamentally interconnected,” 
instead of separate rhetorical phrases of the movement. She maintains “notions of 
racialized sexual difference and racial hierarchy were consistently foundational to how 
white Anglo Saxon women conceived of their political roles and responsibilities in the 
nineteenth and twentieth centuries.”23 Newman also contends that white suffragists 
“were capable of recognizing other individual nonwhite women as their equals, but not 
entire races, because their assumptions about racial superiority were grounded in beliefs 
that their sexual differences were racial traits that were characteristic of the white race 
and helped account for their society’s supposed higher civilization.”24 In her landmark 
study of suffrage in the West, Rebecca Mead also argues against Kraditor’s assertion 
                                                
 21 Newman, “Reflections on Aileen Kraditor’s Legacy,” 307.  
 22 Newman, “Reflections on Aileen Kraditor’s Legacy,” 295; Marjorie Spruill 
Wheeler, New Women of the New South: The Leaders of the Woman Suffrage Movement 
in the Southern States (New York & Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1993). 
 23 Louise M. Newman, White Women’s Rights: The Racial Origins of Feminism 
in the United States (New York: Oxford University Press, 1998); Newman, “Reflections 
on Aileen Kraditor’s Legacy,” 295-296. 
 24 Newman, “Reflections on Aileen Kraditor’s Legacy,” 297. 
  12 
that justice arguments gave way to arguments of expediency. She contends that both 
arguments were used together, complementing each other instead of opposing one 
another.25  
Similarly, historian Allison Sneider critiques Kraditor’s framework for leaving 
historians trying to explain how individual nineteenth century suffragists changed over 
time to embrace “race-based claims for white women’s ballots” instead of 
acknowledging that racism was “integral to the intellectual traditions of liberalism and 
republicanism from which these suffragists drew.” Sneider continues: “neither the 
classical liberal nor republican traditions on which nineteenth-century U.S. suffragists 
and abolitionists drew were inconsistent with the belief in natural hierarchies between 
men and women or between races. To speak in the language of constitutional rights, or 
of a citizen’s right to vote does not preclude the belief that some men and women are 
more fit to exercise these rights than others.”26  
Conversely, as much as liberalism and republicanism rested on racism, they 
relied on sexism as well. Citizenship based in natural rights eroded inherited status, 
while expanding distinctions between sexes and among races. To quote historian Estelle 
Freedman, “The flip side of natural rights was natural sex and natural race.”27 Women 
                                                
 25 Rebecca Mead, How the Vote Was Won: Woman Suffrage in the Western 
United States, 1868-1914 (New York: New York University Press, 2004); Newman, 
“Reflections on Aileen Kraditor’s Legacy,” 295. 
 26 Allison Sneider, Suffragists in an Imperial Age: U.S. Expansion and the 
Woman Question, 1870-1929 (New York: Oxford University Press, 2008), 12-13; 
Newman, “Reflections on Aileen Kraditor’s Legacy,” 295.  
 27 Estelle Freedman, No Turning Back: The History of Feminism and the Future 
of Women (New York: Ballantine Books, 2007), 64. 
  13 
did not fit easily into the imagined community of citizens. Freedman notes “Historically, 
homemaking has been set in contrast to full citizenship.”28 Multiple scholars have 
commented on the unusual and uneven way women fit into concepts of natural rights 
and citizenship. In The Sexual Contract, Carole Pateman argues that, “the social contract 
included a sexual contract…that subjugated all women to all men in a fraternal 
patriarchy.”29 The king’s patriarchal control of society was replaced by men’s patriarchal 
control of women. Joan Wallach Scott argued in Only Paradoxes to Offer that once 
women (or minorities) were excluded from rights in a democracy “they had to act on 
behalf of women [in order to argue for rights] and so invoked the very difference they 
sought to deny.”30 Women’s opponents then blamed the difference women invoked for 
the lack of parity.31  
In her classic work, Feminism and Suffrage, historian Ellen Carol DuBois argues 
that woman suffrage became a primary concern of white women’s rights activist after 
the Civil War. She documents the creation of the American Equal Rights Association 
(AERA), which later split over the issue of whether or not to support the Fourteenth and 
Fifteenth Amendments as written. The AERA later became the American Woman 
Suffrage Association (AWSA), and continued to support the amendments, which 
prioritized black male suffrage. Susan B. Anthony and Elizabeth Cady Stanton broke 
                                                
 28 Freedman, No Turning Back, 130  
 29 Carole Pateman, The Sexual Contract (California: Stanford University Press, 
1988), 3-5. 
 30 Joan Wallach Scott, Only Paradoxes to Offer: French Feminists and the Rights 
of Man (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1996), x. 
 31 Pateman, The Sexual Contract, 2-3.  
  14 
away and founded their own organization, the National Woman Suffrage Association 
(NWSA) in protest of the amendments, which enfranchised black men while omitting all 
women.32 While DuBois was explicit about Susan B. Anthony’s racism in 1870s, she 
concluded that the bifurcation of the suffrage associations was a positive step as it 
created “an independent feminist movement.”33 Where Kraditor saw the antebellum 
period as more visionary, DuBois concluded that the women’s movement was 
constrained by its close association with antislavery activism. However, DuBois later 
recanted this argument as she came to see the formation of an independent women’s 
rights organization also as “a political defeat, with reactionary consequences for both the 
suffrage movement and the American constitutional tradition.”34 DuBois was responding 
to historians such as Bettina Aptheker who faulted both DuBois and Kraditor’s depiction 
of the movement as “essentially white.”35 Aptheker argued that in it was the early 
women’s movement’s connections with abolition that sustained its radicalism, and in 
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breaking with abolition and black rights, the women’s movement became more 
conservative and less effective.36  
Black women’s historians have added greatly to our understanding of black 
women’s activism. Scholars like Rosalyn Terborg Penn, Evelyn Brooks Higginbotham 
and Cynthia Neverdon-Morton tackled pervasive myths that suggested, “black women 
were uninterested in feminist politics and that black men opposed feminist issues.”37 
These authors analyze black women’s participation in the suffrage movement as well as 
a plethora of other movements in support of their communities including movements for 
temperance, improved education and campaigns against lynching and segregation.38 
Higginbotham contends that activist groups could be both conservative in embracing the 
dominant culture while remaining radical in their declaration of rights. She writes that 
the Women’s Convention, an auxiliary to the National Baptist Convention, “combined 
both a conservative and radical impulse” and that their activism “challenges the 
historical validity of the accommodation versus protest dichotomy.”39  
 Scholarship on black woman suffrage has shown “how black women’s 
engagement was much broader than their support of suffrage and included campaigns 
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against lynching, segregation, and racialized forms of gender discrimination, along with 
activities in support of temperance, better education, and increased employment 
opportunities.”40 Patricia Bernstein analyzes the National Association for the 
Advancement of Colored People’s coordinated campaign against mob violence after the 
infamous 1916 lynching of Jesse Washington in The First Waco Horror.41  W.E.B. 
DuBois asked suffragist Elisabeth Freeman to investigate the lynching in Waco, Texas 
during her suffrage speaking tour, and the publication of Freeman’s detailed account 
energized the anti-lynching movement throughout the country.42  
In her landmark study, Paula Giddings agrees with Aptheker that “white 
feminists often acquiesced to racist ideology, undermining their own cause in doing 
so.”43 Rosalyn Terborg-Penn shows how black men and women “fought both racism and 
sexism simultaneously.”44 Black women worked for the vote, sometimes with the 
support of black men and black churches. Estelle Freedman notes that they did not 
expect suffrage to guarantee their equality, but they knew “that power relations always 
rested upon both race and gender hierarchies; that alliance across race and gender could 
                                                
 40 Newman, “Reflections on Aileen Kraditor’s Legacy,” 299-300; See Rosalyn 
Terborg-Penn, Angela Davis, Bettye Collier-Thomas, Elsa Barkley Brown, Evelyn 
Brooks Higginbotham, Cynthia Neverdon-Morton, Sharon Harly, Paula Giddings, and 
Adele Logan Alexander. 
 41 Patricia Bernstein, Waco Horror: The Lynching of Jesse Washington and the 
Rise of the NAACP (College Station: Texas A&M University Press, 2005).  
 42 Ibid. 
 43 Giddings, When and Where I Enter, 370-371.  
 44 Rosalyn Terborg-Penn, African American Women in the Struggle for the Vote, 
1850-1920 (Bloomington: University of Indiana Press, 1998), 35; Newman, “Reflections 
on Aileen Kraditor’s Legacy,” 300. 
  17 
challenge these hierarchies; and that dignified resistance in the face of seeming 
powerlessness could be a mighty weapon for change.”45 
Historian Darlene Clark Hine’s compelling study of black voting struggles in 
Texas, Black Victory: The Rise and Fall of the White Primary in Texas, analyzes the 
South’s most effective tool for black disfranchisement. Hine argues that when the state 
legislated the all white primary in 1923, it opened itself up to a two-decade long legal 
attack that would bring the downfall of the all white primary. However, Hine fails to 
situate non-citizen or alien voting in her analysis. For example, Hine notes that Texas 
adopted only the poll tax and the all white primary to limit black voting, while other 
southern states instituted “literacy tests, understanding and good character clauses, and 
complex registration laws.”46 She makes only limited suggestions as to why Texas 
refrained from implementing similar restrictions and assumes the immigrant alien vote 
was too well controlled to justify further restrictions. However, utilizing further Jim 
Crow restrictions would have restricted the legal resident alien vote, and politicians 
whose power rested on that voting bloc fought to keep them enfranchised. Once the 
power of those politicians waned, their opponents eliminated alien suffrage as a further 
restriction on voting.  
Suffragism in the South has received particular attention in the historiography. 
Spruill points out that Kraditor initiated this debate by maintaining that southern 
suffragists primarily relied on the argument that “the enfranchisement of women would 
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insure the permanency of white supremacy in the South.”47 Anne Firor Scott maintains 
that such arguments were not the bulk of white southern suffragists’ ideology. Anne 
Scott’s foundational work The Southern Lady analyzed antebellum and Progressive-era 
white women and their activity in missionary work, the Women’s Christian Temperance 
Union (WCTU), the Consumer League, and even interracial cooperation. Scott 
concludes that women’s participation in reform movements produced reform itself by 
moving women outside the private sphere. Scott further detailed women’s efforts to 
shape their society in Natural Allies. She argues that the presumption that women were 
naturally responsible for the welfare of the community shaped their voluntary 
associations and helps explain the continuity across generations of female reformers.48   
 In her assessment of Progressive-era Galveston, Elizabeth Hayes Turner argues 
that “elitism more than evangelicalism drove the southern women’s reform movement, 
especially in such secular reforms as the equal suffrage movement.”49 Turner maintains 
that women created spaces of their own within male dominated institutions like churches 
and government. She documents women volunteering in their churches, joining 
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women’s clubs and civic associations and finally moving into suffrage activism.50 Judith 
McArthur and Harold Smith’s biography of Minnie Fisher Cunningham reveals the way 
white suffragists discussed their achievements, protecting their allies and themselves by 
playing into stereotypical gender roles. This facade disguised their activism and their 
responsibility for achieving primary woman suffrage and the ratification of the federal 
amendment. Because of its biographical focus, McArthur and Smith also analyze the 
effects of progressivism and woman suffrage on politics well after the Susan B. Anthony 
Amendment was ratified in 1920.51  
 Jessica Wranosky situates Texas inside the national woman suffrage movement. 
She argues that Texas was crucial to national success, that the National American 
Woman Suffrage Association (NAWSA) saw the state as the doorway into the South, 
and that the South was part of Carrie Chapman Catt’s “Winning Plan.”52 Building on 
arguments made by Melanie Gustafson, Rebecca Edwards, Elizabeth Varon and Paula 
Baker, which show women’s “deep partisan sympathies, loyalties, and even influence” 
before they had the vote, Wranosky shows how Texas women participated in and altered 
state politics.53 Wranosky further argues, in line with Terborg-Penn and Gilmore, that 
Black women hesitated to participate in suffrage activity for fear it would endanger 
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themselves and their communities, but where middle class communities existed so did 
suffrage activism.  
Elna C. Green focused on the twentieth century movement in the South and 
argued that it came about much the same way the movement came about in the North, 
but that it failed where substantial black populations were present.54 While their numbers 
were relatively small, black and brown women’s actions could appear very large within 
a culture predicated on white supremacy. Black populations in antisuffrage southern 
states did not always differ greatly from those in southern suffrage states suggesting that 
the size of minority racial populations was only one factor among many concerning the 
success of woman suffrage in the South.55 When black women formed The Galveston 
Negro Women’s Voter’s League and the Colored Welfare League of Austin, proceeded 
to register as primary voters in 1918, and sued those election officials who refused them, 
they were challenging white supremacy, even if other voting restrictions like the all 
white primary severely limited that challenge.56 
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Merline Pitre calls for “equal consideration of the complex role of black women 
in the challenge to white supremacist politics at the state and national levels.”57 She 
suggests that gender roles may have led black men and women to seek the ballot for 
different reasons, and that black women’s motivations have largely been overlooked. 
She concludes that we still know very little about black Texas activists like “Lulu B. 
White, Christia Adair, Ora Lee Terry, Irma Leroy, Hazel Young and Thelma Bryant.”58 
Suzanne Lebsock argues that it was often antisuffragists in the South that made white 
supremacy a major issue debated during suffrage campaigns. According to Lebsock, 
white suffragists believed that the antis’ assertions that woman suffrage would increase 
black voting and undermine white supremacy was nonsense, and suffragists did not 
respond to the argument until very late in the movement.59 
In between Kraditor and Wheeler’s assertion of the importance of white 
supremacy in the southern suffrage movement and Green, Scott, and Lebsock’s 
argument that white supremacy was not causative or central to the movement, Glenda 
Gilmore takes a middle position. Gilmore argues that white suffragists in North Carolina 
downplayed racial concerns believing that engaging in the debate would link woman 
suffrage to black suffrage leading to the defeat of the movement. However, Gilmore 
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further contends that this tactic did not mean that white suffragists rejected white 
supremacist ideology or that race was unimportant in their campaigns. Gilmore analyzes 
black women’s efforts to assert their voting rights and white suffragists’ response to 
those claims. Gilmore further argues that “By their presence at the polls, black women 
dared whites to use violence and won the dare.”60  
Newman concludes that the historiography has established two larger points:  
…first, that racism, or a belief in white supremacy, was common among white 
 southern suffragists but not determinative of whether they were willing to work 
 with local Black groups or individual Black women (it might also be observed 
 that the willingness of white women to work with local black groups, albeit 
 uncommon, was not necessarily indicative of enlightened racial views); and 
 second, that the vast majority of southern white women supported segregation 
 and did not believe that woman suffrage would endanger those social 
 arrangements.61 
  
Further work on suffrage has analyzed changing meanings of citizenship over time and 
across different communities. Elsa Barkley Brown argues that while white suffragists 
understood citizenship as an individual right, black women understood citizenship as 
emanating from the community.62 Newman concludes “the historiography of suffrage in 
the South remains vibrant and productive, by enlarging its focus from the franchise to 
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citizenship and by incorporating insights from the history of African American women’s 
political engagements.”63  
An analysis of woman suffrage in the State of Texas will add to the growing 
historiography of woman suffrage in the South. However, historians of Texas have long 
debated whether or not Texas qualifies as being truly southern. Some historians have 
argued that Texas was southern; some that it was western, and some simply say it was 
exceptional. Trying to move past this argument, in Beyond Texas Through Time Walter 
Buenger and Arnoldo De Leon argue that historians “should consider the state as a 
component of a larger enterprise, a component that fits into the nation and into the world 
in different ways at different times.”64  
There is a similar prevailing argument about defining Texas as southern or not in 
the historiography of woman suffrage. While glossing over most of the South, Eleanor 
Flexner writes: “Texas obviously could not be considered part of the Solid South since it 
had given its women the primary vote in March 1918 and the presidential vote in May 
1919; it was the ninth, and the first southern, state to ratify.”65 However, the amendment 
to grant presidential suffrage to women in 1919 was defeated at a public referendum, and 
the success or failure of one bill is not enough to designate whether a state is southern or 
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not.66 Rosalyn Terborg-Penn characterizes Texas as a western state, and also incorrectly 
asserts that Texas granted full suffrage to women in 1917.67 Suffrage historian A. 
Elizabeth Taylor assumes that because Texas eventually ratified the Nineteenth 
Amendment, race must not have played as large a role in the state as it did in other 
southern states.68 No single suffrage victory is sufficient evidence that a state belonged 
or did not belong to a particular region of the country.  
Elna Green contends that Texas (and the three other southern states that ratified 
the Nineteenth Amendment) not being “completely ‘southern’… is an insufficient 
answer” to explain the limited successes woman suffrage achieved in these states.69 
Buenger argues that in Texas, a “more open political arena characterized by three or 
more factions that combined in numerous ways offered women opportunities lacking in 
other southern states.” Buenger identified the three factions as reformers, conservatives, 
and rural insurgents who voted against policies aimed at forcing middle class morality 
upon them or limiting their economic freedoms.70 Placing the state within the larger 
context of the United States, at the borderlands between systems of discrimination, 
which targeted African Americans in the South and Mexican immigrants and Mexican 
                                                
 66 A. Elizabeth Taylor, “The Woman Suffrage Movement in Texas,” in Citizens 
at Last: The Woman Suffrage Movement in Texas (Austin: Ellen C. Temple, 1987), 46. 
 67 Rosalyn Terborg-Penn, African American Women in the Struggle for the Vote, 
1850-1920 (Bloomington & Indianapolis: Indiana University Press: 1998), 146-148. 
 68 A. Elizabeth Taylor, “WOMAN SUFFRAGE,” Handbook of Texas Online 
(http://www.tshaonline.org/handbook/online/articles/viw01), accessed October 5, 2012.   
 69 Green, Southern Strategies, 179. 
 70 Walter Buenger, The Path to a Modern South: Northeast Texas Between 
Reconstruction and the Great Depression (Austin: University of Texas Press, 2001), 
255.  
  25 
Americans in the Southwest, and as part of a transnational women’s movement is far 
more revealing than labeling it as something other than southern due to a successful 
suffrage movement.  
Additionally, historical figures in Texas and in the larger United States during the 
Progressive Era considered Texas and Texans to be southern. NAWSA’s strategically 
sought to use Texas as a doorway to the South as Wranosky argues.71 Cunningham even 
reluctantly accepted the position of second vice president in the national League of 
Women Voters, because without her, the board would not have had a single southern 
member.72 Her credentials in the organization were as a southern suffragist from a 
southern state that successfully ratified the Susan B. Anthony Amendment. Neither 
suffragists nor Texas politicians considered being southern and supporting woman 
suffrage to be mutually exclusive. Neither should historians who analyze the movement 
and the reasons for its success in the four southern states that ratified the Nineteenth 
Amendment.  
 The historiography of suffrage in the western United States has focused on why 
those states were successful so early in securing suffrage. Kraditor attributes their 
success to the Turnerian thesis that conquering the frontier made the West more 
committed to freedom and therefore more receptive to woman suffrage. Alan Grimes 
argues that it was actually Anglo concerns about immigrants and the desire to double the 
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white voting population that led to woman suffrage in the West.73 Rebecca Mead and 
Allison Sneider focus on suffragists’ successful organizing in western states, their ability 
to use a viable three-party system to their advantage, and their ability to connect woman 
suffrage to American expansion and imperialism. Like historians of white suffragists in 
the South, Mead argues that white suffragists in the West avoided discussion of race 
while reminding white men of white women’s importance in maintaining settlement and 
white supremacy. Newman emphasizes the difficulty of winning woman suffrage 
through a referendum process and notes that early victories were won by simply 
legislative majorities.74  
 The link between Mormon women and suffrage in Utah also appears throughout 
the historiography of woman suffrage in the West. Women in Utah initially received 
suffrage when Utah was still a territory in 1870. The “longest-running woman suffrage 
publication in the nation,” the Woman’s Exponent, was “published by Mormon women 
in Salt Lake City for forty-two years.”75 The paper was an important tool for Mormon 
suffragists as “proposal to punish polygamy through disfranchisement gained strength 
and eventually passed the U.S. Congress.”76 Congress passed the Edmunds Act in 1882, 
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which enacted anti-polygamy sanctions including disfranchisement. In 1887, Congress 
passed the Edmunds-Tucker Act, which disfranchised all Mormons, male or female.77 
After the Mormon Church officially rejected polygamy in the Woodruff Manifesto of 
1890, Mormon men were refranchised, but not Mormon women.  
 Utah suffragists led an organized campaign to include votes for women in the 
first state constitution, under the advice of Susan B. Anthony. The issue of Mormonism 
had further divided the suffrage movement as both national suffrage organizations 
disapproved of Mormonism, but the AWSA did so at all costs, and the NWSA rejected 
disfranchisement as a punishment for polygamy.78 After two weeks of lobbying for 
suffrage during the state constitutional convention, Utah women were successful and 
Utah entered the Union as the third full suffrage state in 1896.79 The connection between 
Mormonism and woman suffrage was used by anti-suffragists in their arguments against 
votes for women. Occasionally, legislators who considered Mormons to be their political 
enemies resisted woman suffrage as a way of limiting the opposition’s power. In Idaho, 
the legislature abandoned a discussion of woman suffrage for fear it would “fortify the 
power of Mormon Democrats.”80 
 A more recent turn in suffrage scholarship focuses on “suffragists’ international 
organizing, cross-border travel, and imperial commitments… [and] has made visible the 
connections between struggles for women’s rights within U.S. borders and at the 
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margins of U.S. territory including Puerto Rico, the U.S. Virgin Islands, and the 
Philippines.”81 This turn in to an international perspective is also rooted in the transition 
from focusing on the franchise to focusing on citizenship within the historiography. 
Sneider argues: “As U.S. suffragists learned early on, with the passage of the 14th (1868) 
and 15th Amendments (1870), which together created a newly national definition of 
citizenship, and protected a U.S. citizen’s right to vote, suffrage was a national right, 
linked to national citizenship, and rooted in the particular history and geography of the 
nation state.”82 It should be noted however, that women were not fully included in this 
national citizenship and that neither the 14th or 15th Amendments established or protected 
a woman’s right to vote.  
In her 1991 essay, DuBois argued that the American woman suffrage movement 
was part of a longer history of “socialist-feminism” and not a conservative middle-class 
movement. She analyzes the “global revolutionary moment” in which the Seneca Falls 
Meeting in 1848 occurred.83 Leila J. Rupp’s Worlds of Women: The Making of an 
International Women’s Movement analyzed how women’s international work 
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“reproduced the dynamics of global power relations.”84 The international perspective has 
also led to comparative studies like those in the collection Suffrage and Beyond: 
International Feminist Perspectives. The editors argued “our explanations have more 
power if we test our theories on as many cases as possible. In this regard, women’s 
suffrage offers us a rare opportunity…We may not be able to repeat historical events, but 
through comparative history we can experiment with our theories, refine them and 
improve them.”85  
The first paper in this collection encourages scholars to consider connections 
between the early success of the women’s rights movement and the history of settler 
colonial societies. This perspective alters the conversation concerning the early success 
of woman suffrage in the western United States. The authors suggest that historians 
should view this success “as a part of a larger history of colonial settlement” and that 
“unpacking the establishment of woman suffrage in the complicated racial contexts of 
colonial frontiers has much to teach us about the function of racial ideologies to the 
development of woman suffrage.”86 In examining white American suffragists’ reaction 
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to Native Americans in the West, Newman’s White Women’s Rights examines them as 
“agents of the U.S. civilizing mission broadly conceived.”87 Sneider concludes that 
Newman’s argument “encompassed more than the racial conflicts between black and 
white suffragists,” and should encourage future scholarship to do the same.88  
The international perspective has also led scholars to alter the accepted timeline 
of the woman suffrage movement in the United States. This is in part an 
acknowledgement that many national woman suffrage victories occurred after 1920. 
However, it is also an acknowledgement that many American women were not 
enfranchised in 1920. Native American women were not fully enfranchised until 1924. 
African American women were not fully enfranchised until 1965, the year the Voting 
Rights Act was passed. Rosalyn Terborg-Penn analyzes suffragism among women of 
color in the Danish West Indies who were American subjects in 1917, citizens in 1932, 
but could not vote until 1935.89 Puerto Rican women were American citizens but were 
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denied the vote until 1929, and then only when the Puerto Rican legislature acted to 
prevent the United States Congress from forcing woman suffrage upon them.90  
Mina Roces analyzes the woman suffrage movement in the Philippines through 
the 1930s and argues that the American colonial governor feared it would signal that the 
Philippines were ready for political independence.91 The history of Japanese women’s 
enfranchisement at the end of World War II and under American occupation shows that 
voting rights sometimes resulted from invasion or occupation, which southerners in the 
United States learned during Reconstruction. Sneider argues that disputes over the 
governing policies of American territorial possessions provided suffragists with an 
opening to discuss woman suffrage and citizenship. She concludes “Woman suffragists 
in colonizing countries have often benefitted from their location in the metropoles of 
empire, and that U.S. suffrage history is a part of the history of U.S. imperialism.”92 
Sneider encourages scholars to analyze the complexities of a suffrage movement “in a 
nation made up not only of states, but of territories, and not only of citizens, but of 
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territorial inhabitants.”93 In a similar vein, Linda Gordon reminds us “the very 
distinction between the domestic and the foreign in U.S. history has been an ideological 
one.”94 
 Finally the historiography of the woman suffrage movement in the United States 
has turned to analyzing what women did with the vote shortly after winning it. 
Historians Sara Alpern and Dale Baum analyzed election results after woman suffrage to 
determine that “women did not demonstrate a high degree of apathy…nor did women 
vote as carbon copies of men.”95 They continue: “Rather than the actual female vote, the 
incorrect and long-lived exaggerations of female apathy and dependency proved 
detrimental to the women’s movement.”96 Rebecca Mead challenges scholars to counter 
the generally accepted argument that woman suffrage did not drastically impact 
American politics. She argues that successes, including impressive voter registration and 
women’s successful elections to local and state offices, have been obscured “because of 
the dismissive influence of the dominant paradigm.”97 In Texas, the successful 
candidacy of Annie Webb Blanton to State Superintendent of Education in 1918 and the 
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legislative successes of the so-called “Petticoat Lobby” in the 1920s should be 
considered.98  
Kristi Anderson’s After Suffrage also examines women’s political participation in 
the 1920s. Contradicting the traditional misunderstanding that woman suffrage did not 
drastically alter politics, Anderson details “changing conceptions of women’s 
citizenship, increases in their registration and voting, revisions of party rules to 
accommodate women’s participation, and women’s election and appointment to public 
office.”99 Lorraine Schuyler argues that woman suffrage was even more important in the 
South where Jim Crow disfranchisement meant fewer votes were needed to alter the 
outcome of elections. She argues that white women’s campaigns to increase voter 
turnout in the 1920s “undermined the work of disfranchisers.”100 Schuyler concludes that 
one reason women’s political successes have gone unrecognized is that many of them 
were grounded in racism, like the support of eugenics laws. However, women also 
successfully raised the age of consent and founded women’s and children healthcare 
initiatives.101 Schuyler’s conclusion that suffrage activity undermined the Jim Crow 
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system of political control helps explain why Texas legislators moved to strengthen the 
system multiple times after 1920.  
 The successful woman suffrage movement in Texas was ultimately used to 
disfranchise Mexican immigrants and to strengthen the all white primary and the poll tax 
in order to further limit black and brown voting. Each of the changes to election laws 
between 1917 and 1923 affected black, Mexican immigrant alien, Mexican American, 
and Anglo women differently, and requires an intersectional analysis to be fully 
understood.102 As part of this intersectional approach, I consider anyone who fought for 
women’s voting rights to be a suffragist, regardless of their race, gender or participation 
in suffrage organizations. Changes to state election laws in the Progressive Era 
ultimately resulted in increased white control of politics. Chapter one begins with Texas 
Governor James Ferguson’s actions against woman suffrage at the 1916 Democratic 
National Convention and the suffragists’ revenge when they helped impeach Ferguson in 
the summer of 1917. The impeachment campaign allowed women to prove their 
potential political power to Texas politicians. Ferguson’s impeachment led to the 1918 
gubernatorial contest between Ferguson and his former running mate Governor William 
Pettus Hobby. Texas suffragists in 1917 created political conditions in which their 
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enfranchisement benefitted those politicians with the ability to grant it to them in 
1918.103  
 Chapter two covers suffragists’ successful efforts to convince the legislature and 
Governor Hobby that a primary woman suffrage bill would ensure the impeached 
Governor Ferguson would not be re-elected. I maintain that governments pass 
enfranchising legislation when it in some way benefits those already in power. President 
Wilson failed to support suffrage until it was necessary for his foreign policy mission. 
Governor Hobby did not support even primary woman suffrage until it benefitted his 
1918 re-election campaign. While social movements like the woman suffrage movement 
or the civil rights movement can create the impetus, politicians and governments do not 
enfranchise voters unless it profits the political leadership in some way.  
 Fearing Ferguson would win the governorship with a plurality of the vote when 
progressives divided over multiple candidates, and faced with the growing political 
power of Texas suffragists and clubwomen, the Texas legislature passed a law allowing 
women to register and vote in primary elections. Texan women were enfranchised to 
vote in the primaries, because it benefited those politicians already in office. Although 
the primary suffrage law avoided mentioning race, it ensured white women’s access to 
the polls but not black women’s because of the all white primary. It was passed 
alongside a primary alien suffrage law to ensure that legal resident alien women were 
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not enfranchised alongside white, citizen women. As the Texas legislature expanded 
white women’s suffrage, it acted to restrict black and brown suffrage in the state. Texan 
immigrants were legally disfranchised in the primary, because it benefitted those 
politicians already in power. When the political bosses of South Texas overwhelmingly 
supported Governor Hobby’s candidacy, the law barring alien voting was not enforced. 
Despite the legislature’s efforts to limit non-Anglo voting by passing the primary alien 
suffrage law and by requiring women to fill out their voter registration forms in their 
own hand, the changes in electoral law in 1918 resulted in a brief opening in which black 
and brown women increased their political participation.   
 Chapter three analyzes the 1918 primary election, which was dominated by the 
gubernatorial race between Ferguson and Hobby. As Texas was a one-party state, the 
Democratic primary was the election that mattered most. As TESA allowed local 
associations to adapt the campaign to meet local needs, white suffragists chose whether 
or not to work with black and brown suffragists in their communities. In some 
communities, black or brown women worked alone for their own enfranchisement. 
Black women registered to vote even though most understood they would be restricted 
from voting in the Democratic Party’s all white primary. When registrars turned them 
away, black women sued those registrars barring them access. Mexican American 
women also participated in the 1918 election. In some communities, white suffragists 
chose to reach out to African American women, Mexican women, or to both. Anglo 
women’s willingness to work with black and brown women did not necessarily reflect 
their personal support of racial equality. Often white suffragists condescended to non-
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Anglos, and warned them against selling their vote in terms they would not have used to 
address potential white female voters. By securing the re-election of Governor Hobby, 
Texas women secured the political power they had been granted, creating the conditions 
for future successes and failures.  
 Chapter four covers the 1919 state suffrage amendment campaign in which a 
statewide woman suffrage amendment, that also required citizenship as a voting 
requirement, was defeated. If it had passed, immigrant alien men would have lost the 
right to vote and citizen women would have gained it. Again, the Texas legislature 
passed a voting law that benefitted those already in power, and they did so against the 
wishes of Texas suffragists who wanted to avoid a rushed, underfunded, statewide 
campaign when they were so close to getting the Susan B. Anthony Amendment through 
Congress. TESA president Minnie Fisher Cunningham, under the guidance of National 
American Woman Suffrage Association (NAWSA) President Carrie Chapman Catt, 
chose to make alien immigrant disfranchisement, and not woman suffrage, the focal 
point of the 1919 campaign. The bill failed by 25,000 votes. This chapter demonstrates 
how the meaning of citizenship was altered during and by the First World War. Most 
significantly, citizenship defined by obligation, especially where it concerned women 
and racial minorities, increasingly gave way to citizenship defined by rights. From the 
start of World War I through the early 1920s, full citizenship was increasingly defined 
by the ability to vote. Texas suffragists were well aware of the solidifying link between 
citizenship and voting.  
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 Chapter five analyzes suffragists’ efforts to ensure that Texas ratified the Susan 
B. Anthony amendment, shortly after losing the state amendment campaign, and the 
unforeseen consequences of doing so. Texas was the first southern state to ratify. 
However, Governor Hobby called the legislature into a special session six weeks before 
the 1920 presidential election when the governor discovered that by only legally 
requiring men to pay the poll tax, the poll tax itself was unconstitutional under the Susan 
B. Anthony Amendment. Connections existed between the voting rights of different 
groups, even when the state legislature failed to realize it. Changes to one group’s rights 
impacted other groups even when this was not the intention of the legislature.  
With one-half of the legal Jim Crow election laws in jeopardy and after publicly 
lamenting the dangers of wide-open elections, the legislature passed new laws requiring 
women to pay the poll tax, ensuring its enforcement in the 1920 election.  
 The sixth chapter focuses on the state legislature’s attempts to further prevent 
non-Anglo voting in Texas between 1921 and 1923. In 1921, in their first state election 
as full voters, white women helped pass a state constitutional amendment very similar to 
the one they lost in 1919, which disfranchised all non-citizens. This amendment also 
allowed spouses to pay each other’s poll taxes, effectively making it easier for married 
white women to vote. With the addition of white women to the electorate, the 
amendment passed the public referendum. After seeing examples of black women 
registering and voting in municipal and general elections, the legislature followed the 
example of the city of Houston and moved to strengthen the all white primary in 1923 by 
legislating it, instead of allowing the Democratic party to dictate its own membership 
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requirements and restrictions. In legislating the all white primary and eliminating alien 
voting, the Texas legislature strengthened white control of politics in the state.  
 This chapter also shows how women’s votes altered electoral outcomes and 
worked against the Ku Klux Klan’s attempts to maintain political power in the early 
1920s. The wartime experience and the rise of the second Ku Klux Klan also changed 
how the rights of citizenship were protected or defended. To avoid negative press, ensure 
economic prosperity, and to live up to their own ideals, Texans worked to end vigilante 
violence and lynching, even as they worked to limit the memory of that violence.  
 As most Texans moved away from enforcing white supremacy primarily through 
violence, they instead turned to the laws and the courts to do so, but activists 
increasingly turned to the legal system to address the denial of rights as well. In seeking 
measures to further restrict the citizenship and voting rights of racial minorities after 
1920, the state created rallying points for the civil rights movements of the mid-
twentieth century. Much like universal white male suffrage and efforts to remove women 
from politics led to the first wave of suffrage activism in the nineteenth century, woman 
suffrage and efforts to completely remove racial minorities from politics led to the early 
civil rights movement in the twentieth century.  
 The legislature moved to strengthen the all white primary in 1923 by legislating 
it, instead of allowing the Democratic party to dictate its own membership requirements 
and restrictions. Legislating the all white primary proved to be its Achilles’ heel. By 
overstepping its bounds, the State of Texas opened itself to the constitutional challenge 
that eventually brought down the all white primary in 1944. With the support of black 
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Texans, the National Association for the Advancement of Colored Peoples (NAACP) 
fought the measure all the way to the Supreme Court multiple times until the Court ruled 
in Smith v Allwright in 1944 that the white primary in any form was unconstitutional.104  
After gaining the right to vote, white women continued to work for reform. 
Women in groups like the “Petticoat Lobby” worked for strict enforcement of 
prohibition laws, surveys of Texas schools and prisons, for the right for women to serve 
on juries and be police officers, and for the funding of mother-infant health programs 
and public schools.105 White women also increasingly worked in interracial alliances or 
in white organizations meant to be allies to the black community. Jessie Daniel Ames 
became the director of the Texas Council of the Commission on Interracial Cooperation 
(CIC) in 1924, and became the national director of the CIC Woman’s Committee in 
1929. In 1930, she founded the Association of Southern Women for the Prevention of 
Lynching, an all white organization that fought racial and vigilante violence.106 
Women’s continued activism and the incredibly important changes to voting rights after 
1920 reiterate the point that the suffrage movement did not end in 1920. The Anthony 
Amendment removed one impediment between women and the ballot box. However, for 
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women of color; poor women; and women the Amendment did not apply to, like those in 
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CHAPTER II  
“IT IS TIME THE MEN LEARNED WHAT A POWER THE ORGANIZED WOMEN 
OF TEXAS ARE”: TEXAS WOMEN ORGANIZE TO IMPEACH THE GOVERNOR  
 
Democrat James Edward Ferguson (1871-1944) won the governorship in 1914 
with William Pettus Hobby (1878-1964) as his lieutenant governor. State aid to rural 
schools, a weak compulsory school attendance law, and three new normal schools were 
established in Ferguson’s first term. The Texas Woman Suffrage Association changed its 
name to the Texas Equal Woman Association (TESA) in 1916, the same year its 
president, Minnie Fisher Cunningham, first battled Governor Ferguson. She led TESA in 
asking for a suffrage plank in the Texas Democratic Party’s platform. That plank was 
defeated when Senator Joseph Weldon Bailey denounced woman suffrage “as an open 
invitation to the federal government to force black voting rights on the south.”108 After 
all, if the government passed and then enforced the Susan B. Anthony Amendment, what 
would stop the enforcement of the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments?  
 Conservative politicians routinely used the specter of black voting to argue 
against woman suffrage, but black voting had been severely restricted at the turn of the 
century by the rise of the all white primary and the poll tax. Governor Ferguson finally 
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made his stance on the suffrage issue publicly known. He and Bailey wrote the platform, 
taking a states’ rights stand on suffrage and prohibition and declaring their “unalterable 
opposition” to a federal amendment for either cause.109 One supporter consoled 
Cunningham, arguing that Bailey and Ferguson’s highhanded tactics would only bring 
about votes for women and prohibition sooner.110 
That June, the Democratic National Convention (DNC) met in St. Louis and the 
National American Woman Suffrage Association (NAWSA) demonstrated for a plank, 
endorsing votes for women. Suffragists lined the street in a parade wearing white dresses 
with yellow sashes and parasols. While the convention did not accept the plank NAWSA 
advocated, they backed a weaker one encouraging states to act for suffrage. Governor 
Ferguson led the minority opposed to even such a limited endorsement of woman 
suffrage, and instead argued for a plank that would have left suffrage to the states 
without endorsing votes for women in any way. He expressed his disdain for the 
ultimately successful plank in a thundering antisuffrage speech. A Dallas newspaper 
reported: 
Suffragists in the galleries hissed Ferguson roundly when he was outspoken in 
 denouncing the ballot for women. Governor Ferguson declared it was not 
 because the minority loves women less, but that they loved her [them] more, that 
 they made the dissenting report. He declared their desire was to protect women 
 from the corruption of politics and politicians. Senator Stone replied on behalf of 
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 the majority, declaring that the Texan ‘made a man of straw and demolished 
 him.’ He insisted that the Governor misconstrued the whole situation.111 
 
Cunningham responded to Ferguson by organizing an impromptu protest. She led a 
parade in front of the convention hotel with a Texas Flag in mourning draped with strips 
of black cloth that she had cut from one of her black dresses shortly before the 
demonstration.112  
A fellow clubwoman wrote Cunningham that Ferguson’s fight only confirmed 
how hopeless the cause was in Texas. She further decried the fact that while Ferguson 
lost the plank fight at the convention, he would likely sail to reelection in Texas. In fact, 
Ferguson expected to win reelection without even making a formal campaign, opening a 
headquarters or circulating literature in support of his reelection.113 He wrote a supporter 
when he returned to Texas, “I had a great time at St. Louis and while I lost the fight on 
Woman’s Suffrage, I believe that I have a cleaner record than the other crowd.”114 In 
protest, Cunningham embarked on an automobile tour with NAWSA suffrage organizer, 
Lavinia Engle, through “wet” or anti-prohibition counties in South Texas. They stumped 
for woman suffrage and encouraged voters to oust Ferguson in the primary. Cunningham 
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wrote to one supporter, “You will have my earnest and prayerful assistance in the neck 
wringing that you propose Bailey, Ferguson, and Henry and Culberson. Mercy, let me at 
them!”115  
Texas suffragists were livid after Ferguson’s speech at the DNC, and their 
indignation made great headlines for the newspapers. “Suffragists say Ferguson Stand 
‘Cheap Politics,’” said one article, which quoted Dallas suffrage leader, Tex Armstrong, 
saying that the governor made “a laughing stock of himself” in St. Louis.116 A Dallas 
headline announced, “We Will Nail Ferguson To The Cross Declares Advocate of 
Suffrage.”117 A Galveston paper’s article titled “[Suffrage speaker] Declares Ferguson 
Starts His Funeral,” quoted Engle, “We raised a monument for Bailey, and now that 
Ferguson has started his own funeral, we will get a monument for him. And we shall not 
shed any crocodile tears, either.”118 Even with the fight from TESA, both Ferguson and 
Lieutenant Governor William Pettus Hobby were reelected in 1916 as expected. 
Cunningham wrote that TESA “had done all we humanly could to punish Mr. Ferguson 
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for his unwarranted behavior in St. Louis.” Texas suffragists never forgot nor forgave 
Ferguson’s performance at the 1916 convention.119  
The San Antonio Express called the post-primary state Democratic convention in 
August a “great battle between the Pros and Antis.”120 Cunningham secured a hearing 
before the platform committee. A supporter wrote Cunningham that the Ferguson crowd 
would dominate the convention and offered her this advice, “when you inlist [sic] in a 
war of this kind it should not be for one battle or for two battles, but for the full term of 
the war.”121 Cunningham proved to be a worthy adversary in Ferguson’s war. Knowing 
the likelihood of defeat at this juncture, she pushed forward anyhow. Her plan was to get 
a politician friendly to suffrage to write a minority report. “find a hero who [would] head 
a minority report,” noting “we aren’t beaten yet.”122 She concluded a few days later, “It 
was a very courteous and apparently successful hearing. BUT the business was then 
turned over to a small sub-committee, who failed to report Suffrage. I suppose there 
must always be a ‘first’ times before success is ours, but they had just as well give it first 
as last, because we are going to have Suffrage in Texas. That is settled!”123  
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The conservative Senator Bailey failed to support Governor Ferguson in his 
initial run for the governorship. Bailey feared Ferguson’s promised reform legislation for 
tenant farmers. However, Ferguson’s conservative stance on prohibition, woman 
suffrage and most other matters aligned with Bailey’s own ideas. Bailey and south Texas 
political bosses like James Wells and Archie Parr came to appreciate and back Ferguson. 
Ferguson’s conservative policies were crucial to maintaining conservative Democratic 
control of the state, as progressive-prohibitionists actually held majorities in the Texas 
legislature. Ferguson was able to keep reform legislation at bay with the use of his 
veto.124 Together, Ferguson and Bailey wrote the Texas Democratic party platform in 
1916. The San Antonio Express concluded, “victories won by governor and former 
senator at every state of exciting state convention.”125 The convention opposed federal 
prohibition and woman suffrage legislation. For Cunningham, the convention only 
emboldened her desire to “organize, educate and besiege, as patiently as in us lies.”126 
She did not have to be as patient as she anticipated. 
This political fight over woman suffrage played out against the backdrop of 
World War I (WWI) and heightened racial tensions. A local option campaign to ban the 
sale of liquor in Houston on August 21, 1917 was extremely heated. Prohibitionists ran 
ads warning Houstonians that WWI was bringing black troops to Houston. The 
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campaign urged voters to “Remember Brownsville. Make Harris County Dry.”127 
Progressive reformers also investigated red light districts in Houston and the police 
department’s cooperation with brothel owners or at least lax enforcement of paternalistic 
laws passed to protect the troops from vice. According to historian Estelle Freedman, 
progressive anti-prostitution campaigns in the WWI era “targeted women themselves for 
engaging in commercialized sex and for spreading venereal disease, at the expense of 
men.”128 Under increasing scrutiny to clean up their act, the Houston police targeted 
black residents to prove that they were enforcing the liquor and white zone laws, which 
outlawed prostitution or the sell of alcohol within the immediate perimeter of military 
camps or bases.129  
WWI drastically impacted Texas as it was home to more than half of the 
country’s military camps and most of its airfields as well.130 San Antonio was the site of 
a permanent cantonment for training volunteers and conscripts, while Houston, Waco 
and Fort Worth all received a temporary “tent camp” designed to train National Guard 
troops before overseas service.131 When city officials learned that black troops would be 
stationed in Houston at Camp Logan, the Chamber of Commerce sent a note of protest to 
military authorities. However, The Houston Chronicle was adamant in its support of 
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stationing black troops in the south. An editorialist for the paper argued that in failing to 
house black soldiers, Houstonians would be admitting that they were unreasonably 
discriminatory to blacks. The author also questioned how blacks would be able to meet 
their obligations to the nation if not allowed to serve.132 The unit’s officers were 
displeased with the assignment, noting “Every time we have been in Texas we have had 
trouble.”133 White citizens disapproval of black troops had turned violent in San Antonio 
in 1911 and 1916, Del Rio in 1916, and most infamously at Brownsville in August 1906. 
When it came to lynchings, Texas was always in the top three states in the 
south.134 The most infamous lynching in American history occurred in Waco, Texas in 
1916. The murder and mutilation of Jess Washington spurred the National Association 
for the Advancement of Colored Peoples (NAACP) to a national campaign against 
lynching. The NAACP had suffragist Elizabeth Freeman investigate the murder while on 
a suffrage speaking tour through Texas. The NAACP established the Committee on 
Anti-Lynching and began hiring field secretaries to infiltrate and investigate 
communities where lynchings were committed. Like Ida B. Wells decades before them, 
they found little evidence of credible rape accusations preceding lynchings. Instead they 
identified members of lynch mobs and the jailers who helped them.135  
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It did not take long for trouble to occur between whites in Houston and black 
servicemen. By mid-August, Houston police were physically assaulting men of the Third 
Battalion, and preventing them from speaking to black civilians.136 On August 23, two 
mounted Houston police officers arrested a black soldier for interfering in the arrest of a 
black woman. When Corporal Charles Baltimore asked the officers about the soldier’s 
arrest, he was hit in the head, and ran away. The officers gave chase firing three shots at 
Baltimore before apprehending him. Rumor spread through Camp Logan that Baltimore 
died of his injuries and tensions rose. Fearing mutiny, officers ordered the surrender of 
all firearms at Camp Logan. While officers collected the weapons, a soldier yelled that a 
white lynch mob was approaching. Black soldiers grabbed the weapons and ammunition 
and Sergeant Vida Henry led approximately one hundred armed soldiers toward 
downtown Houston. They killed fifteen whites, including four police officers, and 
wounded twelve others. Four black soldiers died as well. When the riot died down, 
Henry committed suicide and his men returned to camp. The Third Battalion was 
quickly evacuated to Columbus, New Mexico. One hundred and eighteen men were 
indicted for the mutiny and riot, and one hundred and ten were found guilty. Nineteen 
were hanged and sixty-three received life sentences in federal prison.137  
Historian Robert V. Haynes describes Houston as a stage city, offering enough 
economic opportunity to draw blacks in from rural areas, but not enough opportunity to 
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convince ambitious blacks to stay permanently. With the start of WWI, jobs in northern 
factories began drawing southern blacks north, creating a labor shortage in cities like 
Houston that worried business owners dependent upon their labor. The Houston 
Chamber of Commerce pressured northern businesses to refrain from recruiting blacks 
for jobs.138 A local newspaper editor at the Houston Post, George M. Bailey, argued that 
the exodus of blacks in the summer of 1917 was not because of labor agents enticing 
blacks to go north. On the contrary, he contended that black flight was due to white 
indifference to the legal and natural rights of black Houstonians. However, he 
maintained that the south still offered the best opportunities for blacks to advance 
economically as he called for progressive sanitation reform to occur within black 
neighborhoods.139 Anglo Texans, resentful of African American mobility and 
unwillingness to continue working for poor wages in the South, often turned to violence 
or intimidation to prevent black Texans from taking advantage of opportunities in the 
North. Along with increasing racial violence on the home front during WWI, violence 
increased along Texas’ southern border after the Mexican Revolution began in 1910. 
Ferguson gained support by repeatedly and publicly pressuring the federal government 
to send troops to secure the southern border with Mexico. He also sent the Texas 
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Rangers to the border, where they were well known for racial violence against Mexican 
immigrants and Mexican Americans.140  
Despite the governor’s popularity, Ferguson embroiled himself in controversy 
over the University of Texas in 1917.  He sought the removal of University of Texas 
President Robert L. Vinson and faculty members he viewed as political enemies; he tried 
to stack the Board of Regents with men loyal to himself; and he vetoed university 
appropriations when he did not get his way. Texas suffragists watched Ferguson’s battle 
with the University unfold, and they sought ways to limit his power while protecting or 
even furthering their own interests. Suffragist Elizabeth Herndon Potter even suggested 
to Will Hogg –Texas progressive Democrat and leader of the UT Ex-Student 
Association -the idea of allowing women to serve on the Board of Regents to counter 
Ferguson appointees. Hogg replied that it “might be well to back up a bill asking for 
eligibility of women on all public boards.”141 
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While the early part of the Ferguson battle played out, Cunningham continued to 
push for woman suffrage legislation in Texas. She declined to attend the emergency 
national executive council meeting of NAWSA, as she felt being present in Austin while 
the state legislature was in session was more important. When NAWSA asked each state 
president to list the measures before their legislatures Cunningham replied that they were 
“vitally interested” in four proposed measures: “1. The Citizenship Bill 2. Statewide 
Prohibition 3. Primary Suffrage 4. Presidential Suffrage.”142 The citizenship bill was an 
effort by progressive Democratic politicians to make citizenship a requirement for 
voting. In effect, it would have disfranchised immigrant aliens, who usually voted 
against prohibition and woman suffrage, making it easier for progressive legislation to 
be passed. The statewide prohibition bill would have outlawed the consumption of 
alcohol within the state of Texas. The primary suffrage bill would have allowed women 
to vote in primary elections and nominating conventions, although they still would have 
been unable to vote in general, special or presidential elections. The presidential suffrage 
bill would have allowed women to vote in any election in which presidential electors 
were decided, effectively giving women a voice in the selection of the American 
president. As the citizenship bill and statewide prohibition both required amendments to 
the state constitution, they would have had to survive public referenda in order to be 
instituted. As primary and presidential suffrage did not require constitutional 
amendments, they were much easier victories to obtain.  
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In February, Cunningham issued a circular discussing the presidential suffrage 
bill: “The Texas Equal Suffrage Association, and its friends in and out of the 
Legislature, have repeatedly asked of the Texas Legislature the submission of a 
Constitutional Amendment providing for equal suffrage. Surely a small enough thing to 
ask, -simply that the voters of this state have the opportunity to pass on our plea for 
justice!”143 She argued that no other suffrage amendment had been backed by as many 
signed petitions as this one. She also included a copy of United States President 
Woodrow Wilson’s letter in support of a similar law passed in North Dakota. However, 
efforts at presidential and primary suffrage would be delayed. TESA suffragist Helen 
Moore later argued that TESA had a majority of legislators in both houses willing to 
support the primary and presidential woman suffrage bills, but the investigation of 
Governor Ferguson, who would no doubt have vetoed the legislation, derailed the 
session: “…feeling was so intense that practically no legislation was enacted or given 
consideration.”144 
In June, Ferguson offered to allow the university to be funded on the condition 
that Vinson and another employee, embattled UT Professor Alexander Caswell Ellis, 
resign. Ellis, married to Austin suffrage leader Mary Heard Ellis, was a suffrage 
supporter himself.  Upon hearing of Ferguson’s offer, Ellis concluded, “We must have 
got his Titanic Majesty considerably uneasy…he and his henchmen have offered us two 
compromises, both of which were such that no gentleman could accept, or would 
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offer.”145 Cunningham heard rumor of the deal, but she immediately wrote Ellis advising 
against it:  
Just for a minute [your letter] gave me the ‘cold shivers,’ that remark of yours 
 about the opposition forces trying to set the University out of danger and getting 
 the dogs called off of Ferguson. Indeed it would be a crime against civilization, 
 and I am strong for not letting it happen; however, I do not think there is any 
 danger of anybody on our side being willing to stop anywhere short of 
 impeachment.146 
 
In response to Ferguson’s attacks on the university, influential ex-students 
lobbied to defend the school and investigate Ferguson.147 With Ellis’s help, Cunningham 
and clubwomen throughout the state organized the Women’s Committee for Good 
Government (WCGG) to educate Texans about the university situation and to lobby the 
state legislature to go forward with impeachment proceedings. Only some of these 
clubwomen were suffragists, but all were opposed to Ferguson’s war on the university. 
When Ellis wrote thanking her, she replied “You see it is the same ‘gang’ fighting the 
University that the Texas Suffragists have been going down in defeat before for a 
number of years …We take pleasure in doing this for the just cause and against our 
common foe…”148 Ellis later noted his colleagues’ pleasant surprise at the response of 
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Texas women: “It is time the men were learning what a power the organized women of 
Texas are.”149 
In July, Vinson sent Ellis a letter of termination, noting the Board of Regents was 
ending the employment of multiple faculty members contrary to his recommendations.150 
University supporters were furious. One wrote in response to Ellis, “Doubtless, they 
think to drive Dr. Vinson to resign, I do pray he will hold out and at least save the 
University from such a president as they and their dictator would select. Dr. Vinson’s 
greatest service to the State, just now is to hold on.”151 State suffrage leaders sprang into 
action. Cunningham sent out a circular on TESA letterhead to her membership arguing 
that “the only hope left for the University is to get the Legislature in called session 
within the next three or four weeks.”152 She asked suffragists to work to get as many 
letters as possible sent to Texas Speaker of the House Franklin Oliver Fuller, urging him 
to call a special session of the legislature to investigate Ferguson. She advised women to 
write to university regents, asking if the Department of Home Economics was singled 
out as part of a “German plot” in the midst of World War I. TESA also focused on 
reaching rural voters with circulars, challenging Ferguson among the struggling farmers 
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who were some of his most ardent supporters.153 The Temple Mirror ran an article 
entitled “Enemies of Governor Ferguson conspire to ruin him,” and argued “After a 
three years unsuccessful effort to rule him they form an unscrupulous league to steal his 
official robes and defame his character.”154 
On July 23, Speaker Fuller called a special session of the legislature to convene 
August 1, although only the governor had the legal authority to call a session. With 
legislators opposed to Ferguson gathering in Austin, the governor issued his own call for 
a special session, hoping to rally his supporters to block the impeachment effort. 
Ironically, his call made the session legal. Cunningham wrote Speaker Fuller thanking 
him and offering the support of TESA, “We feel that if Texas has a re-generation, it will 
be due more than a little to your fearless courage in this hour of need, and we want you 
to know that we are with you.”155 When newspapers reported which local legislators did 
not plan to attend the called session, Cunningham wrote them personally to beg that they 
get to Austin and help in the fight against Ferguson. Cunningham also urged local 
suffragists to convince their representatives to attend. She asked one woman to gather as 
many other Methodist women as possible and go and ask their representative as a fellow 
Christian to get himself to Austin. She asked the women not to use Cunningham’s name, 
but to present as individuals representing their own interests. She also urged them to act 
quickly as TESA was concerned that not enough legislators would attend the session to 
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meet a quorum. Cunningham’s specific tactics depended on the representatives. 
Sometimes she appealed to a legislator’s religious piety. Sometimes she advised women 
to present the session as a war measure, arguing that a corrupt governor would contribute 
to an ineffective war effort.156 
After some confusion over whether they were responding to the Speaker’s or the 
Governor’s call for a special session, the legislature convened and on August 6th began 
investigating thirteen charges against Ferguson presented by Speaker Fuller. The House 
hired M.M. Crane as its counsel. Ellis described the scene:  
The excitement here before the opening of the Legislature was something fierce. 
 The Saturday before the Governor was threatening to prevent the House 
 assembling by putting rangers around the Capitol. If he had done that there 
 would have been some old fashioned Texas gun work. However, the Governor 
 saw that he was beat to a frazzle, and came off his high horse in great 
 shape...What will happen no one can foretell. It looks as if he will have to stand 
 trial at least.157 
  
 Cunningham issued circulars during the investigation urging continued letter-
writing campaigns, “systemize your work for the impeachment of the Governor by 
arranging that no day shall pass without [your representative] getting ten letters from 
home on this subject, expressing the sincere belief of the women in his integrity, and 
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beseeching him to stand fast for ridding Texas of the menace of this man.”158 She again 
cautioned the women to not publicize the campaign. The letters would prove more 
persuasive if they appeared spontaneous.  
Ferguson eventually took the stand in his own defense against twenty-one articles 
of impeachment most of which were various charges of misappropriation of public 
funds. Other charges included inappropriately using public money for himself and his 
family, violating the state’s bank laws, owing $170,000 to Temple State Bank, and 
taking multiple mortgages on the same property.159 Ferguson testified that he had paid 
his debt to the Temple State Bank after appealing to friends who helped raise the 
necessary $156,000. On cross-examination, Crane asked Ferguson who had given the 
governor the money. Ferguson refused to answer. Crane returned to the issue on August 
21, and Ferguson again refused to comment. Crane appealed to Representative E.R. 
Bryan to force Ferguson to divulge this information. Bryan sided with Crane, and the 
legislature upheld the ruling seventy to fifty-six. Still, Ferguson refused. Cunningham 
became concerned that the fifty-six votes against the ruling would be fifty-six votes 
against impeachment. She urged supporters in those representatives’ counties to lobby 
their districts’ legislators, “Is there [no] way in which you can bring pressure to bear 
upon this man to make him see the error of his ways…It is most essential that we should 
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have the vote of every man possible, as the larger it is in the House the greater the moral 
effect upon the Senate; and if the state does not get rid of this man now, no telling what 
vengeance he may be able to reek upon it.”160  
 TESA continued lobbying representatives to impeach Ferguson, while keeping a 
watchful eye on which way each representative appeared to be leaning. Hopeful 
suffragists anxiously followed the trial and TESA Secretary Edith League kept them 
informed: 
 As to things here, everyone now seems to feel comparatively easy as to how the 
 House will vote on the impeachment matter, but no one is relaxing. Men are 
 supposed to come in from the different districts to labor with their 
 representatives, and others are writing, wiring, petitioning, etc. It is currently 
 reported that the men are receiving more mail than ever before. And it has been 
 confidently believed that if the House brings articles of impeachment, the Senate 
 will convict. However, there seems to be flying rumors (that came to me last 
 evening) that the Governor has nine men strongly bound to vote for him in the 
 Senate…It will take 21 to convict. But no one really knows. So go on urging that 
 every possible pressure be brought to bear.161 
 
The House met in an evening session for final arguments and returned a bill of 
impeachment on August 22, 1917. A board of managers drew up the articles of 
impeachment, which were then presented to the Senate and Ferguson was automatically 
suspended from office. With Ferguson at least temporarily out, some of his damage to 
the University was remedied. The Senate declined to confirm two of his appointees to 
the Board of Regents and instead confirmed Hobby-appointee George Brackenridge. 
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Acting Governor Hobby also called a second special session of the legislature to move 
forward with Ferguson’s trial. Ellis concluded: 
That corrupt Governor, and the corrupt whiskey interests behind him tackled the 
 wrong men, or rather the wrong set of men. I am glad to say that the people of 
 the State came to our rescue… The new Governor has given us a decent Board of 
 Regents in place of the band of drunkards and cut-throats that we had. The 
 Legislature has re-appropriated the appropriations which the governor vetoed.162 
 
Shortly thereafter, Vinson wrote Ellis that the Board rescinded the action ending his and 
his colleagues’ employment.163 
The House again hired Crane to serve as prosecutor for the trial before the 
Senate, which began August 30. A university supporter concluded to Ellis, “It now looks 
like they have ‘Him’ where the ‘wool is short.’”164 In the Senate, Ferguson again 
testified on his own behalf, even calling upon God to strike him dead if he were lying. 
He refused to provide information about the $156,000 loan, even when the Senate voted 
23 to 7 to force his response. After frustrating efforts to make him name his financial 
backers, Ferguson delivered his defense’s closing remarks, “There isn’t a thing in the 
articles that can impeach me.”165 On September 22, 1917, the Senate convicted Ferguson 
on ten articles of impeachment. However, they still had to deliver a judgment. They 
could remove Ferguson from office or go further and bar him from ever holding public 
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office in Texas. Fearing the harsher judgment, and although he swore he would rather 
face impeachment a thousand times than resign, Ferguson submitted a letter of 
resignation before the Senate took its final vote. The Senate announced its judgment, 
removing Ferguson and disqualifying him from holding any “office of honor, trust or 
profit under the state of Texas.”166 Ferguson maintained the judgment did not apply to 
him as he had resigned instead of being convicted  
Either way, Ferguson was out of office making the fight for woman suffrage a 
little easier. The new governor previously expressed some vague support for a 
referendum for the cause. Suffragists had reason to be hopeful. Cunningham wrote to 
Potter in D.C., “Isn’t it a great day for Texas? Some time when I see you, I will give you 
the story of this summer’s work!”167 In an earlier correspondence, Cunningham summed 
up the summer’s work against Ferguson: 
The women of Texas are maintaining a headquarters here [in Austin], very 
 quietly, and conducting an education campaign designed to react upon the 
 Legislature in great many counties in the state…We distributed about one 
 hundred thousand of the dodgers [or flyers], and close one to two thousand of the 
 folders. These have been placed in the hands of interested individuals with a 
 personal letter asking them to follow instructions. You may imagine the amount 
 of work this has meant but we feel fully repaid by some of the results. Please 
 understand this is confidential information…168 
  
TESA and its membership had also spent the summer supporting the war effort 
by selling war bonds, working for food preservation, and establishing white zones 
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around military camps. They received favorable publicity in Texas newspapers for their 
war work and even thanked newspaper editors for the coverage.169 Cunningham even left 
Austin to visit Waco on anti-vice work in the middle of the impeachment proceedings, 
because she felt both the Women’s Committee for Good Government (WCGG) work to 
impeach Ferguson and the war work were both necessary for the success of suffrage. If 
woman suffrage was a prize to be earned, payment for meeting obligations to the state, 
Cunningham made sure that Texas women earned the prize. When the WCGG ran a 
balance at the end of their campaign, they donated the $947.54 to one of Cunningham’s 
causes in order to thank her for her efforts and to make up for the time she spent with 
them away from those causes.170  
Progressive Texas women had done more than just impeach a governor in 1917. 
Wranosky argues that “Because of the WCGG’s aggressive strategies and successful 
lobbying through pre-existing suffrage associations and club women’s networks and 
resources, the affair proved what many reform and Progressive Democrats believed for 
decades; Texas women could be proved political allies if given the chance.”171 Texas 
women continued to use the changing political climate and the fight between 
conservative and progressive Democrats to increase their political roles and rights in 
1918. Unknowingly, in impeaching Ferguson, suffragists helped create a 1918 political 
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contest in which the success of partial woman suffrage measures would directly benefit 
those politicians already in power with the ability to pass legislation.  
Despite being pulled in so many directions, Cunningham never stopped fighting 
for woman suffrage. That winter, Ellis wrote NAWSA that he and Cunningham planned 
to blanket the state with pro-suffrage editorials in every newspaper, so as to encourage 
Senator Culberson to support the federal suffrage amendment when it went before the 
congress. She invited Governor and Mrs. Hobby to be her guests at a suffrage banquet in 
Dallas in late October. Hobby evaded the invitation but responded, “I assure you that it 
would be a pleasure [to attend]…but that pleasure will be impossible of realization.”172 
He claimed he needed to devote himself to the stacks of bills passed by the last session 
of the legislature. 
 Suffragists continued to lobby the President of the United States Woodrow 
Wilson as well. Ellis wrote the President: 
Circumstances have changed since the last Democratic Platform was written, and 
 the will of the Democrats now unmistakably demands that political slavery cease 
 at home and abroad…We believe that justice requires and the situation demands 
 that the women of this nation be given their political rights at once by 
 Congressional action. We cannot lead in the war for democracy and be the last 
 nation to establish democracy.173 
 
The political landscape took a surprising turn back in Texas. Although 
Ferguson’s impeachment shifted power in Texas politics and within the state Democratic 
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Party from conservatives to progressives, he ignored the impeachment and verdict.174 
Ferguson announced his candidacy for governor; he ran against Hobby. This kind of 
split was dangerous for Texas Democrats. With the party split so evenly, a small faction 
could decide the victor. The party enacted voter restrictions in the 1890s and early 1900s 
to prevent threats from third party groups like Populists and limit the voting rights of 
black Texans, but this time the threat came from within the party. As Texas was a one-
party state, the Democratic primary was the election that mattered. Ferguson was now 
solidly anti-woman suffrage. Hobby’s views were less clear and certainly less public. 
The split between the two governors reflected the larger split within the Texas 
Democratic party between progressive, dry Democrats who supported prohibition and 
conservative, wet Democrats who were against it. While progressives held a slight 
majority, if they divided behind multiple candidates, Ferguson could have won with a 
plurality. Reform Democrats had to take action to ensure the unity of their supporters 
behind a single candidate, friendly to reform and strong enough to defeat Ferguson.175  
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CHAPTER III  
“WITHOUT US, IT IS FERGUSON WITH A PLURALITY”:  
THE QUID PRO QUO ARRANGEMENT FOR PRIMARY WOMAN SUFFRAGE  
 
“Thank God you belong to Texas – that benighted land of Ferguson,” wrote 
Elizabeth Herndon Potter, Texas Equal Suffrage Association (TESA) Congressional 
Correspondent in Washington D.C., expressing her faith in TESA President Minnie 
Fisher Cunningham. Cunningham fought to expand women’s political rights amidst the 
gubernatorial campaign of 1918. Governor William Pettus Hobby faced off in the 
Democratic primary against Ferguson, whom suffragists and clubwomen had helped 
impeach and remove from office in 1917. Cunningham’s solution to Ferguson’s 
candidacy was a primary woman suffrage bill that allowed women to vote only in 
nominating conventions and primary elections. The bill itself is a classic example of how 
a law appearing to be racially neutral affected women very differently depending on 
their race and citizenship status.176 The confusion surrounding the bill and its 
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implementation also point to the difficulties of adding women as voting citizens to the 
preexisting political structure.177  
In 1917, suffragists and clubwomen led letter-writing campaigns successfully 
urging the legislature to impeach Governor Ferguson. His conviction was secured when 
he repeatedly refused to name the source of a $156,500 personal loan he accepted while 
governor. Ferguson resigned before the Senate issued their verdict preventing him from 
holding any office of public trust in Texas, and he argued that it therefore did not apply 
to him. Despite this fact, suffragists and their progressive allies considered the 
Governor’s impeachment one of their great triumphs. 178  
Upon Ferguson’s removal from office, the less conservative Lieutenant Governor 
William Pettus Hobby became governor, giving hope to suffragists and progressive 
Democrats. Moderate Governor Hobby was drawn into the wet-dry split over prohibition 
within the Texas Democratic Party. While Hobby was against prohibition when he was 
Ferguson’s running mate and lieutenant governor, he came to believe that prohibition 
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was necessary as a war measure. He supported dry zones around military camps and 
many Texans, reluctant about prohibition before the war, agreed with his stance. One 
such supporter wrote the Governor, “while I have consistently voted the anti ticket for 30 
years, yet I heartily agree with you on the position you are taking.”179 Some Texans liked 
that Hobby was not closely aligned with either faction, “Hobby is not a fanatic on any 
subject, he gives careful attention to all matters coming before him, is unbiased in his 
decisions by precedent and, to my mind, absolutely believes in the people ruling.”180 
Prohibitionists were pleased when any legislation friendly to their cause was signed, 
regardless of the reasoning, though they surely wished Hobby was more firmly in their 
camp. Hobby also appeared far less hostile to woman suffrage than his predecessor, and 
Cunningham capitalized on his more neutral suffrage stance.  
Hobby occupied the gray area between solidly conservative Democrats, like 
Senator Bailey and former Governor Ferguson, and solidly progressive Democrats, like 
U.S. Senator Morris Shepherd, Will Hogg, and former Lieutenant Governor and former 
Texas Attorney General Martin Crane. Hobby and his wife had privately supported 
woman suffrage for a few years before 1918, but he did not publicly endorse it, 
preferring to remain neutral while it was still possible. While progressive Democrats had 
had a slight majority in the legislature for a few years, a conservative governor with veto 
power had restrained them. The impeachment of Governor Ferguson left Hobby to 
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decide if he would continue acting to check progressive political power or not. As 
Hobby became more closely aligned with progressive Democrats, power shifted both 
inside the Democratic Party and in state politics in general.181 
Hobby and Ferguson ran against each for the Democratic gubernatorial 
nomination in 1918. As Texas was a one-party state, the Democratic primary was the 
election that mattered. Cunningham and TESA watched the campaign closely, even 
secretly subscribing to the anti-suffragist Ferguson Forum, the weekly populist 
newspaper published by Ferguson. TESA suffragist Edith League informed Potter, “We 
subscribe in the office boy’s name, but this is CONFIDENTIAL. Gives us a clew [sic] of 
what he is up to. Of course you know he is declaring for a third as Governor!! Do not 
grow alarmed.”182 
Amidst the wet-dry split within the Texas Democratic Party, Cunningham 
adhered to Carrie Chapman Catt’s “Winning Plan,” and brilliantly exploited the rift 
within the Texas Democratic Party.183 Catt instructed suffragists to exploit the 
weaknesses of one-party states to achieve partial suffrage measures. Cunningham 
pursued primary suffrage, the ability to vote in party primaries, which the legislature had 
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the power to grant without a public referendum.184 The Texas Democratic Party had 
disfranchised groups that threatened its political power at the turn of the century, but 
Cunningham urged party leaders in 1918 to instead enfranchise white women to counter 
the Ferguson threat.185  
In January 1918, shortly after Ferguson announced his candidacy, Cunningham 
wrote dry Representative Charles B. Metcalf. She argued that, “I am sure with your keen 
political perception you have seen the possibility of the split Pro vote bringing him 
[Ferguson] in again as a plurality winner.”186 If the prohibitionist vote was split between 
two or more candidates, Ferguson could win with a plurality of votes. Cunningham 
offered a solution that served her own interests well, “we believe that we ought to have 
Primary Suffrage given us by the Legislature to use in the July primaries in order to vote 
against Ferguson…Please, Mr. Metcalfe, if you are in a position to advise Mr. Hobby, 
advise him, for his own sake, to submit our bill to the special session. A large number of 
new and grateful voters would be his salvation, I should think!”187 Texas women had 
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proven their worth as political allies in the 1917 campaign to impeach Governor 
Ferguson. Now Cunningham was asking for real political power in the form of primary 
suffrage as a means to continue advancing the cause of progressive Democrats in 
Texas.188 
Cunningham again wrote Metcalfe in February. Judge Ocie Speer of Fort Worth 
had drafted the primary woman suffrage bill in 1917, but Cunningham was unable to 
prioritize it, as the legislature was occupied with the impeachment proceedings. In the 
meantime, Arkansas suffragists had inquired about the bill, and Cunningham sent them a 
copy of Speer’s draft of the bill. The bill passed and withstood court challenges in 
Arkansas, a point Cunningham emphasized to assure Metcalfe that the bill was 
constitutional. She informed him that TESA’s board had resolved to put all their power 
behind Hobby, should he submit the bill, as a special session of the congress could only 
address matters brought before it by the governor. She further noted that all of the 
candidates, except Ferguson, were pro-suffrage, and if Hobby would not support the bill, 
the suffragists would not support him. This was a quid pro quo agreement, primary 
suffrage in exchange for votes. It was also a secret agreement. Cunningham wrote, “you 
will appreciate the extremely confidential nature of this information… our intention is to 
take no affirmative stand for any candidate, since all are suffragists, unless Mr. Hobby 
will help us through the Legislature.”189 Cunningham forcefully concluded with a 
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warning for Metcalfe, “Without us, it is Ferguson with a plurality, and the Legislature 
had better arrange for majority nominations!”190 
TESA did not rely solely on Metcalfe to seal the deal. Cunningham personally 
visited Hobby in addition to urging supporters to write him: 
We called on Mr. Hobby in Austin, and told him greatly but firmly withal, that 
 we want that Primary Suffrage Bill submitted to the Special Session of the 
 Legislature, and we would like it with a strong recommendation for passage from 
 him. He is considering it. We found him somewhat exercised over Mr. 
 Ferguson’s activity, and we left him more so. We had nothing cheerful to tell him 
 along that line… Would you please, Mr. Finty, write and suggest to Governor 
 Hobby that a large number of new voters created by him would naturally be 
 grateful to their creator and might be beneficial to his campaign, - or words to 
 that effect? Of course, if you will, without reference to my having asked.191 
 
Cunningham began working to organize against Ferguson; subtly showing 
Metcalfe how useful her resources could be in a tough campaign. She requested, and 
Metcalfe supplied, a copy of the impeachment proceedings, which TESA used in anti-
Ferguson ads and speeches. Metcalfe remained concerned that the women of Texas 
would not turn out to vote if given the opportunity. He stressed the importance of TESA 
organizing women in urban areas. He concluded, “I hope this to be vindicated in my 
statements that they [Texas women] will vote and for the right men.” Cunningham 
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provided Metcalfe with TESA records of each legislator’s stance on woman suffrage – 
supportive, opposed, or undecided. Metcalfe began lining up votes in the legislature to 
get the bill through.192  
Hobby issued a proclamation calling the legislature into special session on 
February 26, 1918. In special session, the legislature was limited to only the business the 
Governor placed before it, and Hobby did not immediately place voting rights before the 
session. Instead he asked for laws establishing a ten mile white zone around military 
camps prohibiting the sale of alcohol, other wartime measures regulating military bases, 
and drought relief for Texans suffering from crop failures. Hobby’s call to the legislature 
concluded that they should also “consider and act upon such matters of vital importance 
as may be presented by the Governor.”193 Still reluctant to put a primary woman suffrage 
law before the legislature, Hobby left the option to do so on the table.   
To convince the legislature and Governor Hobby to support the primary suffrage 
bill, Cunningham used the same tactics that encouraged the legislature to impeach 
Governor Ferguson in 1917. She instructed local suffragists to personally interview 
newly elected officials and get them on the record for woman suffrage before the special 
session. The women were pleasantly surprised when newly elected representatives 
pledged their support for woman suffrage, particularly when they replaced anti-suffrage 
representatives. Cunningham urged individual suffragists active on the local level to 
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begin letter-writing campaigns to members of the legislature assuring them of their 
constituents’ support for the primary suffrage bill. She wrote Mrs. Wallace L. Wade in 
Bastrop County to “muster your Suffrage forces in Elgin and appoint each member a 
committee of one to see that as many letters as possible come forward promptly, and in 
unceasing numbers…” Cunningham assured a Collin County suffragist, “The bill will go 
thru with the proper demand from ‘home.’”194 
Due to a poorly worded clause in the original Texas Constitution meant to 
prevent out-of-state servicemen from gaining residency and qualifying to vote in Texas 
based on their service, Texas servicemen were disfranchised for the length of their 
enlistment.195 However, alien immigrants could vote after filing their intention, or “first 
papers,” to become citizens and Texas had sizeable Mexican and German immigrant 
communities.196 In South Texas, non-citizen immigrant voting supported a system of 
boss rule, which Historian Evan Anders describes as a “semifeudalistic system” in which 
Mexican-Americans or Mexican immigrants were given some paternalistic care in 
exchange for control of their social and political lives.197 In exchange for services 
including political favors the bosses provided to powerful ranchers, the ranchers 
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delivered the votes of their workers. The majority of these voters were economically 
dependent on ranchers and bosses. 
Cunningham used non-citizen immigrant voting and the disfranchisement of 
World War I servicemen in Texas to motivate her letter writers, urging women to “take 
into consideration the threatening menace of the enemy alien vote and the 
disfranchisement of our men who have answered the call of the colors.”198 She 
encouraged another suffragist to write letters for the bill “to help win the vote of the 
women in the July Primaries and with it the power to protect our disfranchised Texas 
men in the service of our country…”199 The letter-writing campaign was successful with 
the legislature, but Hobby required further persuasion.  
Hobby informed Cunningham that he would only ask for a bill if a majority of 
legislators in both state houses pledged their support. The suffragists gathered signatures 
of legislators, many of whom had been targets of the letter-writing campaign. In 
response, Hobby submitted a requirement for majority nominations to the legislature, 
which opened the subject of election laws to the special session of the legislature. If 
multiple candidates ran in the primary, and no candidate received a majority of the vote, 
the majority nominations law would force the two highest vote getters into a run-off 
primary. The winner of the run-off primary would then be the Democratic candidate in 
the general election. The change was intended to prevent Ferguson from winning the 
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gubernatorial race with a plurality, if multiple progressive candidates split the reform 
vote allowing Ferguson to lead the pack in the initial primary.  
Representative Thomason of El Paso submitted H.B. No. 104, which restricted 
the assistance that could be offered a voter preparing his ballot. The Thomason law, as it 
was called, aimed at preventing English speakers from marking the ballots of non-
English speaking voters, usually Mexican or German immigrants. It was one of the 
Progressive reforms aimed at cleaning up elections by restricting what they saw as 
corruptible voters.200 Metcalfe led a group of legislators in submitting H.B. No. 105 
entitled “an act to provide that women may vote in all primary elections and nominating 
conventions in Texas; prescribing qualifications for such voters; providing for 
registration in cities of 10,000 and over, and declaring an emergency.”201 It was referred 
to the Committee on Privileges, Suffrage and Elections who returned it back to the 
House with the recommendation that it pass. Metcalfe motioned for and got a special 
order set for the bill. 202  
 To further pressure the legislature and the governor, NAWSA suffragist Potter 
was tasked with getting a letter from President Wilson to Hobby endorsing the bill. 
Potter explained the situation in Texas, emphasizing her and Wilson’s shared prejudices: 
 Our impeached governor, who has followers and money, is in Austin attempting 
 to control the state through a compact of the brewery and alien vote. Every sixth 
                                                
 200 General Laws of Texas, Acts 1918, 35th Legislature, Fourth Called Session, 
Ch 30, 54-55. 
 201 Journal of the House of Representatives of the Fourth Called Session of the 
Thirty-Fifth Legislature [of the State of Texas], 273, 297. 
 202 McArthur & Smith, Minnie Fisher Cunningham, 62; Wranosky, Southern 
Promises, 202. 
  77 
 man in Texas is an alien, and votes on ‘first papers,’ Being white, he votes in the 
 Democratic primaries, and is a greater menace than the negro, who has no part in 
 the choice of candidates…the addition to the electorate of Texas of a body of 
 patriotic homogenous women is the best way to save a bad situation.”203 
 
The usually unabashedly racist Potter wrote Cunningham about the campaign for the 
bill, “See that no emphasis is laid on ‘white supremacy’ or that white Democratic 
women only will get a vote. It seems that two or three Repub senators are very touchy 
over the way the South disfranchises the colored man through its primary system.”204 
NAWSA had long feared a suffrage campaign on the state level that could hurt the 
chances of the federal amendment. Undue attention to the all-white primary in Texas 
could sway Republican congressmen in states outside the south to vote against the 
federal suffrage amendment. Suffragists strategically deployed (and refrained from 
deploying) racial arguments when it best suited their cause.  
 Potter received the endorsement from President Wilson, but there was something 
amiss. The letter contained the phrase “to the states,” which could have raised a states’ 
rights debate, delaying instead of helping the bill. Potter returned the letter to the 
President requesting he alter the wording, and anxiously waited the weekend for his 
reply. With the new letter in hand, she wrote Cunningham:  
I have furnished the little special Texas job of getting the ‘favorable expression 
 from the President.’ It made me very nervous to give back the first letter! And 
 ask Mr. President to please revise it so it didn’t sound so states-rightsey –but this 
 is a secret you must keep. I nearly died for fear the press or other great affairs of 
 the president which must take precedence would make the letter come too late to 
 do you any good.205   
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The letter from Wilson to Hobby was read into the record of the Texas legislature on 
March 14, 1918. 
The primary woman suffrage bill was debated on Friday, March 15, 1918. The 
bill exempted women from paying the 1917-1918 poll tax in order to vote in the 1918 
primary election. On the bill’s second reading, Mr. Osborne, a supporter, led a group 
including Metcalfe in amending the bill so that the county tax collector would not have 
to furnish any political party or election officials certified lists of women voters, unless 
they were in cities with populations exceeding 10,000 people. The amendment passed. 
Representative José Tomás Canales, a maverick legislator from south Texas and a 
suffrage supporter, moved to amend it to add “Provided, however, that none but native 
born American citizens be allowed to vote under the provisions of this act.”206 His 
suggestion was rejected. It would not only have required women to be citizens, but 
natural-born citizens, in order to vote in the primary election. It would have been very 
unusual to make a distinction between the voting rights of naturalized and native 
citizens.207 
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Representative Bledsoe called the House to maintain “a quorum pending 
consideration of House bill No. 105.” His call was seconded and Speaker Fuller ordered 
the entrances locked. No member of the House could leave without his written 
permission. Representative O’Brien, fighting against the bill, tried to amend it to have 
the enacting clause of the legislation struck. His amendment was voted down. After 
casting his vote to strike the enacting clause, Representative Monday moved to amend 
the bill so that “There shall be prepared and used a separate booth each for negro women 
and white women.”208 The Democratic Party ran an all-white primary, preventing most 
black voters from voting on its nominees. Rep. Monday was likely raising the issue of 
black voting in hopes that it would persuade his fellow legislators that woman suffrage 
would lead to increased black suffrage. His amendment was defeated. The final version 
of House bill No. 105 passed the House 84 to 34. On March 21, 1918, the Senate 
reported to Speaker Fuller that they had passed the primary woman suffrage bill, 
eighteen to four, but with amendments. Metcalfe succeeded in getting the House to pass 
the senate amendments.209  
The night before Hobby signed the bill into law, he wrote a telling letter to his 
father-in-law, conservative Democrat Judge Samuel Bronson Cooper. Hobby explained 
the expediency of signing the measure, arguing that it would have been politically 
unwise to go against it. He said he had been “in favor of woman suffrage for several 
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years because I have considered it an inevitable development.”210 Historian Jessica 
Wranosky argues that the letter is proof that the pressure of anti-suffrage sentiment was 
getting to Hobby, but that he recognized vetoing the bill, and going so publicly on record 
against woman suffrage, was political suicide. With Hobby’s signature on March 26, 
1918, Texas women could participate in all primary elections and nominating 
conventions.211  
 The primary suffrage bill appealed to progressive or Texas Democrats or 
reformers for many reasons. It was strategically useful for them. They believed that 
young men would vote for progressive candidates and policies, but Texas men were 
volunteering or being drafted into military service for World War I and were 
disfranchised for the length of their enlistment. The women’s vote could help replace the 
soldiers’ vote in the primary, and since Texas was a one-party state, the primary election 
was the election that effectively decided who would hold office. Progressive Democrats 
also wanted to break the hold of boss rule in South Texas, where political bosses like Jim 
Wells retained political power through the controlled bloc votes of Mexican immigrants 
and Mexican Americans.  
 Progressive Democrats wanted to eliminate non-citizen voting to reduce the 
power base of the South Texas bosses, but they had lacked the votes to overcome a 
conservative governor’s veto or the votes needed at a public referendum. Allowing 
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primary woman suffrage tested how women would vote and in what numbers, while also 
countering the votes of Mexican and German immigrants, who tended to vote against 
prohibition and woman suffrage. If it worked, a more progressive governor would hold 
the veto pen and progressive Democrats’ simple majorities in the legislature would be 
enough to pass some reform legislation.212  
Additionally, even without further legislation restricting non-citizen voting, 
immigrant voting would not substantially increase under the primary woman suffrage 
law. Non-citizen immigrants had to file their intention to become citizens in order to 
legally vote. Since married women’s citizenship status was entirely dependent upon their 
husbands, they were not legally allowed to initiate their own naturalization. If they 
wanted to become citizens, their husbands had to apply for naturalization and complete 
the process. Women naturalized by marriage were not issued certificates of citizenship. 
These women were expected to produce their husband’s naturalization papers and a copy 
of their marriage license should they need to prove their citizenship.  
Historian Candice Lewis Bredbenner calls this “the government’s reminder to 
her that a marriage certificate was the only document supporting her claim to U.S. 
citizenship.”213 Boss rule relied on Mexican immigrant men to file their intention to 
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become citizens in order to vote, but did not actually encourage or support them going 
through the naturalization process. Thus, their wives were left in limbo. They remained 
non-citizen immigrants, but without the political rights their “first-paper” husbands 
enjoyed. Immigrant married women would not be enfranchised by the primary woman 
suffrage law. Only single immigrant women of voting age who filed their intention to 
become citizens would be enfranchised, and there were very few women who met these 
conditions.   
Not only did the primary woman suffrage law lessen the impact of immigrant 
voting by offsetting those votes; it gave politicians ideas about how to restrict immigrant 
voting without having to amend the state constitution. If primary suffrage legislation 
could enfranchise a group without the right to vote in general elections, it could similarly 
disfranchise a group that had the right to vote in general elections. In March 1918, the 
legislature actually passed two primary suffrage bills. The primary woman suffrage bill 
enfranchised women in primary elections and nominating conventions; the primary alien 
suffrage law disfranchised legal resident alien immigrants in primary elections and 
nominating conventions. The legislature could not disfranchise immigrant aliens in 
general and special elections without amending the state constitution, which required a 
two-thirds vote in both houses of the legislature and a public referendum in a special 
election. They likely knew that they did not have the votes for a constitutional 
amendment, especially since alien immigrants would be able to vote in the referendum. 
Instead, they used primary election laws as a workaround, much the way suffragists did 
to gain the vote. The primary alien suffrage law also ensured that the primary woman 
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suffrage bill did not enfranchise any female legal resident aliens. Women were partially 
enfranchised while non-citizen immigrants were partially disfranchised.214  
 The primary alien suffrage law was very specific: “This Act shall not be held or 
construed to repeal or in any way limit or restrict the right of women to vote in primary 
elections or conventions given them by any law enacted at the 4th Called Session of the 
35th Legislature.”215 The primary alien suffrage law was to work in conjunction with the 
primary woman suffrage law. Both laws were designed to add to the voting strength of 
progressive Democrats and restrict the voting power of the conservative wing of the 
party. The law also declared: “The importance of this legislation and the necessity for 
placing the right of suffrage in the hands of persons who are loyal to the United States 
and have its interest at heart, create an emergency and an imperative public 
necessity…”216 This emergency was used to suspend the rule that the bill be read on 
three separate days, and the law went into force ninety days after the legislature 
adjourned. The primary alien suffrage law restricted voters in the primaries to American 
citizens creating an entire class of non-citizen immigrant voters who could legally 
participate in general, special and presidential elections but not primary elections.217 
 Additionally, the 1918 special session passed the previously mentioned 
Thomason law, which prohibited election officials from providing aid in preparing 
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ballots for any voter unless the voter was over sixty years old, physically disabled, or 
had been a citizen at least twenty-one years. This last clause meant that election judges 
could still help illiterate American-born Anglos fill out their ballots, but were barred 
from helping illiterate immigrants in the same manner. The law essentially required 
immigrant voters to be literate.218  
 Lastly, heeding Cunningham’s warning that the 1918 primary winner could be 
Ferguson with a plurality, the legislature passed a bill requiring majority nominations. If 
no candidate won the majority vote, a run-off election would follow. The law was 
amended so that the Texas Supreme Court would determine any dispute over eligibility 
of the candidates, instead of party officials. The amendments were called the 
disqualification amendments, and they were specifically intended to keep Ferguson out 
of office. The 1918 special session was a major victory for progressive Democrats. In 
addition to the primary suffrage laws, the special session ratified the national prohibition 
amendment; passed white zone ordinances banning prostitution and liquor within ten 
miles of army bases; and enacted statewide prohibition by statute, rather than by 
constitutional amendment. If progressives were successful in reelecting Governor 
Hobby, they expected to be able to pass even more of their legislative agenda.219  
 By enfranchising women in primary elections, Democrats took advantage of the 
restrictions to black voting presented by the Democratic all-white primary. White 
women were partially enfranchised by a law that did not mention race, and yet stood 
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little chance of meaningfully enlarging the black vote. Even if black women did manage 
to participate in the 1918 primary election, the poll tax was scheduled to go into effect in 
all primary elections thereafter, and would further limit black women’s political 
participation.  
 In 1917, Kate Gordon wrote to Cunningham and all other state presidents of 
suffrage associations in the South asking permission to write their state legislature and 
get them on record “against the women of the respective states being longer held the 
political inferiors of negro men in their United States citizenship.” She continued, “I 
believe it is to be a matter of good political policy for we southern women to play 
democratic prejudices for all they are worth.”220 Cunningham responded forcefully that 
such a request would only harm the cause. She argued that primary suffrage avoided the 
question of black voting while highlighting the hypocrisy of anti-suffrage politicians. 
According to Cunningham, because of the all-white primary, primary suffrage “‘call[ed] 
the bluff’ of those who resent the negro vote;” politicians who claimed that woman 
suffrage would only enhance black voting. And it did so without raising a conversation 
about black voting, which Cunningham believed would only hurt the suffragists’ 
cause.221  
 The final version of the law was poorly written, likely due to the amendments 
added. It caused confusion among election officials, lawyers, and the women rallying to 
vote against Ferguson. The heading of the bill notes the authors’ intent to “provid[e] for 
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registration in cities of 10,000 and over.” Instead, section 2 of the law required 
registration of women in cities exceeding 10,000 people, and section 2a required 
registration of women “in a voting precinct outside a city of ten thousand inhabitants.”222  
Both groups of women were required to register in different sections of the bill and 
under different circumstances. Section 2 required urban women to register and listed the 
generic information required. Section 2a was far more detailed in its requirements. A 
rural woman “shall present herself, personally, at the office of the tax collector of the 
county in which she lives at any time not less than fifteen days prior to the holding of 
such primary election, and shall personally fill out, with her own hand, in duplicate, or 
upon a form and stub, the form of registration receipt prescribed in Section 2 of this 
bill.” Not only did this section of the law require voter registration, it required a literacy 
test.223 
 The literacy test was not required of Texas men. While men were supposed to fill 
out their ballots without assistance (unless they qualified as disabled, over sixty, or had 
been citizens at least twenty-one years) their poll tax receipts did not even require a 
signature. Conversely, under the primary woman suffrage law, registration in one’s own 
hand was required of women living outside large cities, which was more than half of the 
Texas population until after World War II.224 Wranosky notes that the Austin American 
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newspaper reported that the test was aimed to disfranchise rural black and Mexican 
American women, as progressives feared these women would vote for conservatives 
including Ferguson.225 Rural voters had less access to education, higher illiteracy rates, 
and more conservative leanings than their urban counterparts. The test would also 
adversely affect immigrant women who were less likely to be able to read or write in 
English. Cunningham disliked the de facto literacy test, but felt it would take up too 
much valuable time to challenge. She wrote Catt that the literacy test was “aimed at the 
ignorant foreign vote on the border,” and was not worth fighting with so little time left in 
the called session.226  
 Section 5 of the law noted it would take effect in 1918, but that beginning 
January 1919, “each woman voter in this State, voting and offering to vote in any 
primary election or conventions shall be required to pay the poll tax now required by law 
of each male person who desires to vote.”227 The poll tax, whether paid for participation 
in primary or general elections, acted as a financial barrier to restrict voting to those able 
to pay it. Poor Texans lacked the discretionary funds to pay it, as did tenant farmers or 
sharecroppers without access to capital. In a racist and ethnocentric economic system, 
black and Mexican workers were more likely to be disfranchised through the poll tax 
than Anglos. The primary woman suffrage law did not foresee women being able to vote 
in regular elections. Therefore, it only required women to pay the poll tax to participate 
in primary elections. If Texas women gained full suffrage, additional legislation would 
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be needed to require women to pay the poll tax before they could vote in general 
elections.228 
The Texas Attorney General’s office received multiple requests for clarification 
regarding the confusing primary suffrage law. There was particular confusion about 
which women needed to register. Should women living outside of towns of 10,000 or 
more bother registering or could they proceed to vote without having done so? The 
stated intention of the men who drafted the law and the law itself were at odds.  
On April 4th, 1918, W.B. Blalock, a tax collector in Marshall, Texas, wrote the 
Attorney General asking if he could register women before the law actually went into 
effect; if he would be permitted to fill out the registration certificate and have women 
sign them; and if “the Tax Collector be permitted to move his office to small towns in 
the County for the purpose of letting the women register?”229 The Attorney General 
replied that Blalock would have to wait until the law was in effect to register women and 
that women had to fill out the form themselves, but he did believe it appropriate to allow 
women to register throughout the county instead of only in the tax collector’s office.  
In fact, the Attorney General included in his reply a copy of his letter answering 
the same question for a county attorney: “…we held that in view of the provision of the 
law that requires the Tax Collector to meet the taxpayers in the different portions of the 
county for their convenience in paying taxes, would also authorize him to receive 
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registration of women at these times and places…”230 Adding to the confusion, however, 
the Attorney General asked Blalock and others who wrote the office, to consider the 
reply letters as personal correspondence only and not as having legal weight. The 
Attorney General’s office was not supposed to supply legal answers to anyone other than 
state officials. Advice given to local election officials had to remain personal 
correspondence. The Attorney General’s office continued to unofficially respond to 
questions about woman suffrage.231  
Attorney General Looney responded to Robert Maud, Tax Collector in the city of 
Austin, who asked whether wives of state employees should be registered in Travis 
County (Austin) or in the counties where their husbands were elected? State employees 
could not register to vote in Travis County unless they permanently resided there. The 
question became one of how to determine a married woman’s legal residence. Attorney 
General Looney referenced coverture, but noted that “the one-person idea of the 
common law no longer exists in all its strictness, but the husband is the managing head 
of the family and as such has the right to fix the domicil [sic], and the residence of the 
wife is therefore that of the husband.”232 AG Looney concluded that if the couple’s 
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residence was in Travis County, they should register there; if they only reside in Travis 
County temporarily for work, they should register in their home county.233 
Eventually, the Attorney General issued an official opinion on the woman 
suffrage law. He found section 2A requiring that rural women register unconstitutional, 
because it was contradictory with the caption or heading of the law. The headings of 
each law were supposed to summarize it, offering a brief explanation of the law’s effects 
as the legislators who drafted it envisioned. As the people drafting the law were 
supposed to write the captions, they usually matched. In this case, the law had been 
altered during the legislative process, but the caption was never changed to reflect 
modifications.234  
The Attorney General concluded “the only women required to register are those 
who reside in cities of 10,000 population and over.”235 He further opined that tax 
collectors could not move their offices around the county to register women. Despite his 
earlier unofficial advice to Blalock and Tirey, he now maintained, “all women are 
required to appear in person, and in her own handwriting fill out the blanks, in 
person…”236 Attorney General Looney also defined the days in which women could 
register as June 26 through July 11 and reiterated, “registration must occur in the office 
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of the tax collector of each county, at the court house where his office is required to be 
kept and where all of his official acts are required to be transacted…”237 He further 
concluded that if a woman was “unable to read and write the English language she can 
not register as this is a contingency not provided for in the law. She is not authorized to 
delegate to another authority to fill out the necessary blanks.”238 
Adding to the legal confusion of the 1918 election, the legality of Ferguson’s 
candidacy was questionable at best. Ferguson maintained that he had resigned the 
governorship before the Senate issued the sentence against him. He argued that because 
he was not governor when the sentence was handed down, it did not apply to him. 
Others disagreed. The Home and State Newspaper ran an article titled, “Ferguson is 
forever barred from public office in Texas” and printed an anti-Ferguson editorial by a 
local judge. Ferguson counted on winning along side legislative and judicial candidates 
friendly to his cause, who could then decide any challenge in his favor.239  
TESA took all of these issues into consideration when launching its 1918 
campaign. Despite the official Attorney General opinion, the Hobby Campaign, TESA, 
and even the Attorney General’s office argued that the safest option was for all women 
who intended to vote in the primary to register. The Hobby Campaign issued flyers titled 
“Attorney General Joins in Urging Women’s Registry: Letter to Tax Collectors follows 
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opinion issued by M.M. McFarland.” The Attorney General’s public letter instructed, “in 
order to be on the safe side, all women should be registered.” Voter registration and 
education drives were a major part of TESA’s 1918 campaign.240 
 As the 1918 gubernatorial campaign revved up, Ferguson publicly addressed the 
partial enfranchisement of Texas women,  
Don’t you understand me, though, that I have succumbed to the passions of the 
 hour, that I am taking any back water now, simply because the Legislature has 
 made it possible for the ladies to vote. But more than three years ago, when the 
 politicians of Texas were playing hide and seek with that great question, when 
 you could not get them to give an honest expression to the good ladies upon that 
 question, in more than four public speeches, at four different places in Texas, one 
 principally in Waco, I declared that if the women wanted to vote, let them vote; 
 that if women wanted more power you might just as well give it to her, because 
 she was going to have it any way. But I said that I wanted the women to decide 
 the question. I did not want to… lead her against her will to the ballot box… 
 Understand, when I say ‘woman’ I mean that in a democratic sense. I mean the 
 great majority of women. I do not mean these women who are running around 
 over the country making woman suffragists foot and block… I am talking, as I 
 say, in a democratic sense, about the great majority of the women, not the 
 favored few, that class of women who would rather raise trouble than to raise a 
 family.241 
 
Ferguson was a consummate politician, hiding behind the idea that he would 
support woman suffrage if women proved they wanted the vote. However, women who 
wanted and worked for the vote disqualified themselves from being the type of women 
Ferguson would grant suffrage. In contrast, the Hobby Campaign published fliers 
instructing women how, when and where to vote; reiterating that Hobby gave woman the 
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vote; and that Ferguson fought it, reminding them of his actions at the 1916 Democratic 
National Convention in St. Louis.242 The war of words was heated. Ferguson argued 
against his detractors, “They say that Ferguson was indicted, but so was Jesus Christ.”243 
In response, the Hobby campaign pointed out that Pontius Pilate found nothing wrong 
with Jesus. The same could not be said of Ferguson. When a Senator introduced Hobby 
by comparing him to Moses, the Ferguson campaign replied, “According to the 25th 
chapter of the Leviticus, Moses was a socialist, ruled forty years and never reached the 
promised land.”244  
Behind the scenes of the campaigns, Cunningham anticipated a legal challenge to 
the primary woman suffrage law. Supporters wrote warning her of danger, “We hear 
persistent rumors, as no doubt you have, that at the last minute the Ferguson forces will 
go into the courts and by way of injunction attempt to prevent the women from 
participating in the primaries.”245 Cunningham’s solution was a Legal Defense 
Committee comprised of pro-suffrage attorneys, willing to defend the law pro bono. In 
July, Attorney T.N. Jones wrote Cunningham that he was concerned about the outcome 
of injunction proceedings if they were submitted before a Ferguson appointee in Tarrant 
County. He conferred with M.M. Crane, the attorney who prosecuted Ferguson, and 
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suggested that Judge Frank A. Williams lead TESA’s defense of the law.246 Cunningham 
appealed to Williams: 
We are threatened with some sort of legal action to prevent the women of Texas 
 from participating in the primary elections, and, as a counter movement, are 
 forming a committee to take charge of this matter. I have asked to serve on this 
 committee, Gen. M.M. Crane of Dallas, Judge Ocie Speer, of Fort Worth, Judge 
 J.A. Elkins of Houston, Judge Ben L. Jones of Sherman, Judge N.A. Stedman 
 and Mr. D.K. Woodward, Jr., of Austin; and would appreciate it beyond words if 
 you would not only serve on the committee but take the chairmanship and 
 suggest any other names you would want on it.247 
 
Williams accepted the position.  
 Cunningham sent telegrams to all of the proposed committee members 
requesting their counsel, and was quickly assured of their services. Speer replied, “This 
partial franchise is only half a loaf (war bread at that) and I am extremely anxious that it 
not be taken away from the women upon any pretext; it is a weapon by which they will 
be able to demand and receive the full franchise in a little while; and I for one am 
anxious to see them wield this weapon for all it is worth.” By mid-July, Cunningham had 
put together a formidable defense.248  
Cunningham officially informed the Hobby Campaign about the Legal Defense 
Committee. At her request, J. A. Elkins of the Hobby Campaign lent his services to the 
committee as well. The Hobby Campaign had also heard the rumors of a legal challenge 
to the law. One supporter sent a letter that he asked Walter J. Crawford, Chairman of the 
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Hobby Campaign, to destroy after reading, “The Ferguson forces have about come to the 
conclusion that they cannot overcome the woman vote; they are to wait and see the 
extent of the registration; and if it is large, they will have some on[e], some strong Clark 
man, or Clark himself, to enjoin the woman vote or its constitutionality.” The supporter 
went on to detail a plan to change the oath required of Democrats before voting in the 
all-white primary. The new oath would read, “I am a white democrat and will support 
the nominee of the primaries.”249 According to Strickland, the Ferguson campaign 
believed women could not take this oath because they could not vote in the general 
election in November. Strickland further advised that the injunction was expected 
around July 15th. Crawford replied, “The fact is, they have been threatening to enjoin the 
women from voting ever since the law was enacted. If they start it, we will endeavor to 
take care of the situation.”250  
All involved expected a legal challenge to the law, but they disagreed on when it 
would come. Elkins believed the challenge to the bill would come after the election, 
seeking to have the women’s votes thrown out as unconstitutional. Meanwhile Crane 
informed Crawford, “It now seems certain that the enemy will seek an injunction to 
prevent the women from voting.”251 To try to ward off an injunction, the legal defense 
committee organized a meeting at the Hotel Galvez in Galveston, Texas, on July 20, 
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1918. They drafted a press statement, effectively informing Ferguson and his allies that 
defenses were ready should they try a last minute or post-election challenge to the law. 
Crane also issued his opinion on Ferguson’s ineligibility for office to Texas 
newspapers.252  
Legal defenses were in place, but for the primary suffrage deal to remain 
successful, Texas suffragists had to deliver a large bloc of votes to Hobby. It was not just 
their reputation on the line. If Ferguson won, he could have overturned primary suffrage 
as easily as it was passed. While it was an ideal victory for a one-party state, it was also 
an easily reversible achievement. Additionally, Ferguson opposed the federal woman 
suffrage amendment, called the “Susan B. Anthony Amendment,” which was inching 
closer and closer to success in Congress, after which it would move on to the states for 
ratification. For Texas to be one of the four crucial southern states to ratify the 
amendment, suffragists had to carry Hobby to a win.  
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CHAPTER IV  
“THE TROUBLE WITH THE MEN WAS THAT THEY UNDERESTIMATED OUR 
INTELLIGENCE”: WOMEN AND THE 1918 DEMOCRATIC PRIMARY 
 
To heighten the stakes of the 1918 primary election, and to encourage women’s 
turnout, Texas Equal Suffrage Association (TESA) First Vice President Helen Moore 
appealed to Annie Webb Blanton: “May I make a suggestion to you? Why not you 
become a candidate for State Superintendent of Education in the place of Prof. Doughty? 
Please consider it.”253 Although Blanton admitted she liked the idea, she was reluctant to 
enter the race. She had only recently decided the campaign against Ferguson was too 
important and the possibility of primary suffrage too tempting for her to remain publicly 
neutral, although she feared she would lose her teaching position for taking a public 
political stance.254 After the primary woman suffrage bill passed, Blanton wrote 
Cunningham with ideas for educating Texas women and encouraging them to get to the 
polls, “I feel that woman suffrage will now be on trial. If the women vote right, we shall 
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justify ourselves; but indifferent, unthinking women won’t vote right. We need to reach 
the country women, too.”255 
Blanton was convinced that women would be more receptive to her calls urging 
them to vote if she was not asking them to vote for her personally and suggested that she 
wait to make a campaign until women won full suffrage. She was also worried that, “it is 
well known that I am an ardent supporter of the University. Is it not best, just now, to 
keep the University out of any sort of fight?”256 Blanton was extremely hesitant to get in 
the race arguing that by the next election she could have earned her master’s degree, 
which would make her more competitive, and that no one knew if the women would turn 
out to vote and that she could not win in 1918 without an “overwhelming vote of the 
women for me.”257 After giving all the reasons why she was should not stand as a 
candidate in 1918, Blanton admitted, “I don’t want to be rash about it, because, when I 
do run, I want to win.”258 
Moore responded to Blanton that it was actually TESA President Minnie Fisher 
Cunningham’s idea to have a woman on the statewide ballot in the first primary election 
in which Texas women could vote. She urged Blanton to consider running, making it 
clear that unlike other candidates, her candidacy would be part of TESA’s campaign. 
She further informed Blanton that Cunningham had consulted respected progressive 
Democrat Dr. A. Caswell Ellis of the University of Texas and “he predicted that if you 
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would consider running he believed you would ‘sweep the state.’” Moore concluded: 
“May we hope to hear that you will do so and that you will announce an early date.”259 
Blanton wrote TESA suffragist Edith League of her lingering doubts, “my chief fear is 
that, if I run, and fail, it might injure the cause of woman suffrage in the state. Of course 
if I win, it would help it.” She specifically wanted to hear from Cunningham directly 
before making a final decision.260 Blanton eventually accepted the invitation and ran for 
state Superintendent of Public Instruction.  
In addition to getting a woman on the statewide ballot, TESA urged women to 
organize Hobby Clubs or join those already forming in order to campaign for the 
reelection of Governor William Pettus Hobby, who had signed the primary woman 
suffrage law.261 Suffrage historian Jessica Wranosky argues that through organizing the 
Hobby Clubs, suffragists were able to “train the Texas women in campaigning and the 
political process.”262 She maintains that suffragists’ vital participation in the Hobby and 
Blanton campaigns gave them valuable insight into the “inner culture of the state’s 
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political elite and in turn [they] started to be considered part of the club.”263 This insight 
would prove useful in the 1919 campaign for a state full woman suffrage amendment 
and in the battle to ratify the Susan B. Anthony Amendment.  
TESA organized voter registration and education drives. They also sent speakers 
throughout the state encouraging female voters to register and vote. TESA arranged 
Lavinia Engle’s speaking tour through South Texas, which included Rockport, Corpus 
Christi, and Victoria.264 Suffragists campaigned and encouraged women to register and 
vote in a plethora of ways. Newspaper editor and suffragist Mrs. France E. Sutherland 
ran a weekly column entitled “Why Women Should Vote” to encourage indifferent 
women to register and vote.265 Blanton wrote Cunningham that women in Dallas had 
told her “that unless the women vote, and vote wisely, there is some danger of Ferguson 
again…They also tell me that, unless the women vote, the politicians will repeal this 
law.”266 For Texas suffragists, the 1918 gubernatorial primary was about much more 
than the governorship; past and future suffrage successes were on the line.  
Governor Hobby faced off in the Democratic primary against former Governor 
James Ferguson, who suffragists and clubwomen had helped impeach and remove from 
office in 1917. The winner of the primary would be the Democratic candidate for 
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Governor and all but assured of victory in the one-party state. Because of their history 
with anti-suffragist and anti-prohibitionist Ferguson, the TESA campaign was more anti-
Ferguson than pro-Hobby. Ferguson’s candidacy after his impeachment, conviction and 
sentencing, which banned him from public office, was extralegal at best. Ferguson 
counted on his supporters electing judges and representatives friendly to his candidacy to 
decide the legal challenges that would surely come. TESA Suffragist League warned, 
“Mr. Ferguson is boasting that he will elect a legislature that will seat him, and that he 
will also elect judges who will decide the case in his favor…”267 
Cunningham argued,  
…in my estimation the most important [political issue] before us today is that of 
 the candidacy of Mr. Ferguson, in defiance of law, and order, and the 
 Constitution…Mr. Ferguson’s efforts to get himself reinstated embraces the 
 election of a favorable legislature and of Judges Spann, (of Temple), and Harvey 
 to the Supreme Branch of the State, so I trust that the women will be on guard 
 and not vote for any men in the Legislature who are not thoroughly reliable…268 
 
First-time female voters understandably relied on Cunningham and TESA for guidance, 
and many wrote asking whom they should vote for. Edith League replied to one such 
request:  
 Do emphasize the importance of centering on Hobby in the political cricis [sic] 
 that faces us just now. We are for good Government and for keeping out of office 
 all those men who will not live up to the required standards; and for Governor 
 that man is Ferguson… he [Hobby] is already in the chair and his administration 
 has proved himself worthy… This is simply my personal view…you will kindly 
 not quote it from the Texas Equal Suffrage Association.269  
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League replied to a similar request from suffragist Mrs. F.C. Neidermeier 
reiterating the need to support politicians who supported Governor Hobby and woman 
suffrage. While she did not want to pass along all of the information TESA had for fear 
of libel lawsuits, she suggested that Neidermeier send her a list of candidates, and she 
offered to mark the list indicating those candidates “whom we distinctly approve of.”270 
Mrs. Neidermeier did just that noting, “there is (sic) so many candidates we hear nothing 
of out here.”271 League sent the list back to Neidermeier with the candidates “properly 
marked. These men are all safe and desirable.”272 With the exception of Governor Hobby 
and Annie Webb Blanton, TESA declined to officially or publicly endorse any 
candidates. However, they instructed suffragists to avoid any politician “supporting Mr. 
Ferguson in his unlawful candidacy” and informed women of the records of particular 
candidates on woman suffrage and other progressive issues like prohibition. TESA’s 
first vice president, Helen Moore, reiterated the need to research the candidates “so that 
we may be sure of not only defeating Ferguson but of electing men to the Legislature 
who will not permit the repealing of our bill and whom we know will ratify the Federal 
Amendment when it is submitted to them for ratification.”273  
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Abe Gross, secretary of Hobby Headquarters in Waco recalled many similar 
inquiries received by the Hobby Campaign.274 One such letter sent in June asked the 
campaign to:  
…Tell me how each candidate stands with reference to the Candidates –Hobby 
 and Ferguson. The political atmosphere in this little city [Fort Worth] has 
 become so sultry and hot that I have made up my mind to let my vote for each 
 candidate for State, County and district offices be governed largely by the 
 candidate’s attitude toward those two candidates for Governor.275 
 
The campaign replied that to avoid antagonizing candidates, they were not issuing a list 
of preferred candidates all the way down the ballot. They did relay a list of candidates 
for Lieutenant Governor, Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, Associate Justice of the 
Supreme Court, and Railroad Commission that supported Hobby.276 Demonstrating an 
understanding that all Texas political races in 1918 came down to the Hobby-Ferguson 
dispute, one newspaper, in response to numerous requests, “endeavor[ed] to ascertain 
how candidates for other offices expected to vote for governor.”277 The paper sent letters 
to the local candidates and published the comments they received in return.278 The 1918 
primary election came down to the split in the Texas Democratic party between 
progressives and prohibitionists now led by Hobby and conservatives and anti-
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prohibitionists led by Ferguson. If Ferguson and his faction won, they could easily repeal 
the primary woman suffrage law and would fight to block ratification of the Susan B. 
Anthony Amendment in Texas.  
The primary woman suffrage law was poorly written due to changes made to it 
during the legislative process. TESA suffragists were extremely careful when instructing 
women on how to register and vote, due to the confusing nature of the law and how it 
was implemented. Per the state attorney general’s opinion only women in cities were 
required to register due to conflicting clauses in the law. He further opined that Texas 
women had only a seventeen-day registration window.  
Cunningham and TESA organized a registration campaign using their county 
chairpersons. They encouraged all women, even those outside the cities where it was 
legally required, to register. They believed this lessened the chance that the women 
would be turned away from the polls. The San Benito Equal Suffrage Association in 
Cameron County wrote TESA that a local attorney they contacted for clarification of the 
law disagreed with the Attorney General. The attorney additionally advised the 
suffragists, “even if the provisions of this bill which require registration by women 
residing in such precincts, is obnoxious to this section of the Constitution, the Attorney 
General’s opinion hasn’t the authority of finality…”279 Cunningham replied, “we believe 
that it is better to be safe and register than to depend on the election officers accepting 
Attorney General Looney’s ruling; and we are urging women in every case to register 
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and wherever they have automobiles to use them in taking the other women to the places 
of registration.”280  
Cunningham wrote the head of Hobby’s Campaign, Walter Crawford, in early 
June advising, “my desk is piled high with letters from different sections of the state on 
this subject of the registration of women…” Cunningham led TESA in advising women 
to register despite the lack of legal requirements to do so in certain circumstances. She 
asked Crawford if the Hobby Campaign was issuing the same advice. She also wrote that 
Williamson and Bastrop Counties, which had no towns of 10,000 people or more, were 
not intending to provide registration blanks for female voters. She asked him what the 
campaign planned to do about this and specifically advised that they “send out a letter to 
all tax collectors notifying them that the law calls for the registration of women and that 
they are expected to provide blanks for registration.”281  
Crawford replied to Cunningham that he had spoken with the attorney general, 
and convinced him to modify his earlier ruling, “at least to the extent of a letter to all tax 
collectors of the state asking them to provide for registration and suggesting that no 
harm could be done and perhaps a contest prevented by doing so.” They hoped by 
having the attorney general issue the letter, tax collectors who considered it unnecessary 
for women to register in their areas would still allow them to do so. Crawford concluded 
that the campaign would “take up the matter particularly with the tax collectors of 
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Williamson and Bastrop counties,” both of which had substantial German and Mexican 
immigrant populations, which the Hobby campaign hoped to counter with white 
women’s votes.282 TESA encouraged women to register early in the window, because 
while the attorney general agreed that the registration window was legally open from 
June 26 through July 12, some tax collectors declared they would refuse to register 
women on July 12.283 TESA also reiterated the need for women to physically bring their 
registration receipts to the polls.284 
 Despite the attorney general’s opinion, the law instructed rural women, living in 
cities of less than ten thousand people, to “present herself, personally, at the office of the 
tax collector …and shall personally fill out, with her own hand, in duplicate, or upon a 
form and stub, the form of registration receipt prescribed in Section 2 of this bill.”285 
This section of the law required voter registration, but also functioned as a literacy test 
for rural women.286 Wranosky suggests the test was intended disfranchise rural black and 
Mexican American women, as reformers feared these women support conservatives like 
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Ferguson. The literacy test also affected immigrant women who may not have been 
literate in English.287 Cunningham wrote that she was displeased with the de facto 
literacy test, but that it would take too much time to challenge it.288  
TESA and local suffragists were very careful to register legally to ensure they 
would be able to vote in the 1918 primary. The law said that had rural women had to 
register “personally, at the office of the tax collector…” and the Attorney General’s 
official opinion cautioned tax collectors against registering women at various places 
throughout the county.289 However, many tax collectors took out newspaper 
advertisements offering to register women throughout their counties for the women’s 
convenience. The Belton Journal ran one such story, “Tax collector Jake D. Nelson will 
visit 34 communities in the county for the purpose of registering lady voters. The ladies 
of these communities can register when the tax collector makes this visit, or, they can 
come to the court house in Belton to register if they prefer.”290  
The other tactic used by tax collectors was to appoint deputies in voting precincts 
to register the women locally. The Atascosa News Monitor announced, “Reasons 
removed for not registering,” and informed women that Tax Collector Harrison had 
“appointed deputies in all of the 21 voting precincts.” The article continued, “These 
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deputies have been supplied with registration blanks and every woman voter in the 
county can register without having to come to the county seat. Mr. Harrison believes that 
every woman in the county wishes to cast a vote this year and is assisting in every 
way.”291 It is unclear if these tax collectors were truly trying to be helpful or if they were 
trying to trick women into registering illegally, which would have made it easier to 
prevent them from voting or to have their votes thrown out after the primary election. 
Suffragists and reform Democrats suspected the Ferguson campaign would use 
underhanded tactics to ensure the success of his legally questionable candidacy. Duping 
women into registering in a manner that was not legal and would not guarantee their 
right to vote in the primary was one such plot they suspected the Ferguson campaign of 
masterminding. The law clearly required rural women to appear in person at the tax 
collector’s office.  
TESA believed the tax collectors were baiting women into registering in an 
illegal manner, which would then be used to throw out their votes. TESA First Vice 
President Helen Moore wrote one supporter to “urge the women to all register at the Tax 
Collectors office.”292 She reiterated the Attorney General’s opinion but explained that it 
was only an opinion and not a decision, which would have to be given by the state 
Supreme Court. Registering was by far the safest course of action. TESA advised 
suffrage leaders in the Smithville, Texas to have “women of the county… brought in by 
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the city women who have automobiles, in order to have them register in large 
numbers…”293 Suffragist Jessie Daniel Ames later recalled, “The trouble with the men 
was that they underestimated our intelligence.”294 Ames and other suffragists knew 
registering with the tax collector outside of the courthouse would not guarantee their 
right to vote in the primary. She led the registration drive among women in her county 
and reported, “In the July heat 3,300 Williamson County women went to Georgetown by 
wagon, by hack, by foot to register.”295 A newspaper in Texas City reported, “Collector 
is kept busy by women of Texas City: Automobiles Bring 150 to Get Certificates, Total 
Registration for the day 276…”296 The registration campaign was working. 
 In the primary campaign, TESA had to counter the view Progressives gained of 
Hobby when he was Ferguson’s lieutenant governor. Hobby was a moderate reformer 
stuck between more conservative Democrats, like Senator Bailey and former Governor 
Ferguson, and more progressive Democrats, like US Senator Morris Shepherd, Will 
Hogg, and former Lieutenant Governor and former Texas Attorney General Martin 
Crane. While Hobby did not publicly endorse woman suffrage before 1918, he and his 
wife had been supportive of the movement since the mid-1910s.297  
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 Reform Democrats consistently won a slight majority in the legislature, but the 
veto power of Governor Ferguson kept them from enacting most of their legislative 
agenda. After Governor Ferguson’s impeachment, Governor Hobby could have chosen 
to either continue blocking reformers’ legislative efforts, or to embrace the reform 
agenda from the progressive wing of his party. Hobby strategically decided to align with 
progressive Democrats. In March 1918, Governor Hobby called a special session of the 
legislature that ratified the national prohibition amendment; passed “white zone” 
ordinances banning prostitution and liquor within ten miles of army bases; enacted 
statewide prohibition by statute, rather than by constitutional amendment; and passed the 
primary woman suffrage bill.298 Although the quid pro quo deal between Cunningham 
and Hobby remained a secret, the political expediency of passing the primary woman 
suffrage bill did not go unnoticed. The Texas Register reported that Hobby had signed 
the suffrage bill and concluded that politicians previously uninterested in Texas women 
would suddenly convert to woman suffrage: “Mary had a little vote she never had 
before, and now the festive candidate loves Mary all the more.”299  
 By the time of the 1918 election, Governor Hobby was aligned with progressive, 
prohibitionist Democrats and former Governor Ferguson was solidly aligned with 
conservative, anti-prohibitionists. The gubernatorial primary race would be a referendum 
on the wet-dry split within the Texas Democratic party. To prove Hobby’s progressive 
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credentials, Mrs. J. S. Sweeney wrote TESA requesting a circular be issued informing 
the public that Hobby supported suffrage as early as 1915. She added, “While Gov. 
Hobby and I are [related], I have had unfavorable feelings toward him, for being on the 
ticket with Ferguson and too he was an antiprohibitionist, though I never knew of him 
doing anything especially in favor of liquor. Good people sometimes get in bad 
campaigns and sometimes later they see their mistakes.”300 Cunningham replied that she 
would consult the Hobby Campaign and if they approved, would produce the requested 
circular.301 Trying to clearly delineate between Ferguson and Hobby’s politics, TESA 
suffragist League wrote supporters that the success of progressive legislation at the 1918 
special session was being covered “in all the leading magazines in this country.”302 She 
argued it was a nice counter to the coverage Texas received during the Ferguson 
impeachment trial. 
Suffragists were not the only ones trying to establish Hobby’s suffrage record. 
The Ferguson campaign argued that Hobby was actually against woman suffrage, and 
that Ferguson had moderately supported the cause. The confusion led Mrs. Dallas 
Scarborough in Abilene to ask the Hobby Campaign for clarification on both candidates’ 
records, “Altho Ferguson has always opposed Woman Suffrage, and has stated his 
opposition on more than one occasion, he now declares through correspondence with 
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some friends here, that he is for Woman Suffrage and that you are opposed to it.”303 
Scarborough recalled reading speeches Ferguson gave ridiculing the idea of woman 
suffrage, but wanting to be sure, she asked the Hobby campaign to send her the facts on 
both candidates.  The campaign replied with newspaper clippings about Ferguson’s 
speeches at the 1916 Democratic National Convention in St. Louis and literature 
regarding Hobby’s record on woman suffrage.304  
The Denton Record Chronicle reported, “We predicted recently that Mr. 
Ferguson would soon be posing as an original suffrage advocate and sure enough he did 
in his speech here say he had always favored suffrage. Mr. Ferguson must have a short 
memory or think the people of Texas have…” The paper went on to again cite 
Ferguson’s attempt at defeating the suffrage plank in St. Louis.305 Some newspapers 
friendly to Ferguson ran misleading articles or at least argued that Hobby did not deserve 
the credit for the primary woman suffrage law. The Houston Labor Journal ran an 
editorial questioning Hobby’s responsibility for the law, giving credit to Judge Hodges 
of Texarkana who they asserted authored the bill, and dismissing pro-Hobby newspapers 
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by arguing “that leading newspapers supporting Mr. Hobby for governor opposed the 
passage of the bill to the very last.”306 
The Ferguson campaign also used Mrs. N.B. Kent as a surrogate. The Dallas 
Evening Journal identified her as the State Supervisor of Womanhood for the State 
Department of Agriculture, and reported that she was encouraging women to vote and 
believed that the majority of Texas women would. Concerned suffragists reported to 
Cunningham that Kent accused Hobby of having connections with the “whiskey ring,” 
and as a result, Kent encouraged women to support Ferguson.307 Cunningham asked her 
contacts in Austin to investigate Kent and what position she actually held, maintaining, 
“I was not aware that there was any such official position as State Supervisor of 
Womanhood, and certainly no woman holding such a large position as that would be[,] 
has any business to favor a man like Mr. Ferguson.”308  
Kent was not the only previously unknown woman campaigning for Ferguson. 
TESA Secretary Edith League asked Hobby Campaign Manager Crawford for 
information on a woman campaigning for Ferguson in Galveston, the home base of 
TESA and the city where Cunningham lived and worked: “We are trying to find out who 
this woman is in order to know how best to undo any of her work.”309 Crawford replied 
that the Ferguson campaign had hired women throughout the state “scattering poison and 
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waging a campaign of misrepresentation, falsehood, and fraud.”310 He believed that the 
candidates’ well-publicized records on the issues would lead to Hobby’s victory in the 
end. The campaign issued pamphlets informing women “how, when and where they can 
cast ballots” and reiterating that “Hobby signed the law giving women this privilege,” 
“Ferguson fought woman suffrage;” and “Here is what Ferguson did at the Democratic 
National Convention and what the Convention did to him,” before recounting 
Ferguson’s fight against a suffrage plank in St. Louis.311  
While Ferguson had a strong anti-suffrage record from at least 1916 on, Hobby 
had remained uncommitted for as long as possible. However, in 1914, Texas Woman 
Suffrage Association (TWSA) President Annette Finnigan wrote both men, as well as all 
other candidates for governor and lieutenant governor, asking, “if elected, [will you] 
favor a submission to the voters of the question of woman suffrage as a constitutional 
amendment?”312 Ferguson evaded the question. His campaign manager replied with only 
the opening speech of the campaign, which failed to mention votes for women.313 Unlike 
Ferguson, Hobby replied to Finnigan’s inquiry in the affirmative. Hobby handwrote his 
response on Finnigan’s original letter: “I beg to answer your question in the affirmative. 
If you wish me to put it in different [wording] kindly advise. Am traveling…no 
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stationery with me…”314 In their support of Hobby, suffragists referenced the document, 
but they did not release it.  If they had, detractors would likely have pointed out that 
Hobby’s support of putting the issue to a vote was very different than actually 
advocating woman suffrage, especially at a time when suffragists would likely have lost 
the vote anyway.  
The Ferguson campaign cast doubts on Hobby’s suffrage leanings; pondered 
when he converted to a supporter and why; and willfully misled voters about both 
candidates’ suffrage records. Ferguson supporter James T. Denton telegrammed 
Cunningham, asking for the “full and exact language of WP Hobbys (sic) letter in 1914 
favoring equal suffrage.”315 Edith League replied that TESA did not give out copies of 
their records “upon unexplained requests.”316 As the telegram came from Temple and 
TESA had received mail before from Denton on Ferguson Forum letterhead, she posted 
the letter care of the Ferguson Forum. Denton promptly replied, “in view of the standing 
that I ought to have in your circles, any request for information or facts of a public 
nature that I might make ought not to need ‘explaining.’” However, Denton explained 
that the Governor has said the letter exists but did not produce a copy, “Governor 
Hobby’s opponents assert that [his statement was] untrue –that there never was such a 
letter. What’s the reply?”317  
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Ferguson’s campaign continued to make the case that there was considerable 
animosity between female voters and Governor Hobby. An anti-Hobby flyer titled “A 
Woman Asks W.P. Hobby Embarrassing Question at Houston” reported that women 
would not vote for Hobby, alleging that Mayor of Houston, and Hobby Campaign 
Manager in that city, warned anyone attempting to pay women to disrupt Hobby’s 
campaign speech in Houston that the city would not tolerate an interruption. The article 
inquired “What is there in the life of W.P. Hobby so black that he would fear to have a 
woman ask him a question in a public meeting[?]…There is nothing in James E. 
Ferguson’s life to hide. The lid is off.”318 Ferguson tried to appeal to women’s class 
sensibilities as well, depicting woman suffrage as an issue of wealthy women who would 
have nothing to do with common women. The Dallas News reported one of his 
campaign speeches, “Ferguson Alleges Campaign of Hate: Declares fight against him 
violates principles of Christian religion- Is Denied Redemption- Warns women not to be 
misled by Aristocrats who have suddenly become interested in them.”319 By arguing that 
suffragists were aristocratic women uninterested in the lives of farmwomen, Ferguson 
hoped to rally rural women to support him. In their own distinctive ways, each campaign 
advertised their candidate as more in touch and in line with female voters. 
The Hobby campaign made patriotism and loyalty during the war the theme of 
the campaign. They criticized Ferguson for his ties to the German-dominated beer 
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industry, suggested he was the preferred candidate of the German-American Alliance 
being investigated in Washington D.C., and insinuated that perhaps his disloyal friends 
were the originators of his $156,000 loan.320 The Houston Post called the campaign “an 
impetuous, patriotic impulse to ‘slay the beast’ at home.”321 Hon. John W. Pope publicly 
announced his support for Hobby arguing, “Insofar as Texas and Good State 
Government is concerned it is almost as important to defeat Jim Ferguson and the 
German Rifle Clubs of South Texas as it is to defeat the Kaiser.”322 
One flyer announced that “Made by German Ideas” were included in Ferguson’s 
platform, while another accused Ferguson of hiring a German translator so he could give 
campaign speeches to German-speaking immigrants in their native language in Seguin, 
Texas in 1914.323 Another TESA pamphlet reminded women that they only vote in the 
primary “as a result of Governor W.P. Hobby signing the [primary woman suffrage] 
bill” and concluded “While we are fighting to whip the Kaiser abroad, we must be 
careful not to let the Kaiser beat us at the polls at home.”324 After receiving a sample of 
anti-Ferguson literature in the mail entitled “Shall Germany Elect the Governor of 
Texas?” TESA secretary Edith League wrote the editor of the press asking for one to be 
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sent to each woman on her list, which included, “a lady in each county who is attending 
to the Hobby campaign for the Texas Equal Suffrage Association.” The editor confirmed 
he had 259 circulars and was sending 50 more to TESA directly.325 
The Hobby campaign strongly advertized the governor’s support of woman 
suffrage through the primary woman suffrage bill and targeted female voters 
specifically. One of their flyers emphasized Hobby’s war record, and along the bottom 
instructed supporters: “P.S. Please read this and pass it to the women members of your 
family, who are voters.”326 A campaign circular addressed “To the Women of Texas” 
was signed by leading women in Texas including Texas Women’s Christian Temperance 
Union (WCTU) President Nannie Webb Curtis; TESA President Cunningham; and 
accomplished lawyer and Houston Equal Suffrage Association President Hortense 
Ward.327 Another circular entitled “Help Win the War” called attention to the dry zone 
law passed under Hobby at the request of the Secretary of War, arguing that these laws 
helped “make the world safe for Democracy.”328  
One pamphlet informed women when, where and how to register warning them, 
“Don’t fail to register and do your duty as American Citizens.”329 One campaign flyer 
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called on women to register and vote “to uphold the standard of your country.” The same 
flyer argued, “It is as much your precious privilege and sacred duty to answer this call at 
home as it is for our men to answer the call to leave home and go forth to battle for 
American ideals, homes, women and children.”330 Ward used similar wording in her 
poster:  
War is calling to arms our best young men. They lose their right to vote when 
 they put on the uniform. Upon the mothers, wives, sisters, and sweethearts 
 devolves the duty of electing men to all the offices of the State. It is a sacred and 
 important duty. I know the women of Texas will prove worthy of their trust. You 
 must choose a Governor. What are you doing for the Governor who gave you the 
 privilege of voting, who since his entrance into politics in 1914 has been in favor 
 of your enfranchisement?331 
 
The message was clear; voting was part of women’s war work. No longer was suffrage 
the reward for women meeting their obligations to the state through war work. Now the 
Hobby campaign made suffrage itself an obligation to the state.  
Annie Webb Blanton’s campaign for State Superintendent of Public Instruction 
also emphasized the war work of Texas women. In one campaign address, Blanton 
argued that there were two reasons why women were given primary suffrage, “to replace 
the loyal voters now in the army and because of the ability shown by women in war 
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work.” Blanton went on to emphasize “the duty of every woman to take the place, at the 
ballot box, of the Texas boys who are fighting the battle of democracy in Europe.”332 
The Ferguson campaign both feared and reviled the political women working 
against them. This may have been why they failed to adequately organize female 
Ferguson supporters. The campaign did print some flyers inviting ladies to “cooperate in 
organization” of Ferguson Clubs, but in contrast to the Ladies’ Hobby Clubs, they 
wanted women to participate in the already forming Ferguson Clubs instead of starting 
their own.333 One supporter wrote Ferguson, a women’s Hobby Club in Austin met, “that 
a committee had been appointed to visit every woman who could vote in the primaries 
and if they refused to sign up to support Hobby, they would be blacklisted. This is a fine 
recommendation for woman suffrage and if this is the kind of democracy to lead to 
victory, God pity the old party under the regime of Woman Suffrage.”334 While the 
women were not actually blacklisting anyone, their opponents considered their political 
organizing unwomanly and extremely threatening for its potential to harm the Ferguson 
campaign. Meanwhile, the Hobby Campaign advertised his speeches on flyers noting, 
“LADIES are especially invited to be present and hear the issues discussed as they are to 
have the equal responsibility in the election of officers.”335 
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After seeing Texas women deploy their political power effectively in the 
impeachment trial of Ferguson and again in the primary campaign, moderate politicians 
became more accepting of women voting. One suffragist wrote Cunningham that a 
candidate for sheriff had previously expressed concerns about votes for women: “when 
women voted, the men would cease to tip their hats.” She reported that in the 1918 
campaign, the same sheriff “asked [a friend] for her vote, that he not only tipped his hat, 
but held it in his hand, the whole time he talked to her.”336 Conservatives regularly 
espoused concerns that participating in politics would unsex women. However, once 
women had the power of the primary vote in 1918, some of those same candidates 
continued to abide by customs concerning the treatment of middle-class, white women 
while pursuing their votes.  
Under the instructions of TESA and the Hobby Campaign, clubwomen and 
suffragists respectively or together formed local organizations encouraging women to 
register to vote for Hobby. Hobby Clubs answered to the Hobby campaign and formed 
specifically to encourage men and women to register and vote for Hobby. Suffrage 
leagues throughout the state advocated for woman suffrage and usually affiliated with 
TESA, but publicly supported Hobby and Blanton in 1918. This was unusual in that the 
official policy of TESA was to not endorse candidates. Instead, they issued the record of 
the candidates’ stances and votes, and encouraged members to support whomever they 
felt was the best candidate.  
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In spite of their policy of nonpartisanship, TESA encouraged people to register 
and vote for Hobby and progressive, pro-suffrage candidates. In 1918, the Hobby clubs 
and suffrage leagues shared the same goal and strategies. Whether supporters in a 
particular locale organized as a Hobby club or as a suffrage league was determined by 
local political situations. Nannie Webb Curtis, concerned that pro-Ferguson husbands 
would not allow their wives to vote if they joined a Hobby Club, formed a “Democratic 
League.”337 J. M. Andrews tried to organize a suffrage club, but some of the women did 
not want to be called suffragists. Instead, they called themselves the Wharton County 
Hobby Club. TESA’s Edith League advised Andrews, “so long as cooperation in the 
matter of registering, and then voting in the Primary Election, July 27th, is what is 
desired you did the correct thing.”338 Cunningham replied to a similarly concerned local 
suffragist, “It makes no difference to me whether they are called Hobby Clubs, Good 
Government Leagues, or Suffrage Leagues. ‘A rose by any other name would smell as 
sweet;’ the thing is to get the women to register and vote.”339 
Mrs. George Langley wrote Cunningham about her organization, “We call 
ourselves the Hobby Club now as we want every woman to know we will not have 
Ferguson… [We will] go in a body to register that the Ferguson men may see we mean 
business.” Langley also noted that men in town “who would not think of suffrage when I 
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[championed it] last winter, are now saying well done. Funny, isn’t it?”340 Knowing that 
women could bring the candidate they supported to victory swayed the men. When the 
Democratic Party split between wet and dry candidates, white women were seen as the 
least threatening group to break the tie. County Chairperson Mrs. D. N. Stowe reported 
that local clubwomen organized twenty-three Hobby Clubs in her county. She noted that 
the number of women registered to vote closely aligned with the membership of the 
Hobby Clubs and concluded, “I feel confident that nearly all who registered will vote for 
Gov. Hobby…I think we shall give Hobby and [decency] a good vote on July 27th.”341   
In addition to suffrage leagues and Hobby clubs, women in some cities formed 
Blanton Clubs to support Annie Webb Blanton’s candidacy as well. A Fort Worth paper 
reported on the formation of the Blanton Club of Fort Worth by the members of the 
Woman’s Wednesday Club. The club formed after Blanton gave a campaign speech in 
Fort Worth, which was followed by  “a short talk by Mrs. Ella Caruthers Porter of 
Dallas…[who] urged the women of the State to register to vote.”342  
There was quiet cooperation between the Hobby, Blanton and TESA campaigns. 
For example, Cunningham asked Ellis to draft campaign material for Blanton. Blanton 
drafted a flyer entitled “Ought the fathers and mothers of Texas or the Brewers and 
German-American Alliance to O.K. our State Superintendent of Public Instruction?”343 
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Ellis wrote Cunningham that he showed the flyer “to Mr. Broham at Hobby headquarters 
and he said it would beat [current Superintendent Walter Francis] Doughty certainly if 
you could only get it out in time.”344 Ellis recommended to Cunningham that Blanton’s 
circulars tie her opponent, Doughty, to Ferguson and to the brewers. He believed that 
letters from Doughty that came to light during the German-American Alliance would be 
useful for establishing those connections.345 A few days later Ellis elaborated that the 
campaign must “give documentary proof of any charge made.”346 He argued that people 
“are rather tired of, and skeptical of, general charges unsustained by documentary 
evidence,” after Ferguson had “charged everybody with nearly everything, and 
everybody is charging Jim and his crowd with everything.”347 He suggested that 
Cunningham or Blanton use the letters revealed in the German-American Alliance 
investigation to prove Doughty had lied to Texas voters. Cunningham wrote a circular 
endorsing Blanton following Ellis’s advice.348 
While supporting Hobby, TESA maintained calculated separation between 
themselves and the official Hobby campaign. They did not issue or distribute Hobby 
campaign literature, instead instructing supporters to write directly to the Hobby 
Campaign if they required it. After the election, Cunningham maintained, “Our 
organization has never officially endorsed Governor Hobby, either before his election or 
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since. As between himself and Mr. Ferguson, even leaving out the question of the latter’s 
impeachment, our women would naturally have voted for Hobby because of Ferguson’s 
speech against Suffrage in Saint Louis. Those of us who heard it, and I was one, are not 
likely to forget it.”349 Cunningham never forgot Ferguson’s actions in St. Louis, but she 
did far more to elect Hobby than she later let on. She even drafted letters and sent them 
to the Hobby Campaign to be printed on campaign stationery.350 
However, there was some friction between the Hobby Campaign and TESA. In 
early July, Cunningham wrote Walter J. Crawford, Chairman of the Hobby Campaign, 
after receiving a letter from a concerned suffragist in Grimes County. The Woman’s 
Hobby Club there had been “instructed by the Chairman of the Men’s Hobby Club not to 
mention Suffrage in the Club…”351 Crawford replied that Cunningham’s letter was the 
first he had heard of the situation. He assured her that “suffrage should be advocated and 
encouraged, at all times,” and that if the Men’s Hobby Club Chairman acted differently, 
he did so without the permission of the Hobby Campaign.352 He closed by thanking 
Cunningham for her work on behalf of himself and Governor Hobby.353 Notably, he did 
not mention any effort to follow-up with the Men’s or Women’s Hobby Clubs in Grimes 
County. 
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Cunningham declined the Hobby Campaign’s request to move her TESA office 
from Galveston to Austin or Dallas so the two entities could more closely coordinate 
their campaigns. When the Women’s Committee for the Hobby Club of Galveston 
secured an office on the same floor as Cunningham’s TESA office, TESA kept clear the 
dividing line. League wrote a Galveston suffrage supporter, “the rush of getting 
important letters and papers out to the various County Chairpersons for Hobby Clubs 
through the state prevented earlier reply.”354 After admitting that she worked on 
correspondence with Hobby Clubs she noted, “we have had our phone (891) move[d] 
into that room, which is two doors distant us. It was impossible to secure a separate 
phone, and we thought that the Women’s Comm. of Hobby Club needed a phone more 
than we did just at this time. This in explanation of 891 now being the phone to call for 
Miss Hill, and why I am unable to answer.”355 During WWI, government offices had 
first priority for new phone lines, resulting in a delay for civilian orders. While League 
was sending correspondence out to Hobby Clubs, she could not have it appear that she, 
as an employee of TESA, was answering the local Hobby Club phone. That would have 
been too public. When the 1918 primary concluded, TESA took custody of the phone 
and the number 891 again.356 
There was also friction between TESA and male politicians allied with the group. 
For example, Representative Metcalfe tried to exert his influence on TESA and alter 
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their campaign tactics to suit him. In July 1918, he telegrammed Cunningham that 
Senator Hudspeth had pledged to support President Wilson, prohibition and woman 
suffrage, in contrast to his previous stances on these subjects. Metcalfe concluded that 
the recently converted Hudspeth “will be [a] strong effective worker for you on laws for 
women [and] my wife and I make our first personal request you wire me withdrawing 
your opposition on our assurance he is all right[.] wire full reply our expense so we can 
publish[.] help us out[,] your friend.”357 Much to Metcalfe’s annoyance, Cunningham 
replied,  
Deeply regret am unable to comply with your request. Would personally do 
 anything in my power for you and Mrs. Metcalfe but am officially obligated by 
 resolutions passed at state and national conventions to give out impartially the 
 records of men who are candidates for offices. Hudspeth’s record was made in 
 the Senate and in Democratic conventions.358  
 
The Hobby Campaign was similarly irked by TESA’s policy of relaying a 
candidate’s suffrage record regardless of his current positions or supporters. Hobby 
Campaign Chairman Crawford wrote Cunningham when TESA’s records were leading 
women to support the opponent of a candidate for State Treasurer whom he considered a 
friend, “I believe it would be a mistake for us to become involved in other races, where 
our candidates are favorable to Governor Hobby, and approve the issues upon which he 
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bases his candidacy.”359 Much to their male allies’ frustration, Cunningham and TESA 
did not change their policy. 
Understanding the political power Cunningham had, numerous politicians wrote 
for her endorsement or to at least have her publicly confirm their suffrage record to 
would-be voters. In May, Texas Senator Offa Shivers Lattimore wrote, “As a candidate 
for Judge of the Court of Criminal Appeals, I am writing to ask you for your vote and 
active influence.”360 He noted his suffrage record and pride in having written and 
introduced the primary woman suffrage bill in the Senate. Not only did he ask for 
Cunningham’s support, he asked for her advice on running his campaign, “I will greatly 
appreciate your vote and influence, as well as any suggestions you may wish to offer as 
to the success of my campaign. I would be glad to make my victory complete in the first 
primary. This I can undoubtedly do with your assistance and the assistance of women 
like you.”361 When initial returns came in, Senator Lattimore wrote to Cunningham 
asking to use her name in an endorsement of him in a newspaper in preparation for a 
run-off election.362 As the final returns showed he won a majority of the votes, 
Cunningham was able to deny the request without risking Lattimore’s future support or 
friendship.363  
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Even Annie Webb Blanton’s brother, a Texas congressman, wrote Cunningham 
asking her to distribute his campaign cards. Instead Cunningham suggested he contact 
Helen Moore for the names of female Hobby campaign chairs, who she believed would 
be willing to distribute the cards. She concluded her letter, “As you are doubtless aware, 
the Texas Equal Suffrage Association is not distributing cards for anyone except Miss 
Blanton, who is the ‘woman’s candidate,’ she coming out at our solicitation.”364 
The strangest request for political endorsement came from sitting State 
Superintendent of Public Instruction, Walter Doughty, whom Blanton was running 
against. In June, he wrote Cunningham noting the Austin Equal Suffrage Association 
had publicly endorsed Blanton. Doughty wrote Cunningham hoping that the suffragists 
were divided between himself and Blanton, and hoping to get her on the record 
supporting him. He offered Cunningham a list of his accomplishments and ongoing 
projects as state superintendent. However, he refused to take a side in the most important 
political dispute of the day, the gubernatorial race. Instead he argued, “I believe it is the 
business of the State Superintendent to work with the governor that the people elect and 
not to attempt to elect a governor.”365 Cunningham curtly replied that Blanton’s 
candidacy “had the unanimous support of the Texas Equal Suffrage Association, 
convention assembled; also that it has my heartiest personal endorsement and support, 
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together with that of hundreds of other individuals and numerous other organizations.”366 
Cunningham sent a copy of her reply to Blanton as well, who used it in her campaign.367 
While they campaigned against Ferguson, TESA also used the war effort in their 
rhetoric. While German and Mexican immigrants could vote, enlisted men could not. 
Suffragists encouraged women to vote in 1918 to counter the loss of servicemen’s votes. 
One political flyer was titled “Seaman appeals for some woman to cast his vote for 
Hobby.”368 Suffragists also capitalized on conservatives’ reluctance to support the draft, 
fearing the resultant expansion of the federal government. They argued that votes for 
women was a war measure and encouraged women to vote to “elect All-American men 
who will stand behind our boys at the front.”369  One political flyer read “As a woman of 
the world, A woman of America, A woman of Texas, A woman of Lamar County, You 
are called to uphold the standard of your country by registering and voting.”370  
Houstonian Hortense Ward reported her speaking engagements to Crawford. She 
advised, “I am having splendid reports from all over Texas about how the women are 
registering and in some places, Palestine for example, they have already registered as 
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many women as there are poll taxes paid [by men].”371 Hobby also had help from former 
Texas Governor Thomas Mitchell Campbell. Campbell had served two terms and was a 
well-known reformer. Newspapers quoted his speeches for Hobby during the campaign, 
“Where did Ferguson get that $156,000? Ex-Gov Campbel[sic], in speech at Timpson, 
advances arguments to voters. Says State must be united in this time and condemns any 
man who would stir up strife?”372 Ferguson’s 1916 campaign manager even went on the 
record for Hobby. The Houston Chronicle headline read, “Ferguson hopelessly beaten, 
says former manager; Two other leaders now for Hobby.”373 
 South Texas political bosses Archie Parr and James Wells lamented the fact that 
women could vote in the 1918 primary. Not only were the bosses unable to control the 
female vote, they could not predict how women would vote in South Texas. In July, 
Wells wrote Parr that between 1,000 and 1,100 women had registered to vote in 
Cameron County “and no one on earth can tell how they are going to vote, or control 
them.”374 Parr responded, “The Lord only knows what these women are going to do. 
You ought to be able to vote all the Mexican women. Though I know they do not want to 
go to the polls.”375  
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 Wells had stayed out of the impeachment struggle when Hobby was perceived as 
a conservative moderate. Historian Evan Anders argues that Wells’ support of Ferguson 
was conditional upon Ferguson’s political power, which was clearly undermined by the 
impeachment and conviction. He also did not perceive Hobby as the progressive threat 
he would become. Hobby was the son-in-law of a conservative Texas congressman and 
conservative politicians had supported his initial campaign.376 Even when Hobby 
allowed progressive legislation to pass in the 1918 special session, Wells supported 
Hobby, hoping that this would prevent the Texas Rangers from actually enforcing the 
new primary alien suffrage law, aimed at restricting Mexican voting in his area.377 
Hobby’s managers even urged Wells to get other border bosses to support Hobby and 
expressed delight at Wells’ commitment to deliver “a large majority of Mexican 
voters.”378 Clearly Hobby had not allowed woman suffrage or restricted Mexican voting 
out of a commitment to clean elections, but because it was politically pragmatic for him 
to do so. There was no need for the Governor to have the Rangers strictly enforce the 
primary alien suffrage law as long as those voters controlled by the South Texas political 
bosses supported Hobby.  
 Unlike Wells, Parr backed Ferguson in 1918. Incumbent governors routinely 
used the Texas Rangers to influence elections, particularly in south Texas, and Hobby 
was no different. To counter the influence of Parr, Captain William Hanson and his 
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Rangers intimidated Mexican voters in Corpus Christi and dissuaded them from voting. 
Rangers informed residents that they would be imprisoned for voting if they were 
illiterate.379 Especially in light of the extreme violence Texas Rangers and vigilantes 
used against Mexicans in South Texas during WWI, the presence of armed Rangers at 
polling places discouraged Mexican voters from approaching whether they were literate 
or not.  As most political bosses listened to Wells and backed Hobby, there was little 
Ranger interference at South Texas election places outside of Archie Parr’s territory. On 
the contrary, Texas Rangers were ordered to patrol the voting booths in Mercedes after 
rumors of a concerted effort to prevent the Ladies Hobby Club from voting circulated. 
The women were allowed to vote.380  
 While political bosses who supported Ferguson tightly controlled the bloc 
immigrant alien vote, some suffragists attempted to build bridges into the Mexican 
American community. The Spanish-language paper, La Prensa printed an ad from the 
President of the San Antonio Equal Suffrage Association, Rena Maverick Green, urging 
Mexican women to vote to compensate for the men who had enlisted in the military. The 
ad condescendingly told women of Mexican descent to prove their intelligence and 
citizenship by voting: “Es el major signo de inteligencia y de ciudadania.”381 Green 
encouraged Mexican American women to register and vote in the 1918 primary election, 
even translating suffragists’ campaign material into Spanish, extending the voter 
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education campaign to non-English speaking Mexican women in Texas. Green also 
worked with the Texas Federation of Women’s Clubs in an Americanization campaign, a 
style of campaign that would later become popular with the League of Women Voters. 
This particular campaign, “Stranger Within the Gates,” was an attempt to “Americanize 
Mexican immigrant women,” encourage them to assimilate, become citizens, and 
eventually to vote.382 While bosses failed to mobilize the female vote, as did TESA at 
the state level, several TESA county chairmen expressed the desire and willingness to 
register eligible Mexican American women.  
From the county seat of Falfurrias in South Texas, Brooks County Chairperson 
Lenore Hise wrote to League, “our county is not very populous therefore it will not be a 
very large task to get the women to register. It will require some effort to find the 
Mexican women that can vote and get them to register.” Hise left League to assume that 
she would put in the effort. Hise’s successor as county chairperson, Mrs. E.W. Dickey 
later submitted the county statistic sheet to TESA, noting that of the 2500 people in the 
county, including the 1500 in Falfurrias, 143 women registered, but at least ten women 
had their votes thrown out for reasons Dickey did not specify.383 
Mrs. Wilmer Threadgill of Laredo, wrote League, “since time is passing so 
rapidly, and since we have quite a problem on our hands with regard to the Mexican 
women, who will not vote unless we organize them, we would like to get busy at once.” 
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The following month Threadgill explained in a letter to Cunningham that she preferred 
to concentrate her work in the city: 
Laredo is the only large town in Webb County, for this is a ranch, Mexican 
 country. The near-by villages are populated by Mexicans who do not speak 
 English for the most part. I would be glad to be County Chairman for you, but I 
 think I could do more effective work as City Chairman for the reason explained... 
 I should look after these surrounding villages incidentally.384  
 
However, Threadgill planned on visiting the villages as opposed to ignoring them 
altogether. Threadgill gained a reputation as a fine organizer and speaker for woman 
suffrage. In July, Charles Flato Jr. wrote to Crawford of the Hobby Campaign emphatic 
that Kingsville would go for Hobby, “Mrs. Wilmer Threadgill of Laredo has just 
finished a speaking tour down through this part of the district and she made a fine 
impression and while a big majority of our women are for Hobby, I heard of several 
women voters who changed after hearing Mrs. Threadgill.” Flato suggested that the 
campaign write Threadgill thanking her for her good work.385  
 Laredo had a particularly active history of Mexican activist and feminist 
organizing. Laredo and San Antonio each had two Spanish-language newspapers that 
regularly ran articles discussing woman suffrage.386 The First Mexicanist Congress was 
held in Laredo in 1911 and led Jovita Idar to found La Liga Femenil Mexicanista 
(Mexican women’s league) in Laredo that same year. The League of Mexican Women 
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was a social and charitable organization. It particularly served refugees of the Mexican 
Revolution.387 Anthropologist Martha Menchaca argues that during WWI, as “attitudes 
toward immigrants worsened, [Mexican] women turned from charitable activities to 
advocacy for the rights of immigrants.”388 The fact that TESA embraced 
Americanization campaigns and argued against what they viewed as the injustice of non-
citizen voting while citizen women remained disfranchised, likely limited cooperation 
between Anglo and Mexican American suffragists.  
 Cunningham routinely emphasized that county chairmen were to adjust campaign 
plans according to local needs and her reply to Threadgill reiterated this.389 The level of 
cooperation between Anglo, black, and brown women on the local level heavily 
influenced the ways in which local white suffrage leagues went about registering 
women. Some were far more inclusive than others. Nurse administrator and activist 
Louise Dietrich of El Paso informed TESA, “We are organizing the Negro women and 
Mexican who are not affected by the Thomason Law [which restricted voter’s access to 
aid in filling out their ballots], and we are going to impress upon them the sacredness of 
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the ballot given them and that it is not for sale.”390 Progressives regularly accused 
persons of color of being easily bought by liquor interests.  
 While Dietrich pledged to register Black and Mexican women, she warned, 
“Owing to the fact that over one half of the poll taxes in El Paso co. are held by 
Mexicans you can see that every other part of the state will have to get votes enough to 
offset these.”391 Dietrich detailed her plan, “[Outside El Paso] I have 14 other towns with 
802 voters (white) and 257 Mexicans…I have arranged for meetings in these towns and 
will have some speaker talk in Spanish to the Mexicans, although everyone who knows 
them well say they will not vote for the amendment.”392 Although Dietrich believed that 
the Mexican American vote would go for Ferguson, she still worked to register Mexican 
women, even using translators where necessary. Interestingly, her count of voters did not 
include Black women. Perhaps knowledge of the Democratic Party’s all-white primary 
led Dietrich to omit Black women or discourage them from registering, even though El 
Paso was home to a black suffrage league that regularly corresponded and worked with 
the white suffrage league.393 As long as TESA did not have to welcome black women 
into the state organization and could continue arguing against immigrant voting, local 
suffragists were welcome to pursue these voters if they chose.  
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 As Mexican Americans and Mexican immigrants were considered legally white, 
they were not routinely turned away from the all white primary. However, once WWI 
began, Texans began questioning the legality of allowing “enemy aliens,” those non-
citizens whose country of origin the United States was at war with, to vote.  In April 
1918, Cunningham wrote to Judge Keeling asking for “an authoritative statement of the 
status of the enemy alien vote while the war lasts which I can quote in writing to our 
County Chairmen for their information and the protection of our work.”394 The Holland 
News reported in July of 1918 that “The Germans of the Holland country who voted for 
Hughes for president in 1916 will not be allowed to participate in the democratic 
primary on the 27th of this month.”395 Noting that the citizens of Bell County were for 
‘Good Government,’ the News reported that supervisors had been appointed to each 
polling location in the country and that “it is the duty of these supervisors to see that 
only ‘white folks’ vote in the democratic primary.”396  
Historian Bruce Glasrud maintains that WWI “strengthened the objective of 
black Texas women to acquire the power of the ballot,” particularly after seeing black 
men drafted into military service at a higher percentage than whites.397 Black woman 
suffragists were certainly active before and during the 1918 campaign. In an undated 
annual report likely from 1917, the El Paso Equal Franchise League, a group of white 
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woman suffragists, reported a request from the local African Methodist Episcopal 
Church for suffrage speakers and assistance organizing their own league. According to 
the report, “four speakers responded and a number of our members went and there was a 
gathering of about forty women and many men.”398 The black suffragists organized into 
a league and held a debate on woman suffrage that same year.  
In 1918, Mrs. E. Sampson of El Paso wrote directly to NAWSA’s Maud Wood 
Park requesting recognition of the new El Paso suffrage club. The request was unusual in 
that NAWSA did not affiliate directly with local organizations. Local organizations 
affiliated with the state organization (in this case TESA), which then affiliated with 
NAWSA. NAWSA sent the request to TESA’s Edith League. League wrote Mrs. 
Critchett, president of the El Paso Equal Franchise League for information, and Critchett 
explained that Sampson and her fellow suffragists were black women. Knowing that 
TESA would likely refuse to admit a black suffrage club, several white suffragists 
suggested she try getting recognition directly from NAWSA. NAWSA allowed black 
clubs to join, but only if their state organizations allowed it.399  
Critchett noted that Sampson was “a well educated woman and is desirous of 
recognition from the white people,” suggesting that Sampson had been working on 
gaining recognition from El Paso whites for some time. Although Critchett expressed a 
desire to help the black suffragists with their side of the movement, she admitted: “I felt 
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that it was not best nor advisable at this time, our first election to rouse any trouble nor 
about the ‘colored question.’”400 Primary suffrage was too new and it was too risky for 
white suffragists to publicly support black woman suffrage. 
League asked Catt for advice in the matter. Catt sympathized with Sampson, “I 
am sure if I were a colored woman, I would do the same thing they are doing.” However, 
Catt acknowledged that in some southern states, the presence of black suffrage clubs 
would hinder the success of the larger white movement. She advised Cunningham that if 
this were true of Texas, “write to Mrs. Sampson and tell her you will be able to get the 
vote for women more easily if they do not embarrass you by asking for membership and 
that you are getting it for colored women as well as for white women and appeal to her 
interest in the matter to subside.”401  
Of course, no suffrage amendment at the state or national level secured voting 
rights for black as well as white women. While the Susan B. Anthony Amendment failed 
to specifically mention race, it did nothing to guarantee women of color the ballot; it 
simply removed one of many barriers between black women and the ballot. Very few 
black women were able to take advantage of the limited opportunities offered by 
suffrage legislation and vote, although more were able to register. Most progressive 
Democrats supportive of woman suffrage also supported the disfranchisement of black 
men and women through the poll tax and the all-white primary and the disfranchisement 
of Mexican immigrants by ending non-citizen voting. Cunningham responded to 
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Sampson citing the uniqueness of the request and leaving the decision for the state 
convention. This delay tactic saved face, but did not stop black women from registering 
to vote in the 1918 primary.402 
In Kingsville, Christia Adair had previous experience working across racial lines 
for progressive change. In an oral history interview later in her life, Adair recalled how 
“the little town was populated according to race. It had what they called Negro Town, 
White Town, and Mexican Town.” Adair remembered a gambling house at the entrance 
to the black town, whose existence “hurt my heart.”403 She became incensed after seeing 
one of the teenage boys she taught in the Sunday school exit the gambling house. She 
decided something had to be done to shut it down. She knew one white woman in town 
who happened to be the president of the Mother’s Club, who agreed to help Adair. On 
the woman’s advice, Adair organized a Mother’s Club among the black women in 
Kingsville that worked with the white Mother’s Club to end the gambling house. The 
sheriff, who was being paid off by the owner of the gambling house, was nervous when 
he heard rumor of the women’s efforts. He subpoenaed multiple black women to his 
office “and held court.”404 Adair’s husband advised her that this “court” was not legal 
and that she and her clubwomen should “play stupid or dumb, just don’t have any 
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answers.”405 The women took his advice and the sheriff was convinced the rumors were 
all talk. Afterwards, Adair appealed to her white allies. They sent her to the district 
attorney who called “real court then with authority.”406 The gambling house was closed 
and the crooked sheriff was forced to board up the building himself. 
  The white clubwomen Adair worked with were also involved in the suffrage 
movement and reached out to her to participate in the 1918 campaign for a primary 
woman suffrage bill. Adair knew that black Texan men could vote in the general 
election, but had not considered the fact that they were barred from the primaries. Adair 
recalled that white suffragists had asked for their help in passing the primary suffrage 
bill, and that black women had  “helped make contacts and excite public opinion and 
worked on people about it.”407 When the bill passed, the black women who had worked 
for its passage fully expected to be able to participate in the primary. However, the 
election officials barred them from accessing the polls. The official explained that blacks 
could not vote in primary elections in Texas, which “just hurt our hearts real bad and we 
went on.”408 Although Adair and her constituents had helped remove one barrier, based 
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on sex, that restricted black women’s access to the polls, the barrier based on race 
remained. 
Adair later moved to Houston and worked for the local branch of the National 
Association for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP). The words of the 
election officials in Kingsville came back to her when Thurgood Marshall advised her 
that “the only time I can take a case and do something with it is when they deny you 
with this word, ‘You can’t do it because you’re a Negro.’”409 Through her work with the 
Houston NAACP, Adair was later involved with the Supreme Court case that brought 
down the all-white primary.  
In 1918, multiple groups of black women tried to register to vote, even knowing 
they would not be able to participate in the primary. One such group of black women in 
Houston was turned away at the tax collector’s office when they tried to register. They 
returned and presented the official with a letter from the local branch of the National 
Association for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP) threatening a lawsuit. 
They were allowed to register. This is even more remarkable because the Houston 
chapter of the NAACP went inactive after 1918, before being revived a few years later. 
Glasrud notes that despite registering, “few [black women] voted in the primary 
election,” as the all white primary usually prevented their participation.410  
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 In the east Texas county of Orange, black women sued the tax collector who 
prevented them from registering. Attorney T.N. Jones wrote Cunningham informing her 
that the local newspaper ran a story about an injunction suit filed in Beaumont against 
R.M. Johnson, the tax collector in Orange County “either for an injunction or a 
mandamus to compel the registration of a certain negro woman.”411 Jones assumed it 
was an attempt by antisuffragists to hurt the primary suffrage law, either by having it 
associated with black voting or by getting a court ruling against it. Cunningham, equally 
concerned, sought details of the case from a resident of Orange County. Mrs. 
Benckenstein replied:  
 The colored women of Orange were told at their church on Sunday that they 
 would be registered on Monday. They proceeded to the Court house where our 
 Sheriff & Tax Collector instead of being courteous in his refusal to register them 
 was very insulting making our [dusky] population very indignant. They then 
 proceeded to employ an attorney to mandamus the sheriff and their attorney 
 happened to be Geo Holland who at the time was & is chairman of the Men’s 
 Hobby Club of Orange Co. They went to Beaumont next day for trial & the judge 
 before whom the case came up was McDonald a great Ferguson supporter & 
 admirer. The case was dismissed.412 
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Benckenstein concluded that “the whole affair could have been avoided very easily” and 
hoped the incident did not hurt woman suffrage.413 In Benckenstein’s view, the issue was 
not that black women were being denied the ability to register to vote, but that the 
authorities had denied that right in a rude manner. Assured that the primary suffrage law 
was safe, at least for white women’s use, Cunningham replied to Jones. She did not 
foresee a problem coming out of Orange, but assured Jones that the legal defense 
committee would handle any that did arise. She added: “The registration figures are 
enough to make Ferguson sick, and I should not blame him at all if he did want to cut us 
out. Those are practically all Hobby voters.”414 
Officially, the primary suffrage bill did not limit voting based on race, as the all-
white primary and the poll tax were expected to legally limit non-white and poor voting. 
However, tax collectors all issued advertisements encouraging women to vote that 
misrepresented which women were legally entitled to register and vote in primaries:  
By authority of a ruling of the attorney general of Texas, all white women who 
 reside outside of Waco were not required to register, and therefore all white 
 women in McLennan County residing outside of Waco, over the age of 21 on or 
 before July 27th, 1918, and who are citizens of the United States, and who have 
 resided in Texas one year and in McLennan county six months may vote at the 
 primary election, regardless of whether or not they registered. 415  
 
The law did not dictate the race of women that were allowed to vote, but clearly 
individual poll tax collectors who acted as voter registrars were determined to limit their 
                                                
 413 Ibid. 
 414 MFC to T.N. Jones, July 13, 1918, box 20, folder 5, McCallum Papers. 
 415 Newspaper clipping, Waco Times-Herald, July 21, 1918, Box 3, Folder 42, 
MFC Papers. 
  146 
registrations to white women. Additionally, while the primary alien suffrage law was not 
enforced in most of south Texas where political bosses backed Governor Hobby, tax 
collectors in other areas took it upon themselves to enforce it through these 
advertisements, which repeatedly list citizenship as a voting requirement.  
 Cunningham wrote to TESA suffragist Jane McCallum about the hard work that 
summer, made sweeter by being able to register to vote herself: 
 I think we are going to be reasonably satisfied with the showing of the women in 
 registration over the state. Don’t you? Its been an awful strain tho! I registered 
 today. And honey you’ll never know how I felt when I walked out with that piece 
 of paper. But I know how a mocking bird feels when he perches on the top most 
 swaying bough and fast tells his heart’s secrets to the world. But for a hundred 
 and sixty pounds excess baggage and the trifling matter of lack of voice, I could 
 have done it myself!416 
 
Approximately 386,000 Texan women registered to vote in seventeen days, or as 
Cunningham put it, “enough to make Ferguson sick.”417 The Dallas Morning News 
headline the morning after the election read: “Hobby Wins by Majority of 250,000 or 
More.”418 The article noted that the total vote was approximately 740,000, but that 
women voting for the first time were the reason for such a large increase in turnout. 
Returns were still coming in but as of that morning Hobby led Ferguson 3 to 1.419  
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After all the election returns were submitted, Hobby won the governorship by 
more than 300,000 votes, giving him a 2 to 1 margin over Ferguson. It remains the 
largest majority ever received in a Democratic primary.420 Ferguson argued that 
women’s votes were unconstitutional, but estimated he earned less than ten percent of 
them.421 A Victoria County paper reported, “If Ferguson’s claim… is correct, without 
the women voting in this county Hobby’s vote would have been less than 549 to 742 or 
more for Ferguson, which would have given Ferguson a majority of at least 149” in 
Victoria County.422 Newspapers ran the numbers for their counties, reporting the actual 
number and estimates of what they would have been without women’s votes, proving 
their impact.  
Congratulations poured into Cunningham’s office; one correspondent called it 
the “greatest victory since [the] battle of San Jacinto.”423 The Woman Citizen carried an 
article titled “Who Will Women Remember?” recalling Ferguson’s St. Louis speech of 
1916. The article concluded, “When the primary returns were all in, it was found that 
James E. Ferguson had been defeated…Texas women remembered.”424  Hobby 
Campaign Manager Crawford wrote Cunningham hopeful that “we will hear no more of 
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this person Ferguson, since the people not only ‘spoke,’ but shouted on Saturday.”425 In 
August, Cunningham wrote Legal Defense Committee-member Crane with good news. 
Ferguson had publicly announced that he would accept the election results as final. 
However, Ferguson and his friends did not consider his career lost. One supporter wrote 
him thanking him for running, prophetically reminding him that he was still young with 
political opportunities in front of him: “I think those who have opposed you for the past 
few years now realize that your case is not settled and that you are still as game as ever 
and getting a little more prepared for the fight as you go along.”426 
While Ferguson accepted defeat, not all politicians did. On August 29, 1918, 
M.A. Childers, a county judge in Sinton, Texas, wrote to Cunningham about his win 
over incumbent Judge F.G. Chambliss of Beeville. Judge F.G. Chambliss was 
considering filing suit, arguing that the primary woman suffrage law was 
unconstitutional and that he would have won if only the “constitutional” vote were 
counted. Childers wrote Cunningham that he had run openly in support of woman 
suffrage, while: 
My opponent, Judge Chambliss, has always been against suffrage for women. 
 During the campaign before the election he made the assertion that he would be 
 alright in the election if it were not for the d-M women. Yet he solicited their 
 votes just the same as I did. My majority may be due to the women, but if it is, I 
 consider it a great compliment indeed.427  
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Childers contacted Cunningham after seeing newspaper coverage of TESA’s legal 
defense committee. Knowing that the suit would be filed in the District Court of San 
Patricio Country, and the Chambliss could not hear his own case, Childers wrote a short 
biography of each of the four judges in adjoining districts who might be appointed by the 
Governor to preside over the case. Childers considered Judge Volney Taylor to be the 
worst possible choice to hear the case as he was “a pronounced Ferguson man and anti-
suffragist.” Childers continued, “I am reliable [sic] informed that my opponent has 
already indirectly conferred with Judge Taylor as to his views on this question, and that 
Judge Taylor has already expressed it as his opinion that the law granting women the 
right to vote in the primary is unconstitutional. My opponent expects to bring pressure to 
bear on the Governor to have Judge Taylor appointed.” Childers hoped instead that 
Governor Hobby would choose Judge John M. Green of Cuero to hear the case as “he is 
a pronounced Hobby man, and believes in full suffrage for women.”428  
 Cunningham replied to Childers asking him to keep her informed of his case and 
promised “we will not sit idly by and permit ourselves to be disfranchised without doing 
what we can to stop it!”429 Childers wrote Cunningham the next day, “The fight is on. 
Judge Chambliss filed his contest yesterday.” Chambliss filed a petition in the District 
Court “to review for illegality and fraud in the Primary Election…the Certificate of 
Nomination, a Democratic Nominee for District Judge...” He argued that the 1,646 
ballots cast by women in the primary election should be thrown out as unconstitutional. 
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Childers again urged Cunningham to speak to “communicate with Governor Hobby at 
once and ask that he appoint Judge John M. Green of Cuero to try the case. He is the 
only [adjoining] district judge who would give us a ‘square deal.’”430  
 Childers handwrote notes on the copy of the petition he sent to Cunningham 
argues that Chambliss campaigned for women’s votes, “he accompanied his tax collector 
to the various voting precincts, where the ladies registered, and solicited each and every 
woman who registered for voting in Bee County.”431 Only after winning the male vote 
by 19 counts, did Chambliss seek to throw out all women’s votes as unconstitutional. 
Not only did Texas politicians enfranchise women when it was politically expedient for 
them to do so, they worked to disfranchise women when it was convenient as well. Not 
wanting to commit TESA’s finite resources to a small contest that would not affect the 
constitutionality of the primary suffrage law in other parts of the state, Cunningham 
wrote a vague reply to Childers, “You will pardon me if I do not go into detail as to the 
assistance which we hope to be able to render you in this fight. I can only assure you that 
we will do our absolute best, and feel sure that you will be satisfied with it.”432  
Judge Chambliss had indeed spoken with Judge Taylor and, giving rise to 
questions of impropriety, the two men made a deal to exchange benches while 
Chambliss’ case worked its way through the court. In other words, Judge Chambliss 
handpicked his friendly colleague to hear his case. Childers reported to Cunningham:  
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Judge Chambliss refused to certify his disqualification to the Governor 
 exchanged Districts with Judge V.W. Taylor of Alice. Judge Taylor appeared at 
 Sinton to-day, and took the bench and called the case. We refused to answer, as 
 we had received no notice of the setting of the case, the law requiring the judge 
 who sets the case to give the contestee five days notice. The case was set for next 
 Wednesday, Sept. 25th. and notice issued to me immediately. Next Wednesday 
 the case will be called, and tried, and a judgment rendered against me.433  
 
Cunningham was in DC working on the federal amendment, when Childers’ 
Campaign Secretary asked her to come to Beeville for the trial.434 Cunningham, ill with 
the flu, was unable to travel.435 Judge Taylor upheld Chambliss’ argument that the 
primary woman suffrage bill was unconstitutional and threw out women’s votes. The 
recount gave Chambliss a nineteen vote win over his challenger. Due to the stacked 
nature of the court system and the limited impact this ruling had on the rest of the state, 
Cunningham chose not to challenge it.436  
Childers did not give up after seeing the Democratic nomination officially 
awarded to Chambliss. Instead his supporters launched a grassroots campaign to have 
voters write in his name on the general election ballot in November instead of voting for 
the official Democratic nominee, Judge Chambliss. The Chambliss campaign accused 
Childers of underhanded tactics and alleged that he had corresponded with people in the 
State who could help him overturn Chambliss’s rightful victory. When Childers searched 
his files for his copy of his correspondence with Cunningham, he found it missing and 
thought it might have been stolen. To clear his name, he got the original letters from 
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Cunningham and made them available to the interested parties. He later forwarded 
Cunningham a copy of the “affidavit of M.C. Nelson, admitting to the purloining of my 
correspondence.” He added “notwithstanding the person insults, the trickery, the 
conspiracies, etc. the friends of good government wrote in my name in sufficient 
numbers to give me more than 300 majority.” When the votes containing misspellings 
were thrown out, Childers’ actual majority was approximately 150 votes.”437 The write-
in campaign was successful, and Chambliss was voted out of office.  
Another local contest that caught the attention of Cunningham and TESA was 
that of the machine-connected, Archie Parr, against D. W. Glasscock. After the election, 
Glasscock had a 1,200 vote lead over Parr, but Parr refused to release the election returns 
from his home county. Fearful that Parr would steal the election by inflating the Duval 
County returns, the Glasscock campaign appealed to Governor Hobby to launch a Texas 
Ranger investigation into “election irregularities in Duval County, as well as the Latino 
precincts of Cameron and Hidalgo counties.”438  
The Rangers uncovered mass electoral fraud including ballots prepared by 
election officials for illiterate Mexican voters; a candidate for office, who happened to 
be political boss Jim Wells’ brother-in-law, who had acted as an election official and 
marked ballots; voters who were not legally eligible to vote including non-citizens who 
had not filed their initial naturalization papers; and citizens who had failed to pay the 
poll tax. Parr finally submitted election returns for Duval County, giving himself enough 
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of an edge to beat Glasscock. When Wells and Parr’s men organized the district 
convention with the intention of awarding the election to Parr, Glasscock’s men bolted 
and formed their own convention, nominating Glasscock and nullifying the votes in 
Duval County based on the Ranger investigation.439 The fight was now between 
Glasscock’s faction with their legally questionable convention and Parr’s faction which 
was clearly guilty of rampant voter fraud.  
Glasscock’s faction appealed to the state Democratic Party, led by Hobby and his 
supporters, who directed the Texas secretary of state to confirm Glasscock as the 
nominee. In response, Parr sued to have the Glasscock’s Certificate of Nomination 
reviewed and to have the courts declare which convention had been the proper 
convention. Glasscock obtained a favorable ruling from none other than Judge 
Chambliss, who ruled that “Parr’s convention was the regular one, and directing that 
Parr’s name be printed on the ballot as the nominee…” Judge Volney Taylor would 
normally have heard the suit, but Taylor and Chambliss had exchanged benches due to 
Chambliss’ own election suit. Additionally, the same attorney represented Glasscock and 
Childers.440 
Like Childers’ faction, Glasscock’s faction refused to give up. In October, they 
formed the Hobby-Glasscock Club to launch a write-in campaign for Glasscock in the 
November election. The Chairman of the club, Chas. H. Flato Jr, wrote Cunningham that 
the “club has for its objective the overthrow of the corrupt machine domination 
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heretofore exercised by Archie Parr, and the installation of ‘Clean politics on the Rio 
Grande,’ and an honest, decent, patriotic, representative for the citizenship of this district 
in the State Senate.” Flato Continued, “Of course, you are entirely familiar with the plan 
of Mr. Parr’s campaign, which is being made in behalf of liquor interests, Fergusonism 
and strictly against woman suffrage.”441 Flato appealed to Cunningham to enlist the 
suffragists in the twenty-third senatorial district to educate male voters how to scratch 
out Parr’s name and write in Glasscock’s. He also wanted Cunningham to write a public 
endorsement of Glasscock for publication in local and state newspapers.  
Cunningham responded three days later, delayed by her bout with the flu. She 
forwarded to Flato a list of women in the 23rd senatorial district whom she was writing, 
urging them to get in the campaign. She specifically lauded Mrs. Wilmer Threadgill of 
Laredo, “a young, vigorous, well educated, progressive woman, [who] did splendid work 
during the campaign in June and July in your district.”442 Finally, as TESA and 
Cunningham rarely ever endorsed specific candidates beyond giving out their record on 
suffrage, Cunningham instead wrote her endorsement as an appeal to local women to 
“get into the fight.”443 Hedging Flato’s expectations, Cunningham warned him against 
using the appeal too widely less the Parr campaign used it “to rouse a spirit of local 
resentment at interference from the outside District.”444 She concluded, “Please exercise 
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your best judgment about making use of it.”445 However, Cunningham did give Flato 
advice on how best to use mobilized women to help Glasscock by distributing 
educational material, canvassing neighborhoods and as poll watchers who could “watch 
the methods of the ‘Steam Roller.’”446 
In her letter to the women of the 23rd senatorial district, Cunningham called the 
election “a contest between the advocates of a democratic form of Government and the 
advocates of the old fashioned ‘Steam Roller.’”447 She argued, “because this question of 
a high ideal in governmental matters is more than a local one, it effects[sic] the welfare 
of the whole state, to appeal to you to do anything that you can to help in the educational 
campaign for good government and the election of Mr. Glasscock as Senator from the 
23rd Senatorial district.”448 Drawing connections between democracy at home and WWI, 
Cunningham continued:  
Remember that much blood has been shed that ‘Governments of the people shall 
 not perish from the earth.[‘] Remember that today our best and bravest are daily 
 making supreme sacrifice of their lives to ‘Make the world safe for Democracy.’ 
 You are privledged [sic] to bear your share in this world movement, you are 
 privledged [sic] to serve in making Texas a state to which those soldiers of 
 Democracy on the Western front may return with joy. I feel sure that you will 
 hold your part of the line.” 449 
  
Flato replied thanking Cunningham, assuring her that he was contacting each of 
the women on the list she sent to him, and assuring her that he was confident they would 
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win the majority of the votes, “whether or not we are able to get a fair count at the polls 
is another matter.”450  
The Glasscock campaign utilized boss-delivered votes in counties friendly to 
them, while working to limit non-citizen voting in counties friendly to Parr in the 
November election. Hobby again had the Texas Rangers patrol Parr’s territory. Armed 
Rangers guarded the polling stations, intimidating Mexican voters. However, Parr was 
able to retain his state senate seat through typical political boss tactics of allowing 
ineligible immigrants to vote and throwing out write in ballots with minor spelling 
errors. He was also aided by the fact that Glasscock’s female supporters could not vote 
in the general election.451  
Hobby won the governorship by a comfortable margin. Annie Webb Blanton was 
also elected State Superintendent of Public Instruction, the first woman to win a state 
office in Texas.452 Texas women were credited with turning the tide against Ferguson, 
and politicians took notice of their political power and usefulness when the Party 
divided. Shortly after the 1918 election, the Texas Democratic Party unanimously 
adopted a suffrage plank, endorsing state and federal woman suffrage amendments. The 
platform, written by Ellis, also advocated a citizenship requirement for voting, “Thus 
making our Texas ballot 100 percent Democratic and 100 percent American.”453 WWI 
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concluded in November of 1918, but nativist sentiment lingered. Evan Anders 
concludes, “the establishment of woman suffrage and the partial enforcement of the 
restrictions on Hispanic voting contributed to the formation of the new Anglo majority 
within the local electorate” of south Texas.454 That new Anglo majority would join 
progressive Democrats throughout the state and further solidify white control of state 
politics in the coming years.  
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CHAPTER V  
“NOTHING SHORT OF A MIRACLE WILL AVERT IT”:  
THE 1919 STATE SUFFRAGE AMENDMENT CAMPAIGN 
 
1918 was a great year for Texas suffragists and for Cunningham. After brokering 
the primary suffrage deal and successfully defeating Ferguson, Cunningham led TESA 
in passing a resolution at their annual convention vowing to hold off on a state suffrage 
amendment in favor of waiting and working for the federal amendment. NAWSA put 
pressure on states to limit the number of referendums requiring NAWSA support and 
money per year. As NAWSA was very close to having the federal suffrage amendment 
through Congress, they did not want to waste resources on a single state or suffer an 
unnecessary loss that could be used against them in their congressional lobbying 
campaign. Concurring with Carrie Chapman Catt’s strategy, Cunningham prepared for a 
fight to ratify the amendment in Texas. Before the 1918 primary election, TESA mailed 
statistics tally sheets to each of its county chairpersons. TESA instructed them to hold 
the sheets until after the election and then return them reporting the total population of 
the county, the number of women registered, and the number of women who voted.455 
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They hoped to use the information to sway representatives in favor of ratifying the Susan 
B. Anthony Amendment when it was sent to the states. 
 As early as November 1918, Cunningham was tactically arguing against 
politicians who wanted to submit a statewide woman suffrage bill. When Representative 
W.L. Dean offered to submit the bill for her, Cunningham replied that the amendments 
enacting prohibition and restricting voting to citizens should come first.456 Following 
Catt’s advice, Cunningham did not want a woman suffrage state amendment to be voted 
concurrently with a prohibition amendment. Both women believed that anti-
prohibitionists would swiftly organize to try to defeat the prohibition amendment, and 
that these organizers would also work for the defeat of the suffrage amendment. 
Requesting amendments requiring citizenship as a voting prerequisite and prohibition be 
passed first allowed Cunningham to delay submission of the state suffrage amendment. 
Such amendments would also eliminate the non-citizen vote controlled by boss rule in 
south Texas, which Cunningham believed would be used against any woman suffrage 
state amendment. In addition to using the citizenship and prohibition amendments, 
Cunningham also argued for a delay on the grounds that suffragists did not want the 
amendment to go to a general referendum until the soldiers had returned from service in 
WWI. She even asked Representative Dean if it was possible to submit the bill with a 
clause that it not go to general referendum until the troops returned home and were able 
to vote.457 Cunningham hoped to delay submission of a state suffrage amendment until 
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the federal amendment had been submitted and ratified, guaranteeing woman suffrage 
throughout the United States.  
 After TESA successfully passed a resolution confirming they would not submit a 
state suffrage amendment in 1919 without NAWSA approval, Cunningham went to 
Washington D.C. to assist NAWSA in lobbying for the federal amendment. She 
persuaded Texas Senator Morris Sheppard to obtain a resolution by the Texas legislature 
in support of the federal amendment noting the success of woman primary suffrage in 
Texas, “In the Democratic Primary of July twenty-seven, nineteen eighteen, the women 
of Texas spoke clearly and emphatically in behalf of civic righteousness and honor in its 
public servants, thus giving trustworthy proof of their eminent fitness for the ballot, 
without any limitations whatsoever, except such as may apply to all voters alike…”458 
The phrase on limitations was likely intended to relieve fears about non-white voting by 
ensuring those concerned that the same restrictions that prevented black men from 
voting would prevent black women from voting as well. The resolution passed by the 
Texas legislature “respectfully but urgently requested [the U.S. Senate] to act 
immediately and favorably upon the woman suffrage amendment which has already 
received proper recognition by the House of Representatives.”459  
 Cunningham was still away from Texas when rumors began to circulate that a 
state suffrage amendment would be submitted despite TESA’s opposition. In late 
December, Catt received word from Mrs. E.B. Reppert, president of the Dallas Equal 
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Suffrage Association, that M.M. Crane, their ally in the impeachment of Governor 
Ferguson and in the fight for primary suffrage, was backing a state suffrage amendment 
regardless of TESA’s official stance.460 Cunningham replied that she was “depressed by 
the nature” of Crane’s letter, concluding, “if the leading Democrats of the state see the 
women of Texas resting under obligation to the Democratic Party, it is indicative of a 
complete failure to envision and appreciate the work which the women did to rescue and 
regenerate the Democratic Party in our state.”461 She specifically mentioned women’s 
work in the campaign against Archie Parr. Cunningham was incensed that Crane 
believed women “enjoy[ed] the right of Primary Suffrage by favor of the Democratic 
Party.” She bitterly recalled the 1916 state convention where suffragists asked for “only 
the endorsement of the principle of Equal Suffrage,… he may remember that we found 
no man, in all that throng, and we asked many, including himself; willing to introduce 
our resolution…”462  
 Fearing that Texas suffragists would be rushed into an underfunded and ill-fated 
campaign, Cunningham wrote to Catt for advice over the Christmas holiday. Referring 
to the public referendum required for an amendment to the Texas constitution, 
Cunningham asked: “Shall we go into that state referendum? The men are wild for us to, 
for their own selfish reasons of course.”463 Progressive prohibitionists believed that a 
woman suffrage amendment would increase turnout for their own cause, and once 
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women were enfranchised, they would largely support prohibition as well. Cunningham 
explained to Catt that suffrage supporters in the legislature suspected that the reason 
TESA would not appeal Childers v. Chambliss, the one court decision against the 
primary suffrage law, was that they feared the law would be overturned as 
unconstitutional. In reality, Cunningham did not want to invest in challenging a ruling in 
such a stacked court, when the ruling did not affect the constitutionality of the primary 
suffrage law in other parts of the state and she was sure the federal amendment was 
forthcoming.464 To promote their own causes and to protect primary woman suffrage for 
their own benefit, progressive legislators sought a amendment to the state constitution 
allowing woman suffrage.465 
 Catt and Cunningham both wrote Crane arguing against the passage of the state 
suffrage amendment in early 1919. Crane replied to Reppert regarding both letters and 
argued that the Texas Democratic platform included a suffrage plank now binding 
Governor Hobby to submit a state suffrage amendment. If Hobby failed to do so and 
immediately, Crane argued, he would “would be classed in that particular with ex-
Governor Ferguson,” who ignored prohibition planks and elections results during his 
administration.466 Crane condescendingly argued that “the decision [of the TESA 
convention] was overridden by the unanimous adoption of the party platform…when the 
entire Convention overrode the decision of the women’s meeting, as a matter of course it 
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was nullified, and the will of the Convention substituted thereof.”467 Crane then 
dismissed Catt’s contention that “saloons will be lined up against us” as the prohibition 
amendment referendum would be held the same day, arguing that the saloons had been 
run out of Texas and were no longer a concern.468 He asked suffragists to not divide 
themselves between national suffragists and state suffragists, and instead work for 
suffrage in all places. He concluded, “the Democrats of the state have taken the subject 
out of the hands of its women, and put it in the hands of the men to vote on now.”469 He 
cryptically warned that if suffragists did not urge legislators to support the amendment, 
“the men may conclude that the time for woman’s suffrage has not yet arrived.”470  
 Reppert again sought Cunningham’s wisdom concerning the state suffrage 
amendment, writing that while she did not want it, “really I believe that nothing short of 
a miracle will avert it.”471 Reppert included newspaper clippings detailing the growing 
momentum for the amendment. One quoted Representative Thomason of El Paso 
discussing the likelihood that suffrage and prohibition amendments would be “submitted 
early in the session.”472 Another noted that Nannie Webb Curtis, president of the state 
Women’s Christian Temperance Union (WCTU), was in Austin working for both the 
prohibition and woman suffrage amendments. Reppert included an editorial written by 
the Dallas Evening Journal editor Tom Finty, whose help Cunningham sought during 
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the primary suffrage bill campaign.473 Finty gave suffragists advice on how to avoid 
losing a state constitutional amendment campaign, citing the recent failure of a similar 
suffrage amendment in Arkansas as an example of what not to do. Reppert despaired to 
Cunningham, “I am hoping by some miracle this ‘cup’ may pass over us, but I am afraid 
we are ‘in for it.’”474  
 Cunningham wrote Catt to discuss Reppert’s insistence that Cunningham support 
the campaign against submitting a full suffrage amendment to the state legislature. She 
stressed the “compact with the National” to not enter campaigns without NAWSA 
consent and the resolution passed by the TESA convention to not enter a state campaign 
in 1919.475 Making matters more difficult, Texas WCTU President Curtis sent out 
circular letters to her supporters and the women’s clubs claiming that “a traitorous 
attempt to defraud the women of full suffrage will be made and that they MUST be on 
guard!”476 Referring to Curtis as “Our friend the enemy,” Cunningham confided to Catt: 
“She [Curtis] hasn’t sense enough to understand the strength of our present position, nor 
the difficulties and expense of a state campaign.”477  
 Curtis was also one of the vice chairmen for a new organization of women that 
first met in January 1919, the Texas Women’s Legislative Association. With primary 
suffrage in hand, and believing full suffrage was sure to follow, this group of Texas 
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women’s organizations formed the Association to lobby for their thirteen-point agenda, 
which included “strengthening laws regarding child labor, working women, mothers’ 
pensions, public education and prohibition.”478 With the support of their respective 
memberships, the Association pursued successful lobbying campaigns including letter-
writing campaigns to legislators similar to those utilized by Cunningham and TESA. The 
Austin American reported that their first meeting was “probably the largest and most 
representative meeting of Texas women ever held in Austin…More than 159 women 
representing practically every woman’s organization in the state of Texas, were 
present.”479 The paper reported that Mrs. Lala Fay Watts, “chief of the woman’s division 
in the Texas State Department of Labor,” called the meeting, which elected Hortense 
Ward as chairman and multiple vice chairman including WCTU President Curtis, Watts, 
Mrs. R. L. Young, and McCallum.480 Suffragist W.E. Spell of Waco was elected 
corresponding secretary. The Association was to be a permanent organization, which 
intended “to co-ordinate the efforts of the women of Texas interested in legislation to the 
end that they may intelligently further the measures which they have closest at heart.”481   
Cunningham believed that Curtis was motivated to push for the state suffrage 
amendment not just by suffrage sentiment, but also by the urge to be a part of a 
successful suffrage campaign, as she was out of the state during the fight against 
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Ferguson. However Curtis was not alone in asking Cunningham to back the full suffrage 
state amendment. Even TESA suffragists wrote to Cunningham imploring her to return 
to Texas to either fight submission of the bill or see it through to passage.482 Hortense 
Ward was a leading suffragist and president of the Harris County Equal Suffrage 
Association in Houston. She was an experienced lawyer, the third woman in the state 
admitted to the bar. She worked for the passage of the Texas Married Women’s Property 
Law of 1913. In 1915 she and her husband were both admitted to practice before the 
United States Supreme Court, making her the first woman from Texas to argue before 
the highest court in the land.483 Not only did Ward support the state prohibition 
amendment; she authored the bill. Ward had tirelessly campaigned among Houston 
businessmen and elected officials for support of the federal amendment in 1917, and she 
was one of the women TESA sent to Austin in 1918 to convince Governor Hobby to 
submit the primary suffrage bill. However, she did not agree with Cunningham and 
Catt’s strategy in 1919. She believed that submitting suffrage and prohibition 
amendments in 1919 would mean progress on both issues.484  
Catt hoped in vain that the federal suffrage amendment would get through 
Congress quickly enough to change the course of events in Texas.485 A ratification 
campaign would be far easier than a state referendum campaign. Cunningham assured 
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Catt that despite the letters she was receiving urging her to return to Texas and push for a 
state suffrage amendment, she would remain in DC fulfilling her commitment to 
NAWSA and the congressional campaign, unless Catt instructed her to return to Texas. 
She felt it best to fight the mounting pressure for a state woman suffrage bill.486  
 Catt received letters from Texas women urging her to support the state 
amendment and to send Cunningham home to Texas. She replied to one such letter from 
TESA suffragist Jessie Daniel Ames: “In order that we may quite understand each other, 
let me repeat: We believe by the middle of January our big task will be over in 
Washington and Mrs. Cunningham can make quick tracks for Texas and attend to the 
ratification and all the incidental problems that may accompany it.”487 She concluded 
with a warning that Cunningham would only be released to Texas if the federal 
amendment failed. Unfortunately for Catt and Cunningham’s strategy, the federal 
amendment was delayed in Congress. It would not pass in January 1919. Ames wrote 
Cunningham beseeching her to come home and warning her against turning the probable 
campaign over to Jane McCallum. Ames praised McCallum and her abilities, but argued 
that Cunningham could not bestow self-confidence or a statewide reputation on her, both 
of which would be needed for success.488  
Meanwhile, Hobby heartily endorsed the full woman suffrage bill he sent to the 
legislature:  
                                                
 486 MFC to CCC, Dec 22, 1918, Box 19, Folder 4, McCallum Papers.  
 487 CCC to Ames, Jan 3, 1919, Box 21, Folder 2, McCallum Papers.  
 488 Jessie Daniel Ames to MFC, Dec 21, 1918, Box 20, Folder 5, McCallum 
Papers.  
  168 
The action of the Thirty-fifth Legislature, in giving partial suffrage to the women 
of Texas by making it lawful for them to vote in party conventions and primaries, 
has, in my judgment, been heartily approved by the people. If any proof of the 
fact were needed to show that women are capable and competent electors, the 
proof was abundantly furnished by the manner of their participation in the 
electorate of the dominant party in Texas.489 
 
Hobby also argued that women’s vital contribution to the war effort was an “additional 
reason for hastening their equality as citizens.”490 He called woman suffrage “a fitting 
reward for duty well performed and at the same time it involves a broader 
Americanism.”491 He then detailed the citizenship clause he submitted alongside the 
woman suffrage amendment. Hobby maintained the citizenship clause, “limits the ballot 
to others who are not equal with respect to Americanism.”492 As an amendment to the 
Texas constitution, the woman suffrage amendment would not only have to pass both 
houses with a two-thirds majority; it would also have to survive a statewide referendum.  
 On January 21, 1919 Representative Thomason wrote Cunningham that it was 
almost a certainty that the Texas legislature would pass both the state suffrage 
amendment and the state prohibition amendment.493 The situation had gone from bad to 
worse. Catt had for years advised against having suffrage and prohibition on the ballot at 
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the same election, fearing that the opposition to prohibition would organize and then be 
more than willing (and able) to fight the suffrage amendment as well.494  
 Progressive Democrats in Texas did not heed Cunningham’s advice, because it 
did not benefit them. As Jessica Wranosky argued, “When male officeholders and 
political leaders backed woman suffrage legislation, they did so specifically to expand a 
political party’s, or faction’s, voter base and influence.”495 Progressive Democrats 
wanted to pass a state prohibition amendment in 1919, that could be enforced before the 
national prohibition went into effect, and they believed putting woman suffrage on the 
ballot would help secure their victory. They submitted the state woman suffrage 
amendment for their own benefit.  
 Additionally, antisuffrage politicians were aware that the Susan B. Anthony 
Amendment was close to approval in the U.S. Senate and they badly needed a suffrage 
defeat to argue against Texas ratifying it. After the success of the primary woman 
suffrage law, and with a legislature stocked with representatives subject to women’s 
votes in the primary, anti-suffragists needed a state suffrage failure if they were to have 
any hope of blocking ratification. Therefore, “no legislators in the House voted against 
the resolution,” although “most legislators representing South Texas and counties with 
large German [populations] were absent from the vote.”496 These legislators likely 
wanted the amendment to pass through the legislature only so that it could fail at public 
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referendum and be used as a basis for not ratifying the Anthony Amendment. However, 
they did not want to be present and go on record supporting the suffrage amendment, 
especially with the citizenship clause included. Being absent allowed them to refrain 
from publicly supporting the amendment while allowing it to pass and be put on the 
statewide ballot.   
 On January 23, 1919, Catt wrote Cunningham that according to her sources, the 
full suffrage bill passed the Texas legislature and that the referendum would take place 
on May 24, a frighteningly short time to campaign in a state as geographically large as 
Texas. Catt feared the consequences of a referendum loss for other suffrage fights in the 
state: “It is quite possible that a defeat of that amendment in Texas would throw us out 
of suffrage for some years to come.”497 She advised Cunningham to try to get the 
measure rescinded. However, Catt suggested a particular strategy if the amendment 
could not be rescinded; she was emphatic that the woman suffrage amendment include a 
citizenship clause. She even forwarded a copy of the South Dakota suffrage bill 
containing the language she thought best. She maintained that it had worked in South 
Dakota and she thought it would work well in Texas too: “If you cannot get it rescinded 
toward the end of the session then by all means leave no stone unturned to get it 
amended with these citizenship clauses.”498  
 Non-citizen voting was remarkably widespread in the nineteenth and early 
twentieth century America. It peaked in the 1870s when approximately “twenty-two 
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states and territories granted aliens the right to vote.”499 Non-citizen voting laws steadily 
declined in the following decades, and in 1889 North and South Dakota were the last 
two states to include non-citizen voting in their constitutions. As of 1900, Texas was one 
of only eleven states that continued to allow non-citizen voting. Four of these states 
banned non-citizen voting before WWI. Another three states banned it in 1918 including 
South Dakota, whose law Catt forwarded to Cunningham. The law repealing alien voting 
succeeded in South Dakota the same year Texas legally banned non-citizens from voting 
in primary elections, although the Texas law was not fully enforced.500 By 1919, only 
four states continued to allow non-citizen voting: Indiana, Texas, Missouri and 
Arkansas. Legislatures in the two states where women had achieved primary suffrage, 
Texas and Arkansas, both passed amendments to end non-citizen voting in 1919, which 
required public referenda.501  
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 The citizenship clause would require all voters to be citizens, and as such, would 
disfranchise so-called “first-paper voters,” those legal resident aliens who had filed their 
intention (or first papers) to eventually become citizens. This would drastically reduce 
the Mexican bloc vote, the bedrock of power for political bosses in south Texas. Bosses 
ruled political machines, which dominated the politics of their respective areas. 
According to Evan Anders, boss rule was a “semifeudalistic system” in which Mexican-
Americans or Mexican immigrants received some advantages in exchange for control of 
their votes and acquiescence to obey the bosses.502 Bosses performed services including 
political favors to powerful ranchers, who then delivered the votes of their Mexican 
workers. The bosses themselves also established paternalistic relationships with the 
workers in order to secure their ballots, and workers pressured bosses for particular 
favors. In 1919, Boss James B. Wells described the relationship thusly: “I take no 
advantage of them or their ignorance. I buried many a one of them with my money and 
married many a one of them. It wasn’t two or three days before the election, but through 
the years around, and they have always been true to me…”503  
Boss rule in south Texas was dependent upon the bloc votes of Mexican legal 
resident aliens. The citizenship clause was part of a set of laws that limited the political 
power of Mexican immigrants. Early twentieth century immigration drastically reduced 
the number of Mexican immigrants in Texas who qualified to file for citizenship. In 
1906, Congress passed laws requiring all immigrants to speak English and to have 
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registered at their port of entry in order to qualify for citizenship.504 In Texas, 
approximately 63% of non-citizen Mexican immigrants did not speak English in 1900. 
The new immigration laws also caused petitions to expire after seven years if they had 
not been completed. Many of those immigrants whose applications expired did not meet 
the new standards required for citizenship. Of the 28,597 initial petitions for citizenship 
filed by Mexican immigrants in Texas between 1848 and 1906, only 416 were 
completed and resulted in citizenship. After the law went into effect, only about 2,027 
petitions were still considered active.505 Additionally, as immigration laws in Texas 
encouraged the immigration of laborers, Mexicans who walked across the border “did 
not have to register or pay a fee,” which was required of immigrants who came by 
steamship or train.  Many Mexican immigrants in Texas were excluded from citizenship 
by the new law, which specified that immigrants had to have registered upon entry to be 
eligible.506 
In 1907, Congress passed the naturalization act that cemented women’s 
dependent citizenship, by requiring women to take their husband’s nationality in all 
cases. Married women were barred from applying for citizenship independently of their 
husbands. Anthropologist Martha Menchaca cites the 1910 U.S. Census estimate that 
“34,182 people of Mexican descent were part of mixed households in which one parent 
was born in Mexico,” to argue that “the law thus allowed many Mexican women to gain 
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citizenship, while in other cases it caused U.S.-born women to lose it.”507 The 
naturalization laws of the early twentieth century made it far more difficult for Mexican 
immigrants in Texas to qualify for citizenship. However, political bosses largely ignored 
the laws, continued to have these workers file first papers, illegally paid poll taxes for 
them when necessary, and instructed them how to vote in elections.  
 Citizenship voting bills had been considered by the Texas legislature before. In 
January 1917, the El Paso Morning Times headline read: “Bill Before Legislature to 
Prevent Mexicans Voting.”508 The paper reported, “Representative Dudley declares men 
from across the [Rio Grande] River are voted in herds and he wants constitution changed 
to make alleged practice obsolete.”509 Dudley and his fellow El Paso representative, 
progressive Democrat R.E. Thomason sponsored the legislation. Tellingly, 
Representative José Canales, representing Cameron and Willacy counties in south 
Texas’s seventy-seventh district, publicly opposed the citizenship-voting bill because 
non-citizen voting was occasionally necessary “in order to save the Democratic 
party.”510  
                                                
 507 Menchaca, Naturalizing Mexican Immigrants, 211-212; See: U.S. Census 
1913b: 799. 
 508 “Bill Before Legislature to Prevent Mexicans Voting: Amendment is 
Proposed by El Pasoans at Austin,” El Paso Morning Times, Jan 30, 1917, 
(texashistory.unt.edu/ark:/67531/metapth198631/m1/1/: accessed June 16, 2016), 
University of North Texas Libraries, The Portal to Texas History, texashistory.unt.edu; 
crediting University of Texas at El Paso. 
 509 Ibid. 
 510 Ibid. José Canales served represented the ninety-fifth district (Cameron, 
Hidalgo, Starr, and Zapata Counties), with the support of political boss James Wells, 
from 1905 to 1910. He then ran as an independent in 1910 and became supporting of 
prohibition and woman suffrage. He was elected as a Democrat to represent the Seventy-
  175 
 In 1918, the legislature attempted to weaken the voting power of non-citizens by 
passing a primary alien suffrage law preventing non-citizens from voting in primary 
elections or nominating conventions. Its passage also ensured that the primary woman 
suffrage law would not enfranchise immigrant women. In 1919, the legislature passed 
the Thomason law, requiring that election officials only use the English language when 
assisting voters, and only those voters over sixty years of age or the physically disabled, 
or who had been citizens for at least twenty-one years were to receive aid. This provision 
allowed election officials to assist illiterate native-born whites, but prohibited assistance 
to non-English speaking immigrants or naturalized citizens.511  
 Progressives had been largely opposed to non-citizen voting, although when 
given the opportunity they embraced the system to ensure electoral victories. Running as 
a reformer in Duval County, D.W. Glasscock courted non-citizen votes delivered by 
machine bosses in his 1918 primary race against boss Archie Parr, as had Hobby in his 
fight against Ferguson. However, the investigations into voting fraud in the Glasscock-
Parr race brought non-citizen voting and the rampant voter fraud amongst the south 
Texas political machines into the spotlight. Glasscock contested the seating of Archie 
Parr before the Texas Senate and called for electoral returns from Cameron, Hidalgo, 
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Willacy, Starr and Duval counties to be thrown out as it was impossible to distinguish 
the legal votes from the plethora of illegal ones. Concurrently, Representative Canales 
called for an end to Ranger intimidation of and violence against Mexicans and Mexican 
Americans in south Texas. Canales supported Hobby, but strongly believed that Ranger 
violence had to be stopped.  
 The Senate chose to investigate the Glasscock-Parr contest, and substantiated 
Glasscock’s claims of fraud among Parr supporters. However, they found that the 
Glasscock campaign equally guilty of capitalizing on the controlled Mexican bloc vote 
and committing voter fraud. Concluding that both men were equally corrupt, the Senate 
chose 16 to 4 to seat Parr. The Senate investigation and the headlines it produced helped 
further turn the tide against non-citizen voting and the corrupt political machines whose 
power rested upon it.512 Historian Evan Anders notes that while Parr clearly ran a corrupt 
political machine, “any endorsement of the Glasscock cause must be qualified, however, 
because of the racial implications of the insurgent uprising…For the Mexican 
Americans, a new Anglo order would mean labor exploitation, untempered by 
paternalistic concessions, and complete exclusion from the political process.”513  
Changing patterns of immigration and violence along the border contributed to 
the further exclusion of Mexicans from political power in Texas. After the Mexican 
Revolution began in 1910, the Mexican immigrant population in the United States 
surged. Menchaca cites the U.S. Census to argue that “by 1917 it was estimated that the 
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Mexican population had more than doubled during the war years and had increased to 
over four hundred thousand.”514 The majority of these refugees settled in Texas. 
However, the declining economic and political power of Mexican immigrants combined 
with their social reality of discrimination and unequal rights led to a seditionist 
movement.  
Historian Gabriella González explains that at the center of the centerpiece of the 
movement “was a manifesto known as the Plan de San Diego, a plot to kill Anglo males 
over the age of sixteen and return territories to Mexico.”515 Sediciosos or seditionists 
attacked Anglo-owned businesses including ranches, railroads, and military camps. The 
unequal and violent response from the Texas Rangers and Anglo vigilantes led to the 
murder of hundreds of Mexicans in South Texas. González adds “Most of those killed 
were not part of the seditionist movement and simply fell victim to the strong anti-
Mexican fervor.”516 The heightened levels of violence close to the border after the 
Mexican Revolution climaxed between 1915 and 1916.517 When the United States 
entered WWI, rumors abounded that Mexican immigrants would be forced into the 
American military. Governor Ferguson even made a tour of border towns to “give 
personal assurances to fleeing Mexicans…who are being frightened into deserting their 
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crops and crossing into Mexico to avoid conscription, in an effort to say the wholesale 
migration…” of a much needed labor force.518 
 In the wake of the violence, intimidation and rumors intended to encourage 
immigrants to return to Mexico, and increased Anglo immigration into South Texas, the 
Mexican immigrant population in South Texas declined as a percentage of the 
population during WWI. Even so, racial attitudes hardened, the legislature installed new 
voter restrictions, and the Texas Rangers enforced them when it benefited those already 
in office. Governor Hobby mobilized the Texas Rangers to “discourage Mexican 
voting,” when it suited him.519 Menchaca argues that U.S. entry into WWI and the U.S. 
government’s increasingly hostile stance against revolutionary Mexico “cast doubt on 
the desirability” of German and Mexican immigrants in Texas and “tarnished their 
allegiance to the United States.”520 She concludes that German immigrants were 
perceived as “alien enemies” and Mexican immigrants as “a nuisance.”521  
Texas suffragists capitalized on the nativist sentiment and what they saw as the 
injustice of non-citizen voting in light of their own disfranchisement. Their propaganda 
in late 1917 focused on “alien enemies” voting while “loyal American women” 
remained disfranchised.522 Anders argues that the persistence of machine rule even in the 
wake of increasing violence and voting restrictions, led to an “association of Mexican-
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Americans with widespread corruption and reinforced the ethnic prejudices of the Anglo 
voters of the state.”523  
 Representative Canales’s efforts to rein in the Texas Rangers led to a Texas 
Senate investigation that “expose[d] the full scope of Ranger lawlessness,” though did 
little to change the laws or reform the organization. Wells and Parr supported Canales in 
his efforts, but were opposed by most other legislators.524 The legislature was not 
particularly concerned with civil rights violations and vigilante violence perpetuated by 
the Rangers. Reform Democrats supported Hobby, who stood accused of using the 
Rangers to manipulate elections in south Texas in his favor. Anglos in south Texas also 
disapproved of the charges, as the Rangers were seen as a check on the power of the 
political bosses backed by Mexican voters. Defenders of the Rangers argued that the 
tactics in question, which included the killing of more than two hundred Mexicans along 
the border, were required to “restore order.”525 The Ranger investigation further linked 
voter fraud, non-citizen voting and corrupt political bosses in the public mind, increasing 
public will to eliminate the practice. 
 In the 1919 regular legislative session, progressive Democrats passed two state 
constitutional amendments that were extremely important for their agenda. One was a 
prohibition amendment that would go into effect sooner than the federal prohibition 
amendment. Much to Cunningham and Catt’s dismay, the other bill was a statewide 
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suffrage amendment, which included the citizenship clause.526 Unbeknownst to Catt, the 
amendment had been submitted alongside a citizenship amendment, and the two were 
combined. If woman suffrage passed, non-citizens would be disfranchised. If woman 
suffrage failed, first paper voters would retain the right to vote.527 Although Catt 
believed it was a winning combination in the midst of the nativism of WWI, it contained 
a fatal Achilles’ heel; women could not vote in a special election, but non-citizen men 
could vote. 
 The woman suffrage amendment with the citizenship clause intended to 
disfranchise legal resident aliens and weaken the system of boss rule in South Texas. 
The violation of election laws concerned progressives. Anders maintains: “All of the 
bosses systematically violated the election laws of the state by paying the poll taxes of 
their Mexican-American followers, recruiting ineligible aliens to vote, marking the 
ballots of illiterate voters, and tampering with the results when necessary.”528 Voter 
fraud angered Texan progressives, including white woman suffragists. These reformers 
sought to purify elections and rid them of fraud, in part by eliminating the votes of black 
and brown Texans.529 Dry Democrats considered these voters racially inferior, 
uneducated, and too easily bought. Darlene Clark Hine defined legislator Alexander 
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Watkins Terrell’s “right sort” of man for the ballot as “undoubtedly, white, native-born, 
of the upper socioeconomic class, and a Democratic party loyalist.”530 According to her 
biographer, Annie Webb Blanton “believed the quality of voters –who, in her mind, 
would be educated, native, white, middle- and upper- class citizens of both sexes – 
remained more important than simply having a numerous electorate.”531 In response to 
the violation of election laws and the inclusion of voters that they deemed unqualified or 
fraudulent, progressives pursued disfranchisement. 
Texans were also concerned that the black vote could be the deciding factor in a 
divide of the dominant Democratic Party. Hine argues that Texans were “ever mindful of 
the potential of the black electorate to hold the balance of power when white people 
divided.”532 At the turn of the century, in response to a threat presented from populists 
who tried to unite disparate factions in the state, Democrats imposed the (Alexander 
Watkins) Terrell election laws establishing the all white primary and the poll tax.533 The 
laws made voting more difficult if not impossible for poor whites, cash-poor farmers, 
and blacks, all of which were active constituents in the populist movement. Even with 
these electoral controls, Democrats still had reason to be fearful. After all, capitalizing 
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on a divide within the party is exactly how white Texas women achieved primary 
suffrage. The factional split influenced nearly all decisions made in the party. 
Progressive prohibitionists maintained that blacks voted against prohibition, because 
liquor interests paid them to do so. This logic led them to further favor disfranchising 
black Texans. They were also disheartened when individual candidates attempted to win 
close elections by appealing to the small number of black voters.534  
Heightened levels of violence between whites and blacks reached climactic 
levels throughout the 1910s, particularly after the U.S. entered WWI. Between May and 
October of 1919, the so-called Red Summer, “twenty-five major racial conflicts” broke 
out in the United States.535 Hine notes that in this decade, “the number of riots, lynching, 
and violent interracial clashes reached their highest level every,” in Texas.536 In the town 
of Longview in Northeast Texas, racial tensions ran high as Samuel L. Jones and Dr. 
Calvin P. Davis, both leaders in the black community, encouraged black farmers to sell 
their products in Galveston for higher prices than selling locally to white buyers. 
Concurrently, a local black man named Lemuel Walters was lynched for dating a white 
woman.  
The Chicago Defender covered the lynching, and whites angered by the 
unfavorable news coverage targeted the local reporter responsible. A white mob was 
fired upon as they approached the reporter’s house. The men fled, recruited other whites, 
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and formed a mob that burned black residences and black-owned businesses and beat a 
teacher. The County Judge E.M. Bramlette and Sherriff D.S. Meredith called on 
Governor Hobby to help restore order, and Hobby ordered eight Texas Rangers to the 
area. He also put three Texas National Guard units stationed nearby on alert.  
When the Rangers did not arrive soon enough, the sheriff again turned to 
Governor Hobby, who ordered 100 guardsmen to immediately restore order in 
Longview. Eventually Hobby ordered another 150 guardsmen to Longview and declared 
the entire county to be under martial law. Brigadier General R.H. McDill enacted a 
curfew and confiscated all firearms, even from city peace officers. Eventually a white 
citizens’ committee agreed to work with the guardsmen and passed resolutions 
disapproving of the shootings and arsons. Texas Rangers arrested seventeen white men 
and twenty-one black men, although none were tried once the violence subsided. After 
the end of five days under martial law, normal life resumed and citizens retrieved their 
previously confiscated firearms.537  
Instead of blaming whites who initiated the violence, the state blamed blacks and 
particularly called out the NAACP for instigating racial violence through their 
publication of racial injustices. In response to the Longview Race Riot of 1919, the state 
attorney general subpoenaed the Austin NAACP’s records. The NAACP national 
secretary John Shillady went to Austin to discuss the matter, and “was beaten by a gang 
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composed in part of local officials.”538 Governor Hobby blamed Shillady for the incident 
and the NAACP for inciting the Longview Race Riot. He supported a campaign to rid 
the state of the NAACP. By 1923, only five NAACP branches remained active in the 
state.539 Both violence against black and brown Texans and an increase in disfranchising 
laws curbed their political power in the late 1910s and early 1920s.  
 Responding to the effort to disfranchise a substantial portion of their base of 
power, conservative politicians including bosses James Wells and Archie Parr decided to 
focus their efforts against the woman suffrage amendment in 1919, rather than divide 
their efforts between the prohibition and woman suffrage amendments. The woman 
suffrage amendment, with the citizenship clause, could be far more damaging to the 
machine control than prohibition.540 Wells took this position alongside his wife, Pauline 
Wells, who led the Texas Association Opposed to Woman Suffrage (TAOWS), a branch 
of the national organization. Pauline Wells was the first woman to address the Texas 
Senate in 1915, when she gave an impassioned speech against woman suffrage, linking 
votes for women with “feminism, sex antagonism, socialism, anarchy, and 
Mormonism.”541 Pauline Wells established TAOWS in March 1916 in Houston along 
with prominent member Ida M. Darden. Although the organization failed to manifest 
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widespread grassroots support, the leaders of the movement circularized the state with 
antisuffrage literature. TAOWS regularly argued that woman suffrage would lead to 
black domination of the South. They had lobbied against the primary woman suffrage 
bill to no avail in 1918. In 1919, with the assistance of her husband, Pauline Wells and 
TAOWS distributed more than 100,000 pieces of antisuffrage literature.542  
 In contrast to the TAOWS campaign’s focus on woman suffrage, Cunningham 
followed Catt’s advice and made the citizenship clause the focus of TESA’s 1919 state 
campaign. While Cunningham had led suffragists to avoid making overt racial 
arguments for suffrage, she and Catt both felt that arguing against non-citizen voting and 
specifically non-citizen voting in south Texas by Mexican immigrants was a winning 
strategy. She regularly asked supporters to emphasize that clause in their arguments and 
she did the same in hers.  
 Historian Walter Buenger argues that Texas progressives, including suffragists, 
rejected the Confederate myth in Texas in the 1910s and 1920s. He maintains that 
antisuffragists’ effort to tie antisuffragism to the Old South was detrimental to their 
cause, as the state moved away from Confederate mythology of the Lost Cause and 
instead embraced the mythology of the frontier, the Texas Revolution, and the Alamo.543 
Historian Greg Cantrell concurs with Buenger, that “the years beginning around 1910 
saw an upsurge in interest in the period of Anglo-American colonization and the Texas 
Revolution, as Texans began distancing themselves from the memories of the Civil War 
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era —memories associated with slavery, defeat, military occupation, and poverty.”544 
 Cantrell further argues that progressives wished to portray a “New South that 
included harmonious (albeit paternalistic and unequal) race relations.545 In this context, 
anti-suffragists’ racist arguments about woman suffrage leading to black domination, in 
a state that as of 1910 was only 18% African American and contained no more than ten 
counties with black majorities, may have actually hurt the anti-suffrage cause.546 On the 
contrary, Cunningham’s strategy to focus the campaign on non-citizen voting in the 
hyper-patriotic WWI era with its increasingly ugly nativist streak seemed to fit the 
prevailing attitudes of progressivism in Texas and the United States, while also playing 
on racial biases against Mexican Texans.  
 Cantrell contends that the version of Texas history which progressives embraced 
was “very much a white, male, elitist version.” Citing Oscar Branch Colquitt, Governor 
of Texas from 1911 to 1915 as his example, Cantrell argues “Colquitt may have wanted 
his fellow Texans to forget about slavery, the Civil War, and Reconstruction, but also he 
wanted them to remember a whites-only version of the Texas Revolution, a version in 
which Hispanics or Indians appear only as the enemy.”547 With violence from the 
Mexican Revolution spilling across the Texas border, violence from Texas Rangers 
viciously attacking Mexican Americans and Mexican immigrants in south Texas, and the 
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Zimmerman telegram leading many Americans to view Mexico as a potential threat 
during WWI, the mythology of the Texas Revolution was useful for those who sought to 
further delineate good, Anglo Texans from bad, Mexican immigrants and Mexican 
Americans.  
 When it became clear to Cunningham that a state suffrage amendment campaign 
was inevitable, she relented and returned to Texas. In late January, letters were already 
leaving TESA headquarters noting the election of May 24 and declaring “every woman 
in Texas should enter into it with enthusiasm and bring us triumphantly to the end of our 
labors…”548 Cunningham attended the signing of the suffrage resolution on February 5 
and was presented with one of two gold pens Hobby used to sign it. One newspaper 
reported “The Governor made no speech, merely stating that he was delighted to affix 
his signature to the document.”549 Cunningham issued a letter to TESA board members 
pretending to be pleased that the full suffrage amendment had passed the state legislature 
and calling an emergency board meeting for February 12, 1919 in Austin. Maintaining 
her focus on the federal amendment she also called a meeting of the ratification 
committee that same morning, with a joint meeting of the committees in the afternoon.550  
 The board meeting also scheduled TESA’s annual meeting for June 11-13, 1919, 
only a couple of weeks after election day. The announcement read: “Suffrage 
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Convention to be Victory Celebration.”551 However, Cunningham’s statement to the 
paper reveals her hesitancy about this campaign. The paper reported “…in mapping out 
the campaign, [Cunningham] called attention to many advantages it will have over 
previous ones waged, and also pointed out several handicaps, Mrs. Cunningham said: ‘It 
is an unwise general who would go into battle without considering advantages and 
disadvantages, and we must be ready to overcome all handicaps in this fight.’”552  
 Crane wrote Cunningham in early February regarding the forced campaign, “the 
present situation cannot be helped.”553 He complimented Cunningham’s gracious 
acceptance of the campaign she had tried so hard to avoid, “Your graceful acceptance of 
the unalterable condition imposed on the delegates by their constituents to put the state 
suffrage plank in the platform led me to believe you be able to endure what could not be 
helped as uncomplainingly as anyone, and much more so than most of us men.” 
Although he concluded the letter offering, “if at any time you think I can serve you, you 
may command me,” he did not come to Cunningham’s aid in the campaign.554 When she 
telegrammed Crane that TESA had chosen him as the chairman of the advisory 
committee for the state amendment campaign, he promptly declined, claiming “it will be 
impossible for me to give time to campaign work.”555 Cunningham wrote that his 
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response was “a great disappointment.”556 She emphasized that they did not want his 
time so much as his name and occasionally his advice when TESA suffragists asked for 
it.  
 Cunningham told Crane she was encouraged by the TESA board meeting at the 
start of the campaign, in which she argued the suffragists saw both their “handicaps” and 
“our undoubted advantages.”557 Cunningham inquired as to who was running the 
prohibition campaign, hoping the two campaigns could assist each other. Crane replied 
that Harper Kirby was the chairman of the prohibition campaign and maintaining that, 
“the two campaigns dove-tail into each other most beautifully.”558 He then continued to 
offer unsolicited advice on campaigning to Cunningham, who by this point was a 
veteran of Texas political campaigns. Crane explained that the newspapers were for the 
suffrage and prohibition amendments and could be counted on to provide free publicity 
so that neither campaign needed to waste their resources on direct circulars throughout 
the very large state. Referring to the 1918 gubernatorial campaign, Crane argued that 
“tens of thousands of dollars have been absolutely wasted by using it in a manner that is 
not effective,” by paying to print and mail circulars.559 Crane’s unwillingness to actually 
help the campaign while offering uninformed advice and assuming the success of the 
campaign was assured were all bad signs. Cunningham’s progressive male allies were 
not lining up for this fight, which they presumed had already been won. 
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 Cunningham’s reluctance to go forward with the suffrage amendment 
referendum must have been common knowledge among clubwomen and suffragists in 
the state, because Jane McCallum felt the need to issue a statement on the rumors. “Mrs. 
M’Callum Says Friction Does Not Exist,” read the headline. McCallum recounted 
receiving letters about “a great row among the women leaders at the Capitol.” McCallum 
responded to the rumors:  
 As always among intelligent people, there have been differences of opinion. In 
 this particular instance the differences concerned chiefly the time our amendment 
 should be submitted. There were a number of straightforward, candid, but 
 perfectly friendly arguments on the subject…The difference as to the year was 
 quickly and definitely settled when, on the same morning, Governor Hobby in 
 his message asked for submission at the earliest possible moment, and the United 
 States Senate failed to pass the Federal Amendment. ‘The difference as to the 
 month continues to call for discussion…‘The Texas Equal Suffrage Association 
 already is thoroughly organized and merely awaits the setting of the date before 
 launching an active campaign in every county in the State.560 
The election date was set for May 24, 1919. Cunningham personally signed each circular 
letter sent to senatorial district chairmen on February 27, 1919, noting that they had only 
twelve weeks to carry the campaign to victory.561  
 Some southern suffragists preferred enfranchisement by state amendments to 
enfranchisement by a federal constitutional amendment. Kate Gordon, in particular, was 
horrified by the Susan B. Anthony amendment, and believed it to be a violation of states’ 
rights. Ever the strategist, Cunningham was more pragmatic. When arguing about the 
federal amendment to a Texas politician, she wrote, “This right has been given the 
                                                
 560 Newspaper Clipping, “Mrs. M’Callum Says Friction Does Not Exist,” Box 8, 
Folder 6, MFC Papers. 
 561 MFC Circular to Senatorial District Chairmen, Feb 27, 1919, Box 21, Folder 
1, McCall um Papers. 
  191 
negro- the alien, the Inidian [sic] by The Government and especially at this time and in 
the great need why avail about the method of righting a wrong and doing what in 
common justice should have been done long since.”562 Although Cunningham usually 
chose to avoid mentioning race in her arguments for fear that woman suffrage would be 
linked with black voting, when arguing against states’ rights opposition to a federal 
suffrage amendment, Cunningham routinely mentioned the obstacles to a state 
amendment, which she identified primarily as black and alien immigrant voters (though 
she emphasized non-citizen voting more than black voting). Following Catt’s advice, 
Cunningham made non-citizen voting the focal point of the 1919 suffrage campaign.  
 Getting down to business, Cunningham organized a State Advisory Committee 
for the Suffrage Campaign, writing local suffragists to nominate men of standing in their 
towns. She then sent the nominees an invitation to join the committee, a copy of the 
campaign outline, and a request for campaign advice.563 As with the rest of the 
campaign, Cunningham emphasized the alien amendment: “Our amendment is designed 
to enfranchise the loyal American women of this state, but to disfranchise the alien 
enemies in our midst, and the aliens have such an advantage over us in that they can vote 
on the Amendment while we, the women, cannot.”564 Cunningham argued that this 
handicap required her and other women to “lay aside our natural differences in asking 
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and call loudly for help from the American men of this state…”565 Cunningham used the 
threat to the state presented by non-citizen voting to counter any moderate or 
conservative discomfort with women campaigning for their enfranchisement. Prejudice 
against non-citizen voters could allay prejudice against political women in public. 
 TESA propaganda emphasized the citizenship clause and appealed to the 
patriotism of wartime voters. “Are you an American Citizen?” read one TESA flyer. 
After summarizing the citizenship clause the flyer concluded, “If you believe in America 
and American citizenship, vote and work for the adoption of Suffrage Amendment on 
May 24th.”566 Edward Idar, editor of the Laredo newspaper Evolución, was critical of the 
suffrage amendment, although he wrongly concluded that suffragists were against 
immigrant voting only because of a deal between suffragists and prohibitionists.567  
 One of the circulars Cunningham sent to her county chairman argued that the 
citizenship clause had “received little attention.”568 After stating that Texas was one of 
only a few states that still allowed alien voting, she argued, “This was found during the 
war to be a serious menace when the alien enemy was exempt from military service but 
could vote, while Americans went into the Army and were, therefore disfranchised. It is 
no less serious, these reconstruction days.”569 While Hobby argued that one reason 
                                                
 565 Ibid. 
 566 TESA Flyer, “Are you an American Citizen.” Box 8, Folder 11, MFC Papers. 
 567 Menchaca, Naturalizing Mexican Immigrants, 224-225; See: Evolución, 
March 16, 1919 & March 18, 1919. 
 568 MFC to TESA County Chairwomen, February 1919, Box 2, Folder 48, MFC 
Papers. 
 569 Ibid. 
  193 
women deserved the vote was their war service, Cunningham declared that one reason 
legal resident aliens deserved to be disfranchised was their lack of war service. 
 Desperate to canvass the state and take advantage of every opportunity to 
convince voters, Cunningham inquired about giving a suffrage speech at the Georgetown 
Mayfest shortly before the election. When she learned the only speech would be a 
“patriotic address” by Governor Hobby, she wrote Hobby directly, “Will you not say a 
few words for the Amendment from the standpoint of the American citizenship 
qualification included in it? We believe that this will be entirely in keeping with an 
address on true patriotism…”570  
 In Annie Webb Blanton’s April letter to Cunningham, she noted a conversation 
with suffragist Edna Beveridge. Both women were concerned that the bill preventing 
voters from receiving undue aid filling out their ballots passed without the votes for an 
emergency clause, meaning it would not go into effect for 90 days, well after the May 24 
election. Blanton believed that illiterate or non-English speaking voters would have their 
ballots filled out for them: “So foreigners can vote against us on May 24. I fear the 
result, if this is the case.”571 
 Ever the strategist, Cunningham kept a close eye on the opposition. Noting the 
anti leaders were former Governor Ferguson, border boss Jim Wells, and Wells’ wife, 
Pauline who headed TAOWS, Cunningham concluded that “this whole campaign is 
terribly mixed with the Ferguson issue, and the real tug of war is to see whether he can 
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swing the strength against Suffrage which he was able to swing for himself in last 
summer’s campaign. If he can, we are beaten, because Hobby would never have been 
elected without the women and the women cannot vote for themselves.”572 However, 
Cunningham took comfort in the knowledge that the “men in power know that win or 
lose this campaign we still have Primary Suffrage and know how to use it with deadly 
effect.”573  
 Although Catt and NAWSA had emphasized their limited resources and inability 
or unwillingness to help state campaigns that were not approved, they began working on 
finding resources for Texas. In March, NAWSA’s Nettie Shuler telegrammed 
Cunningham that they could offer four organizers and possibly a fifth later. NAWSA 
offered to cover their travel to and from the state and salary and expenses while in the 
campaign.574 Cunningham was also working on getting local men and women to speak at 
events in support of the amendment.575 The most impressive speaker they were able to 
secure was Dr. Anna Howard Shaw. In fact, Shaw wrote Catt insisting that she visit 
Texas instead of other southern states because of the importance of this campaign.576  
 Cunningham later wrote Catt complimenting the “splendid work” the national 
organizers were doing in Texas. However, she did have to explain one incident that 
created enmity between a national organizer and Cunningham. Early in the campaign, 
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two judges wrote editorials in newspapers on the problem of soldier voting, and 
Cunningham and the organizer took opposing sides on the issue. At the original Texas 
state constitutional convention on July 21, 1845, Mr. Anderson moved to include the 
words “provided that no soldier, seaman or marine belonging to the army or navy of the 
United States shall be entitled to vote in any election to be held under this 
Constitution.”577 The Debates of the Convention summarizes his position:  
 He thought no argument was necessary to convince the mind of the necessity of 
 this provision. It was sustained by precedents, being contained in nearly every 
 State Constitution in the United States. Without something of the kind, those who 
 should be introduced here for purposes of defence [sic], would be permitted to 
 mingle in elections, without knowing the wants and necessities of the particular 
 county where they might vote, and might frequently elect an individual to 
 represent us in some office of the State, contrary to the express wish of the 
 county.578 
 
The amendment was adopted and included in the 1845 Texas constitution.579 Anderson 
was only partially correct. Many states had a clause mandating that military service in 
that state could not be used to qualify for residency and voting privileges. However, 
Anderson’s phrasing did not just prevent servicemen who were residents in other states 
from becoming Texas residents through their military service. His phrasing also 
disfranchised any Texan who enlisted or was drafted into the military. This poorly 
phrased clause disfranchising all Texans for the length of their military service remained 
enshrined in Texas law for more than one hundred years.  
 Additionally, WWI servicemen were effectively disfranchised well after 
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returning home. Texans had to pay the poll tax before February 1 to be eligible to vote in 
that year’s elections. When servicemen returned home after that date, they were 
disqualified from voting for the rest of the year as they had not paid the poll tax on time. 
The disfranchisement of servicemen in Texas was a glaring inconsistency in WWI when 
Texas was home to “half the country’s military camps and most of its airfield.”580 One 
suffragist informed Cunningham that the “women in Bastrop were astounded when told 
that their sons in uniform cannot vote-yet the first paper aliens may.”581 Although her 
senator advised Neas to avoid using this argument as it “touched our venerable 
constitution,” Neas insisted that “it fitted our purpose and assisted in crystallizing [sic] 
the matter for women.”582 She was able to convince the senator of the wisdom of 
focusing on servicemen disfranchisement and alien voting in the suffrage amendment 
campaign.  
 While Texans who joined or were drafted into the services automatically lost the 
right to vote, enlisted New Yorkers training in Texas were able to vote through an early 
version of absentee ballots during the war. One paper reported that in 1916, a New York 
soldier stationed in McAllen, Texas had determined the result of a local election of 
assessor in his hometown in a race that was tied before his vote was counted.583 The 
1917 New York election included a referendum on woman suffrage. In reporting on the 
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upcoming election, newspaper articles noted that one-tenth of the New York state 
electorate was active military, which could delay election results as they would vote on 
absentee ballots. Newspapers also carried stories of legislative efforts in West Virginia 
to allow servicemen to vote while serving in other states, on ships, or overseas.584 Yet in 
Texas, servicemen were absolutely disfranchised for the length of their service, 
regardless of where they were stationed, even if they were still in their hometowns.   
 With the war officially over in November of 1918, Texan servicemen were 
slowly beginning to return home. The issue at hand in 1919 was the effective 
disfranchisement of returning servicemen who had been disfranchised and out of the 
state when the poll tax window closed on February 1. As such, even if a WWI veteran 
returned home to Texas in time for the election, he remained disfranchised. The judges 
in question wrote their opinion that the law was never meant to disfranchise such loyal 
and respectable men and suggested that they could legally, or rather extra legally, vote, 
because no registrar was going to stop them and no judge would dare rule against them, 
despite what the law said. Multiple supporters joined in writing newspaper editorials 
claiming that returning soldiers could vote without having paid the poll tax before the 
window closed in 1919.585  
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 According to Cunningham, the two judges who initially published the idea were 
known Ferguson supporters. She believed the issue was actually raised “to open the 
flood gates of the Rio Grande upon the election (by Ferguson and his friends) in the 
guise of permitting the discharged soldiers to vote without poll tax since they were not 
here to pay poll taxes in January.”586 If election officials did not enforce the poll tax in 
1919, political bosses in south Texas could increase the controlled machine vote without 
expending funds on poll taxes. Cunningham did not think this issue was really about 
returning American servicemen being able to vote without poll tax receipts. She 
suspected it was an effort to encourage election officials to refrain from requiring poll 
tax receipts from any soldier, in particular soldiers leaving Venustiano Carranza’s 
constitutionalist army in Mexico. She reported to Catt that multiple suffragists, including 
the NAWSA organizer in question, fell for it and were campaigning for a law that would 
allow returning soldiers the legal right to vote instead of expecting them to be allowed to 
vote extra-legally.587  
 As Blanton and Beveridge toured Federation of Women’s Clubs district 
meetings, they encouraged Texan women to support soldier voting. They hoped that 
once the returning veterans were enfranchised, women would “reap their gratitude” in 
the form of support of the suffrage amendment.588 Progressive Democrats believed that 
young men of service age would support progressive issues like prohibition and woman 
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suffrage; they subsequently believed that WWI servicemen’s inability to vote hurt their 
cause. Blanton wrote Governor Hobby and suggested “if the thing can be done legally, 
he call a special session of the legislature at once, get the constitution amended so to let 
the soldiers vote, set a special election for it before May 24, and let them vote on 
prohibition and woman suffrage.”589  
 Blanton wrote Cunningham advising her of this emerging campaign. She wanted 
circular letters sent to members of the parent-teacher associations, mothers’ congresses, 
federated clubwomen, and the suffrage association members urging a letter-writing 
campaign to Governor Hobby and Texas legislators in support of soldier-voting. 
However, Blanton waited for Cunningham’s advice before pursuing the letter-writing 
campaign, and Cunningham immediately replied for her to cease efforts on this front.590 
Cunningham believed suffragists were busy enough campaigning for the woman 
suffrage amendment with the citizenship clause. She did not want them distracted by the 
soldier voting issue, which would likely require its own constitutional amendment, but 
once the issue of returning servicemen voting in Texas had been raised, it would not go 
away.  
 In the 36th Legislative Session, Walter Elmer “Uncle Elmer” Pope submitted a 
bill that would have at least enfranchised WWI veterans who returned home to Texas. 
HB 7 permitted returning soldiers with honorable discharges to vote without a poll tax 
receipt. Although the bill originally contained an emergency cause allowing it to go into 
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effect immediately instead of after the ninety-day waiting period, the bill did not pass 
with the two-thirds majority needed to enact the emergency clause. As it stood, the bill 
would go into effect after the special election on May 24 in which two divisive 
constitutional amendments would be voted on: statewide woman suffrage and 
prohibition.  
Pope’s bill was extremely broad in its definition of “Military Service,” which 
included:  
…all officers and enlisted men of the Regular Army, the Regular Army Reserve, 
 the Officers’ Reserve Corp, and the Enlisted Reserve Corp; all officers and 
 enlisted men of the National Guard Reserve recognized by the Militia Bureau of 
 the War Department; all forces raised under the Act entitled ‘An Act to authorize 
 the President to increase temporarily the Military Establishment of the United 
 States’ approved May eighteenth, nineteen hundred and seventeen; all officers 
 and enlisted men of the Navy, the Marine Corps, and the Coast Guard; all 
 officers and enlisted men of the Naval Militia, Naval Reserve Force, Marine 
 Corps Reserve, and National Naval Volunteers recognized by the Navy 
 Department…591 
 
However, the bill did not stop at what most would consider military service. It went on 
to include:  
all officers of the Public Health Service detailed by the Secretary of the Treasury 
 for duty either with the Army or the Navy; any of the personnel of the 
 Lighthouse Service and of the Coast and Geodetic Survey transferred by the 
 President to the Service and jurisdiction of the War Department or of the Navy 
 Department; members of the Nurses Corps; Army Field Clerks; Field Clerks; 
 Quartermaster  Corps; civilian clerks and employees on duty with the military 
 forces detailed for service abroad in accordance with provisions of existing law; 
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 and members of any other body who have heretofore or may hereafter become a 
 part of the military or naval forces of the United States…592 
 
Finally as Pope was supportive of woman suffrage, he included a clause in case 
woman suffrage was achieved applying the exemption to women who were overseas as 
well: “…provided, however, that if franchise be hereafter given females in this State, 
this Act shall likewise apply to such females holding certificates of honorable discharge 
from the military service of the United States as used herein according to the provisions 
granting franchises to said females.”593 
On March 19, 1919, in a surprising move Governor Hobby vetoed the bill. On 
March 14, he had asked the attorney general’s office for an opinion on the law, and the 
attorney general responded that, in his view, the law was unconstitutional.594 Multiple 
newspapers reported that the attorney general found the law unconstitutional but failed 
to identify the constitutional issue.595 This left Hobby open to criticism from his 
opponents (and opponents of woman suffrage and prohibition) that he was against 
soldier voting.  
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In his official opinion to Governor Hobby, Attorney General C.M. Cureton found 
the soldier-voting law in violation of four different sections of the state constitution 
ruling it “unconstitutional and void.”596 Attorney General Cureton explained that the bill 
could be read one of two ways. The first view was that it did not exempt returning 
servicemen from paying the poll tax, but allowed them to vote without paying it as a 
prerequisite. Cureton held that if this was the case, the bill violated Section 2 of Article 6 
of the state constitution, which declares the poll tax a prerequisite to vote (in connection 
with Section 3, Article 7 that actually levied the poll tax). However, if the bill exempted 
servicemen from paying the poll tax altogether, then it was in violation of Section 3, 
Article 1 of the state constitution regarding equal rights: “…no man, or set of men, is 
entitled to exclusive separate public emoluments, or privileges, but in consideration of 
public service.”597 It was also in violation of Section 1 of Article 8 requiring that 
“taxation shall be equal and uniform.”598 Cureton referenced a dozen or so cases 
supporting his decision including one in which he quoted the decision: “While the 
exercise of the elective franchise is a privilege rather than a right, yet all regulations 
upon that subject must be reasonable, uniform and impartial.”599 Cureton included this 
note despite the fact that he referred to voting as a right multiple times throughout his 
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opinion. He concluded that HB7 if “signed and filed by you with the Secretary of State 
would be void.”600 Following Cureton’s legal counsel, Hobby vetoed the bill.  
Vetoing a soldier-voting bill at the end of WWI was a public relations nightmare 
for Governor Hobby. The Bartlett Tribune and News ran an article titled: “MEN FROM 
OVERSEAS REFUSE TO PARADE WITH GOVERNOR.”601 The wounded soldiers 
were recovering at the Fort Sam Houston base hospital in San Antonio and had been 
scheduled to ride in a San Jacinto Day parade with the governor advertising the Liberty 
Loan when they heard of his veto and refused to participate because of it. The Director 
of the Red Cross on the base, S. Arthur Shaw, asked the men to reconsider, but “they 
flatly refused, their spokesman saying they ‘would not ride in the parade with a governor 
who took the soldier’s vote away.’”602 Shaw again attempted to persuade the men to 
participate, but they only agreed after he said: “The issue is broader than any State 
political quarrel and you should continue to do your duty to your country in spite of any 
Texas Governor.”603 The paper reported that the soldiers rode in the parade using the 
phrase “in spite of any Texas governor” as their slogan.”604  
 Hobby’s political opponents continued the verbal assault in opinion pieces. One 
such article was titled “GIVE OUR FIGHTERS A CHANCE” and argued that it was 
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impossible for returning soldiers to have paid their poll tax when they were fighting in 
France. It described the legislation that Hobby vetoed: 
 It was thought that their services to the country was worth more than a 
 measley[sic] little dollar and six-bits. This bill passed and it would have become 
 law, but something happened to it. Governor Hobby desired that these patriots of 
 ours had not right to vote on their return; they were good fighters, but they might 
 not be good reformers; they had saved the world for Democracy, but that same 
 Democracy was afraid to recognize their freedom by giving them a chance to 
 pass on some proposed fanatical changes in the constitution of Texas….605 
 
The article encouraged “the manhood of the state” to vote against the reforms Hobby 
supported.606  
 While suffragists generally assumed that the young men returning from the war 
would vote for reforms, there is no evidence that they were correct in this assumption. 
However, after Hobby’s veto, anti-prohibitionists and anti-suffragists argued that the 
“manhood” of Texas should vote against these issues to spite the governor who robbed 
soldiers of the ballot.607 It is an interesting appeal not to the returning soldiers 
themselves, but at men who would be angry at the continued disfranchisement of ex-
soldiers.  
Local and state suffragists offered their support for any law that would 
enfranchise servicemen, which they believed was right but would also help their own 
cause. Beveridge asked Cunningham to support a letter writing campaign she began 
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urging Hobby to fix his mistake: “We wanted to strike while the iron was hot and get all 
the credit we could toward our cause out of it…The legislature will not turn it down, the 
public is with the soldier…”608  
Cunningham wisely kept TESA out of the public debate. She believed the men 
who initially raised the issue did so to further Ferguson’s aims of preventing state-wide 
woman suffrage and prohibition. She wrote Beveridge: “We deplore the lack of the 
soldier vote and have deplored it from the house tops. We endorsed the law[,] which the 
Governor vetoed. BUT since he vetoed it, it seems to me the gravest error in policy for 
us to complicate our campaign with the question...”609 Cunningham assumed that since 
the law was vetoed due to the attorney general deciding it was unconstitutional, then the 
only way to enfranchise returning servicemen was to amend the constitution. That 
constitutional amendment would require a referendum; meaning soldiers would not be 
enfranchised in time to help suffragists in the 1919 election. Suffragists wanted to 
enfranchise servicemen in the hopes that servicemen would soon repay the favor, not to 
add unnecessary work to their overcrowded plates. Cunningham, in particular, did not 
think a large enough group of servicemen would return to Texas by May 24 to make it 
worth the effort. However, when it became apparent that the issue was hurting Hobby 
and the reform amendments, Cunningham and other TESA leaders worked behind the 
scenes to pressure Hobby into encouraging and signing a law similar to the one he had 
vetoed.  
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 Many lawyers and politicians wrote articles printed in newspapers around the 
state arguing that returning soldiers could vote as long as election officials agreed with 
their reasoning. In April, Senator T.H. McGregor, who served as Vice Chair of the 
Privileges and Elections committee in the House in 1915 and chaired that committee in 
1913, was quoted in a newspaper article arguing that soldiers had not forfeited the right 
to vote: “I therefore believe if the bar concludes, and will so declare itself, that the ex-
soldier can vote that he will be permitted to do so.”610 His reasoning was that no 
“authority in Texas has held directly nor indirectly that an ex-soldier can not vote 
without a poll tax receipt.”611 He maintained that without a decision in an appellate court 
before the election, the election judges would be left to decide the issue “and the most of 
the them, if not all of them, will hold that the boys are qualified and will let them 
vote.”612  
 The author instructed returning soldiers to take their discharge papers with them 
and go to the polls, contending that as soldiers were not subject to the poll tax when they 
were overseas and that it was therefore constitutional that they should vote without a poll 
tax receipt, “There is not a red-blooded civilian in Texas who would not rather have the 
folded discharge of the humblest private soldier in all that army for one hour than a paid 
up poll tax for the rest of his life.”613  He concluded that voting is a right, not a privilege 
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or benefit and “the law protects and enforces [voting] as jealously as it does property in 
chattels or lands.”614 
In response to the public furor and the pressure from reformers, Hobby called a 
special session of the legislature in May.615 Again, the legislature would only address the 
effective disfranchisement that ensued when soldiers returned to civilian life after the 
poll tax deadline and not the absolute disfranchisement of servicemen for the length of 
their service; the later would require amending the state constitution. Suffragist Jane 
McCallum of Austin noted to a friend: “As I write, Austin is all agog with excitement 
over the calling of the legislature in special session to provide a way for soldiers to vote 
in the May elections.”616 She noted in her diary: “Legislature called together to arrange 
for soldiers to vote. Mrs. Cunningham, Mrs. Doom and I started them off!”617  The next 
day, McCallum’s diary recalls her meeting two men, presumably legislators, who “came 
to office on my invitation to talk our soldier voting problem.”618 McCallum hoped for a 
compromise law that could pass and be considered constitutional by the governor and 
attorney general. 
Confident in the legislature’s ability to write a constitutional soldier-voting bill, 
McCallum sought publicity for the fact that the suffragists had helped the soldiers’ 
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cause: “The way will undoubtedly be found, and suffragists have used their influence to 
help bring it about.”619 She then asked for publicity congratulating Texas women for 
getting soldiers the ballot and listing reasons why soldiers should vote for woman 
suffrage. 
While those opposed to woman suffrage and prohibition railed against Governor 
Hobby in the press, suffragists like Edna Beverage supported his decision and tried to 
explain his veto to a skeptical public. A Temple Daily Telegram article announced 
Beverage’s forthcoming speaking engagement for suffrage and noted that Hobby had 
called the special session for servicemen voting. The article stressed Hobby’s legal 
reasoning for vetoing the first bill, placing some of the blame on the authors of the bill 
and on the attorney general. It also reminded readers that, “even if it had become a law 
would not have permitted the ex-soldiers to vote in the election this month.”620 However, 
the article again failed to specify what elements of the original bill were unconstitutional 
leaving some to doubt Hobby’s motives.  
 The special session of the legislature met the first week of May 1919. They 
received a message from the governor directing them to address the enfranchisement of 
returning soldiers:  
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I am informed that there are fully 75,000 Texas soldiers who have been 
 discharged since the adjournment of the Regular Session. Entertaining with you 
 the same view with respect to this subject and believing that it is in accord with 
 the true genius of democratic government not to suffer a needless restriction on 
 the right of suffrage I was favorable to this measure. The bill, however, on being 
 submitted to the Attorney General for his opinion, was declared unconstitutional, 
 and for this reason was vetoed.621 
 
Hobby went on to say that while he agreed with the legislature that something 
must be done to address the problem, the bill he vetoed did not have the two-thirds vote 
needed to put it into effect before June 16, which was well after the special election. He 
called on the session to pass a law with the two-thirds votes necessary to ensure the right 
to vote for returning servicemen in the May election. He also addressed those who 
believed that returning servicemen already had the right to vote, arguing that without a 
decision by a higher court, confusion would result “preventing many of the discharged 
soldiers from voting, even if they have such a right.”622 He urged the legislature to bring 
order to the chaotic situation. Finally, Hobby wanted the legislature to address how to 
prevent people from impersonating recently returned servicemen in order to illegally 
vote. Hobby concluded: 
The friends of good government and honest elections in Texas want the 
 discharged soldiers to vote. The enemies of good government and honest 
 elections in Texas want the gap open so those who pose as soldiers can vote and 
 repeat their vote when the occasion requires or when the orders from 
 headquarters direct. Those who are sincere in their desire to settle the great 
 question to be voted on May 24 according to the will of the people of Texas want 
 an election whose legality cannot be questioned.623  
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In an argument reminiscent of Cunningham’s suspicions when the issue was first 
raised, Hobby argued that anyone who said soldiers already had the right to vote and 
wanted to leave the issue at that was actually counting on confusion on election day and 
the ability to challenge election results they did not like thereafter. He asked the 
legislature to pass a bill: “1. To permit the discharged soldiers to vote without payment 
of the poll tax. 2. To prevent the slacker or imposter who has not paid a poll tax from 
representing himself as a soldier and voting. 3. To bring about a uniform system in each 
and every county in Texas under which discharged soldiers may vote.”624  
It was during this special session that Cunningham spoke for the woman suffrage 
amendment in the Texas House of Representatives. Judge James A. King supported 
woman suffrage and believed returning soldiers would as well. He wrote Cunningham, 
“in your speech this A. M. in House you might fortify, the statement that the soldiers, as 
a rule, will vote for Equal Suffrage…”625 He recalled an anecdote in which a Red Cross 
worker was walking across a military base when a vehicle stopped to offer her a ride, 
“No woman who are our partners in the war shall walk when we kakhi [sic] boys can 
give them a ride!” King concluded, “So at the election on May 24th, the kakhi [sic] boys 
will help the women ride [over] the top into the Ballot Box...”626 King added that 
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Cunningham could allude to the fact that the female Red Cross worker would be in the 
audience, but he asked that she not specify his wife by name.627  
Multiple versions of the returning veteran voting bill were put forth and multiple 
amendments were suggested as well. Representative Pope submitted House Bill No. 5. 
In it he included “widows of deceased soldiers who died in the military service of the 
United States after January 1, 1915.”628 Similarly when Senate Bill 1 made its way to the 
House, Pope offered an amendment that war widows “may vote without the payment of 
a poll tax so long as she remains single, if otherwise qualified to vote under the law at 
the time she offers to vote.”629  
The successful bill was far more limited in scope than the original. It relieved 
“discharged soldiers, sailors, and marines” from paying poll taxes in 1918 and 1919 in 
order to vote in 1919 and 1920. Specifically, it declared that since servicemen were 
prevented,  
by reason of [servicemen, sailors and marines’] service and obedience to the 
 laws, rules and regulations of the military service, and by reason of the 
 inadequate provisions of the laws of this State, from paying their poll taxes under 
 the provision of Section 2, Article 6 of the Constitution of this State, and, by 
 reason  of the great calamity of war as aforesaid, have been so prevented; and 
 whereas it is declared in Section 9, Article 16 of the Constitution of Texas that 
 absence on business of the United States shall not forfeit a residence once 
 obtained so as to deprive anyone of the right of suffrage, therefore it is declared 
 that sailors, soldiers and marines should and ought not to be compelled to pay 
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 their poll taxes due or assessed against them for the years A.D. 1918 and A.D. 
 1919.630  
 
Because the bill had the votes to enact the emergency clause, it went into effect on May 
9, 1919, less than two weeks before the election in which the state woman suffrage 
amendment was decided.631  
McCallum sought publicity thanking suffragists for getting the soldier-voting bill 
passed, and she listed reasons why soldiers should vote for the suffrage amendment.632 
Although Cunningham advised suffragists to avoid being publicly drawn into the 
problem of servicemen disfranchisement, she admitted to working behind the scenes 
with McCallum and others to urge legislators to address the issue. In a letter to 
Beveridge she wrote: “The whole thing was under advisement at the time when you and 
Miss Blanton wrote me and I was wild with anxiety for fear some public section on the 
part of women would up-set the plans.”633  
Cunningham privately wrote Catt in May, explaining that after the editorials by 
judges friendly to Ferguson about soldiers voting, Governor Hobby “conferred with 
friends of the Pro and Suffrage Amendments and called the Legislature, ostensibly to 
grant these few returned discharged soldiers the right to vote without poll tax, but in 
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reality to put certain safe barriers up against those soldiers being out of Carranza’s 
army.”634 She further explained that one of the NAWSA organizers was still very upset 
with Cunningham’s handling of the soldier-voting issue: “She was not only hurt, but 
thinks I am downright stupid politically and that I missed a grand chance to make us a 
whole new set of voters all our own!”635 Considering the bad press Governor Hobby 
received for his veto, and the convoluted legal manipulations required in passing a 
constitutional soldier voting law, Cunningham was wise to keep TESA out of the public 
campaign.  
In response to propaganda encouraging returning soldiers and their supporters to 
vote against both a prohibition and woman suffrage amendment, and realizing the 
benefits of good press to be gained by having recently returned war veterans serve as 
spokesmen for the cause, Cunningham recruited returning soldiers to campaign for 
woman suffrage.636 She successfully enlisted the help of returning Major Richard F. 
Burgess to speak for the state woman suffrage amendment. He initially replied that he 
believed the amendment would pass overwhelmingly without his assistance, but agreed 
to aid the last week of the campaign only if Cunningham believed he was needed.637 
Cunningham replied that 
…a very active propaganda to the effect that the Suffragists and Prohibitionists 
 sought to have these two amendments voted for while the soldiers were out of the 
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 electorate has hurt us tremendously. I feel then injustice of this keenly because 
 the Suffragists did everything possible to keep our Amendment from going to the 
 vote before the soldiers were demobilized.638 
 
Burges sent an official statement to McCallum at her request for use in the campaign 
emphasizing women’s war service and concluding that “the millions of American 
women who served their country with equal fidelity at home, should remove the last 
doubt in the mind of anyone that the extension of the equal right of suffrage is a long-
deferred act of simple justice.”639  
Some suffragists were encouraged that returning soldiers could vote, but suffrage 
leaders soon realized that very few servicemen would return home in time to vote. 
Instead, they used their support of the war cause and returning servicemen to encourage 
men at home in Texas to vote for the suffrage amendment. McCallum wrote to 
newspaper editors urging their support: “ 
To you especially we appeal to use all the power of your paper to see that the 
 foreign and near-foreign men in Texas, most of whom were exempted from 
 military service, do not, in the absence of our soldier boys, vote themselves into 
 power, and at the same times disfranchise the mothers, wives, sisters and 
 sweethearts who have stood behind these boys unreservedly, unflinchingly and 
 without counting the cost.640  
 
                                                
 638 MFC letter to Major Richard F. Burges, May 15, 1919, Box 3, Folder 7, MFC 
Papers.  
 639 Richard Burges to Jane McCallum, April 29, 1919, Box 6, Folder 3, 
McCallum Papers. 
 640 Jane McCallum to Editor, The Times of Brownsville; The Recorder of 
Greenville; The News of Loraine; The News of Orange Grove & The Messenger of May; 
March 13, 1919, Box 5, Folder 20, McCallum Papers.  
  215 
McCallum advised local suffragists throughout the state to get letters from soldiers 
favorable to suffrage printed in their local newspapers on Mother’s Day, May 12, 
1919.641 Beveridge wrote Cunningham that she had “asked all the soldiers today in 
Ballinger if they were going to stand by the women with their vote. You bet we are, they 
said.”642  
 TESA fought an uphill battle in 1919. As women could not vote, their 
propaganda could only encourage them to “let your husband know how you feel about it 
so that he will help you to get the vote.”643 Both Mexican and German immigrant men 
wielded the vote although in fewer numbers due to harsher naturalization and voting 
laws and increased migration out of south Texas in response to the anti-Mexican 
violence of the 1910s. Edward Idar reported many Mexican immigrants learned that they 
were ineligible to vote only when they went to the polls on election day. Some even 
went directly to the courthouse to file new petitions for citizenship, “but a great many 
were unable to apply, as they were told the new laws required that they speak 
English.”644 
 With their reduced numbers and an increasing Anglo population in south Texas, 
the state suffrage amendment passed in seven out of the twelve most southeastern 
counties, although the vote was close in most of them. The political bosses in south 
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Texas were losing control as their voting bloc shrank and Anglos resistant to their 
dominance moved into the area. Only Duval and Starr counties voted overwhelmingly 
against the suffrage amendment. The amendment lost by large majorities in counties 
with significant German immigrant populations.645 Additionally, if the soldiers really did 
support woman suffrage at the ballot, there were not enough of them. Prohibitionist men 
also failed the suffragists when they went to the polls. While the prohibition amendment 
passed, the would-be full suffrage bill failed by 25,120 votes in 1919.646 Male legal 
resident aliens retained full voting rights, while citizen women maintained the right to 
vote in party conventions and primaries only.  
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CHAPTER VI  
“WE NEVER HAVE YET HAD…A COMPLETE VICTORY, THERE IS ALWAYS A 
BITTER DROP IN THE CUP”:  
THE RATIFICATION CAMPAIGN AND SAVING THE POLL TAX 
 
The night before the 1919 state election, Carrie Chapman Catt wrote 
Cunningham, “For better or worse you have fought a good fight… We never have yet 
had an easy victory or a complete victory, there is always a bitter drop in the cup… We 
will hope for victory; we are prepared for any news and will bless you in any event.”647 
Cunningham had only reluctantly entered the 1919 campaign and was well aware of the 
odds stacked against the state woman suffrage amendment. Defeat did not surprise her, 
although she briefly investigated charges of electoral misconduct that may have illegally 
or at least unethically contributed to the loss.648  
The most egregious allegation concerned the order of the amendments. On the 
official ballot issued by the Secretary of State’s office, the suffrage amendment was 
second on the ballot, but mysteriously on election day, twenty-eight counties in the 
Ferguson stronghold of East Texas used a ballot with the amendments in a different 
order. Further adding to the confusion, the tally sheets continued to list the suffrage 
amendment as the second amendment on the ballot, leading to inaccurate counts. TESA 
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also “received reports of ballot boxes left unguarded and polls that never opened.”649 
Cunningham and TESA made the decision to accept the defeat in the state campaign 
although they alleged unfair election practices had been used. If they had filed suit and 
lost, they would have been responsible for their own legal bills as well as their 
opponents, and they did not have the means to accept taking on that financial risk, nor 
the time to pursue the case through the court system. 
Cunningham had spent the first half of 1919 coordinating two campaigns: the ill-
fated campaign for the state suffrage amendment and the campaign to get the Texas 
legislature to ratify the Susan B. Anthony Amendment once the federal Congress 
approved it and sent it to the states. Cunningham had committees working on both issues 
from January into the spring of 1919, and after the state suffrage amendment was 
defeated on May 24, 1919, she immediately shifted focus to the ratification effort, as she 
expected the Anthony Amendment to be successfully passed by the U.S. Congress in a 
matter of weeks.  
Five days after the failed election, U.S Senator Sheppard assured the press and 
Cunningham that the results would not change his vote on the federal amendment. He 
argued that even if he were an anti-suffragist, “I would still vote for the federal suffrage 
amendment, because it submits to the states the question of federal suffrage for their 
decision under the method established by the constitution itself.”650 He reassured 
Cunningham that “the noble work you and your associates have done for suffrage in 
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Texas… is certain to bear splendid fruit in the future.”651 The United States Congress 
passed the Susan B. Anthony Amendment and sent it to the states for ratification in June 
of 1919, a few short weeks after the state amendment was defeated. Cunningham was 
left to focus on getting the Texas legislature to ratify the Anthony Amendment, a 
difficult task in a southern state.  
According to Cunningham, suffragists began working “the day after we knew we 
had lost our referendum, whereas the Antis were too busy counting up a great big 
majority against us so we couldn’t contest the election and expose their cheating.”652 
Suffragists had to counter the prevailing antisuffrage argument that the referendum 
proved Texas did not want votes for women. Specifically suffragists had to justify why 
they lost the state woman suffrage amendment referendum and argue that Texas should 
ratify the federal amendment in spite of that loss. The Texas Association Opposed to 
Woman Suffrage (TAOWS) argued that the May referendum proved Texans did not 
want woman suffrage. TAOWS president, Pauline Wells, and anti-suffragists Charlotte 
Rowe testified against ratification before the state legislature.653 Political bosses Jim 
Wells, Archie Parr, and more than a hundred conservative politicians petitioned the 
                                                
 651 May 29, 1919, Sheppard to MFC, Box 5, Folder 30, MFC Papers, UH Special 
Collections.  
 652 Winegarten and McArthur, ed., Citizens at Last, 193.  
 653 Handbook of Texas Online, Debbie Mauldin Cottrell, "Texas Association 
Opposed To Woman Suffrage," accessed June 10, 2016, 
http://www.tshaonline.org/handbook/online/articles/vbtvw. 
  220 
legislature to vote against ratification out of respect for the May 1919 election results. 
They further argued that the amendment was a violation of states’ rights.654   
Additionally Cunningham was “advised that a strong effort will be made to 
repeal that part of the Primary Election Law which permits women to participate in the 
primaries…”655 Historian Walter Buenger argues that reform Democrats in the 
legislature made a political calculation to support ratification, because they knew that 
women primary voters could oust those politicians who voted against it.656 Perhaps to try 
to remove this incentive for politicians to support ratification, but also to deal a blow to 
suffrage, anti-suffragists worked to have the primary woman suffrage law repealed. 
Cunningham wrote politicians supportive of woman suffrage, asking them to counter 
any action taken against the primary woman suffrage law by anti-suffragists.  
For anti-suffrage politicians to alter this portion of the election law, they needed 
Governor Hobby to submit the election laws of the state to a special session of the 
legislature. Hobby had promised Representative R.D. Thompson of Greenville that he 
would do just that as Greenville wanted to amend an unrelated portion of the law. 
Cunningham asked her supporters in the legislature to convince Greenville “to release 
the Governor from his pledge since it greatly jeopardizes our interests.”657 Cunningham 
argued that suffrage supporters could defeat a legislative challenge to the primary 
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woman suffrage law, but concluded “there is really no reason why we should go through 
the fight if we can prevent it…”658 
On June 6, 1919, Cunningham wrote Senator Westbrook to inform him that she 
was “securing from the Secretary of State’s office in Washington the proper form for the 
Ratification of a Federal Amendment…”659 She apologized if her actions appeared 
forward, but argued that “a burned child avoids the fire!” She argued that the 1919 state 
suffrage amendment “was destined to defeat from it’s [sic] very wording,” and that if 
TESA had authored a “properly worded amendment” the results may have been 
different.660 She explained that some of the campaigning came down to the wording of 
the bill, and that the phrase “‘Qualifications for male and female voters’ was interpreted 
by the Ferguson campaigners to the tenant farmers as meaning to limit voting to men and 
women who owned land…”661 She did not want similar phrasing issues to come up 
during the ratification fight.  
University of Texas Professor Alexander Caswell Ellis was particularly useful in 
TESA’s ratification campaign. He had edited The Texas Democrat during the 1919 state 
suffrage amendment campaign, using this platform to champion woman suffrage and 
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prohibition.662 His assessment of the 1919 state election helped suffragists frame their 
loss in terms of non-citizen voting and the prohibition issue. The suffrage amendment 
had performed surprisingly well in South Texas counties. Anders argues that, “the 
establishment of woman suffrage and the partial enforcement of the restrictions on 
Hispanic voting contributed to the formation of the new Anglo majority within the local 
electorate” in south Texas.663  
Anders also notes the “massive exoduses of [Mexican immigrants and Mexican 
Americans] in 1915 and 1917 and the campaign of the Texas Rangers to deter illegal 
voting in 1918,” contributed to the new Anglo hold on political power in South Texas. 
He maintains that while Mexican immigration into south Texas increased again after 
WWI, these new arrivals had no loyalty to the political machines. The recently arrived 
Anglo farmers who hired these immigrants generally opposed the machines as well. 
Anders argues that by 1920, “Anglo voters outnumbered the ring-controlled Hispanic 
voters by a majority of almost two to one.”664 While boss rule would not die out in all of 
south Texas, its hold was drastically weakened after WWI by both demographic trends 
and the state’s changing elections laws.  
Ellis compared the 1919 state election returns across counties to argue the defeat 
was primarily due to German immigrant and German American voters in central Texas, 
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who were in some places aided by Mexican and black voters.665 When the strategy to 
link woman suffrage with the citizen-voting clause failed, TESA blamed non-citizen or 
recently naturalized voters for defeating the amendment. Cunningham wrote one 
legislator that he should not have been surprised that the amendment failed as it was, 
“handicapped with an alien exclusion rider and by some oversight of our friends and 
machinations of our enemies, rushed to the vote while approximately 200,000 American 
men were out of the electorate in the United States Army. There are in this state nearly 
150,000 men of voting age (United States Census 1910) foreign born.”666 Cunningham 
emphasized the German explanation for the amendment’s defeat although historians 
Judith McArthur and Harold L. Smith argue, “she knew reality to be more complex.”667  
This argument was reiterated by suffrage supporters who also wrote legislators, 
at the request of TESA suffragists: “Also I do not regard the recent election as a true and 
fair expression of the majority of the Democratic voters of our state, and think it is 
particularly to be regretted that the woman suffrage amendment and the alien 
amendment were combined so that each could not be determined on its own merits.”668 
TESA issued flyers explaining away their loss and arguing that, “Democratic legislators 
do not violate their platform and personal pledges at [the] behest of a majority made by 
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Negro and Republican votes.”669 Citing numbers gathered by Ellis, the flyer argued, 
“twenty German counties gave 41,836 anti-suffrage, pro-alien votes,” and “twenty 
Negro counties gave 27, 195 anti-suffrage, pro-alien votes.” The flyer concluded that 
wherever substantial numbers of black, German or Mexican populations were present, 
the amendment lost. However, it explained the success of the amendment in south Texas 
by arguing, “the illiteracy of the Mexicans prevented their voting at all under our new 
law, with the result that every one of these counties gave Suffrage a majority.”670  
TESA issued ratification campaign propaganda blaming the failure of the state 
suffrage amendment on multiple factors including: overconfident supporters who 
thought their votes were unnecessary, two hundred thousand Texan men still enlisted 
and unable to vote, and the short time allotted for a campaign before the hastily 
scheduled election, which competed with a Liberty Loan drive. The last two reasons 
suffragists cited as responsible for the amendment’s defeat were “the illegal changes in 
the official ballots used in 28 counties” and “the fact that woman suffrage was bound up 
with the exclusion of the large alien vote in the state, and could not be voted for on its 
merit…”671 Cunningham made the case that for all of the reasons cited above, the 1919 
state referendum could not be considered a true expression of the political will of Texans 
regarding woman suffrage.  
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 In July of 1919, Ellis responded to “an open letter to a prominent politician” 
written by anti-suffragists demanding that the politician in question name those who he 
referred to as “the forces of evil” organized against woman suffrage. Ellis responded by 
naming the impeached Governor James E. Ferguson, who “directed the campaign 
against suffrage.”672 Ellis recounted the paid advertisements “which must have cost 
much money [and] appeared over his [Ferguson’s] signature in leading Texas papers.”673 
He reiterated that the ads included “scurrilous personal attacks” on nationally prominent 
suffragists like NAWSA President Catt and Dr. Anna Howard Shaw.674 Ellis then 
recounted numerous instances across the nation in which anti-suffrage forces worked 
against woman suffrage legislation. Ellis was not exaggerating some of the personal 
attacks made by Ferguson and his supporters against suffragists. Cunningham had even 
sought legal advice regarding whether or not Ferguson’s actions constituted libel.675  
On June 10, 1919 Cunningham wrote Catt informing her that Governor Hobby 
had called the Texas legislature for a special session scheduled for June 23rd. 
Cunningham wrote she “hoped to ratify the first day possible after organization of the 
Legislature, and we are lining up our forces accordingly.”676 On June 16, 1919 Catt 
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wrote to the Texas Legislature that the Susan B. Anthony Amendment had “at last 
passed House and Senate and is now in the hands of your Governor.”677 After listing the 
first three states to ratify and those she felt certain would ratify within the week, Catt 
concluded, “we feel certain that the State of Texas, whose history has been so 
progressive, will gladly take its place among the early ratifications.”678 That same day 
Cunningham wrote Sheppard “things look very hopeful.”679 Cunningham 
enthusiastically concluded that she was “practically certain of a majority for ratification 
in both House and Senate. The fight narrows down to one of tactics, and I’m praying that 
they will not out general us and split our forces on some technicality or side issues.”680 
She argued that they were not safe until the amendment was ratified, “because there are 
so many devious tactics which can be employed to side track us and give such of the 
men as may be lukewarm a chance to slip out of making a record.”681 
Catt was disappointed that Pennsylvania and Massachusetts were slow to ratify, 
and she wrote a worried letter to Cunningham, “I do not know what I can say which will 
assist you in this time of anxiety. I should say you had the most ticklish job and the most 
crucial problem of any of the states at this moment.”682 Catt suggested that Cunningham 
                                                
 677 June 16, 1919, Catt to The Texas Legislature, Box 1, Folder 9, MFC Papers.  
 678 Ibid. 
 679 June 16, 1919, MFC to Sheppard, Box 5, Folder 30, MFC Papers, UH Special 
Collections.  
 680 June 16, 1919, MFC to Sheppard, Box 5, Folder 30, MFC Papers, UH Special 
Collections.  
 681 June 18, 1919, MFC to Metcalfe, Box 5, Folder 48, MFC Papers, UH Special 
Collections. 
 682 June 23, 1919, Catt to MFC, Box 1, Folder 9, MFC Papers, UH Special 
Collections. 
  227 
argue that Texas needed to ratify as a Democratic state as the first states to ratify had all 
been Republican-led. She also suggested making “a sufficient story about the unfair play 
in the [1919] campaign,” and emphasizing the League of Women Voters’ commitment 
to passing fair election legislation.683  
Anti-suffragists descended on Austin in an effort to prevent the ratification of the 
Anthony Amendment by leveraging the recent defeated referendum. Cunningham was 
prepared for them. She maintained her argument that the 1919 election was not a true 
expression of public sentiment, but also reiterated that the state Democratic platform 
bound Texas Democrats to support ratification.684 The ratification battle lasted six 
eventful days. The Texas House of Representatives passed the resolution quickly, but the 
fight in the Senate was more difficult. Cunningham did not have a vote to spare, and 
antisuffragists put forth a bill requiring another referendum before Texas could ratify the 
Anthony amendment. Luckily for Cunningham, the antisuffragists’ bill was thrown out 
on a technicality. Having played all their cards, antisuffragists tried in vain to break 
quorum in the Senate by convincing ten senators to leave.685 In the end, Cunningham 
and TESA were successful in lobbying Hobby and the reform Democrats to ratify the 
19th Amendment on June 28, 1919 over the opposition of anti-prohibition Democrats 
who described it as an example of federal intrusion on a states’ rights issue.  
                                                
 683 June 23, 1919, Catt to MFC, Box 1, Folder 9, MFC Papers, UH Special 
Collections. 
 684 McArthur and Smith, Minnie Fisher Cunningham, 83.  
 685 McArthur and Smith, Minnie Fisher Cunningham, 84.  
  228 
Texas historian Walter Buenger argues that “Because women could already vote 
in the Democratic primary, the threat of retaliation more than chivalrous courtesy moved 
the legislature to ratify the suffrage amendment.”686 Cunningham’s brilliant marshalling 
of the primary suffrage bill, and TESA’s campaign to get women to vote in the 1918 
election had directly resulted in the willingness of the legislature to ratify the Anthony 
Amendment. A similar series of events played out in Arkansas, the only other state to 
pass primary woman suffrage and one of only four southern states to ratify the Anthony 
Amendment. After surviving a filibuster in the Texas Senate, the amendment went to 
Governor Hobby for his signature.687  
However, Cunningham did not feel that woman suffrage was safe enough to 
leave Austin with the legislature still in special session. She responded to a request from 
Catt for her to help in Alabama’s ratification campaign, that she could not leave Austin 
until after July 15, as anti-suffragists were still targeting the primary woman suffrage 
law. She emphasized, “…our elections are next July and the Federal Amendment will 
not be in force in time for us to vote then if we lose this.”688 Cunningham had anticipated 
a challenge to the primary suffrage law after the failure of the state suffrage amendment. 
She followed Metcalfe’s advice to “assure our-selves the Governor would not submit 
repeal of the Primary Suffrage law.”689 On June 13, 1919, she reported to Metcalfe that 
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she had “Governor Hobby’s personal assurance that he would not submit anything which 
can be interpreted as an opening for a bill to repeal the Primary Suffrage law,” though 
she noted Hobby’s demand that this be kept confidential.690 Nevertheless, she remained 
in Austin to ensure the primary woman suffrage law was safe.  
On August 28, 1919, Mrs. C.H. Brooks, a national chairman of the League of 
Women Voters, wrote Cunningham congratulating her on the Texas ratification and 
asking her to initiate the process by which the TESA would become the Texas League of 
Women Voters (TLWV). Brooks hoped for “the State Chairman…[to be] appointed at 
once, and your County Organizations urged to merge themselves into County Leagues of 
Women Voters…”691 Brooks also asked Cunningham to appoint a woman to head each 
of eight committees devoted to lobbying on particular issues. For example, Cunningham 
asked Mrs. E.H. Yale to head the Americanization Committee for Texas.692 The 
Americanization Committee, also known as the Committee on American Citizenship, 
worked for compulsory education (including for adults), English to be made the national 
language, increased requirements for citizenship, “more sympathetic and impressive 
naturalization ceremonies,” an oath of allegiance to the United States as a requirement 
for all voters, direct citizenship for women, and “compulsory publication in foreign 
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language newspapers of lessons in citizenship.”693 Yale accepted and was sent 
information on the League-backed Smith-Bankhead Bill, which would provide funds to 
educate “native and alien-born illiterates in speaking and writing the language of 
America.”694 Specifically the bill would set aside $5 million the first year and $12.5 
million each following year until 1926 to fund “evening and factory schools, 
neighborhood and settlement courses in English, civil government and American history 
and ideals.”695  
With the TLWV organizing, the attempt at eliminating the primary woman 
suffrage law thwarted, and the Anthony Amendment ratified by the State of Texas, 
Cunningham turned to repaying favors to suffrage supporters. On September 13, 1919 
she sent Senator Richard Edwin “Ed” Westbrook “the letter I promised to write as an 
official and permanent record of our grateful appreciation to you for your splendid help.” 
The promised letter thanked Westbrook for his “valuable assistance in securing the 
passage of the Ratification Resolution thru the Senate.”696 She backdated it to June to 
make it more useful. While she gave Westbrook permission to use it as he saw fit, she 
suggested that he “have the benefit of our experience last summer, and that was that such 
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a letter was very much more valuable in the hands of the women leaders of every county 
in which you campaign than it was when used as a circular or newspaper advertisement,” 
which could open Westbrook up to accusations of seeking outside help to influence a 
local election.697 
Westbrook replied to Cunningham thanking her for the letter, but it is clear from 
his response that he was already gearing up for the campaigns of 1920. He hoped that 
predictions that “women will not pay their poll taxes” proved false, though he 
acknowledged, “the opposition… is doing everything possible to discourage them.”698 
The primary woman suffrage law exempted women from the poll tax in 1918, but 
required it of women primary voters after January 1, 1919.699  
The Texas League of Women Voters (TLWV) launched a poll tax campaign to 
encourage women to pay the poll tax, the only form of voter registration Texas had. The 
plan was approved by the last meeting of TESA and carried over when TESA became 
the TLWV.700 The TLWV mailed postcards to 250 women throughout the state asking 
them how many women voted in the 1918 primaries in their counties, how many voting 
precincts existed in their counties, what was the greatest obstacle to registering women, 
and what could be done to remedy it. Ames reported that the most common answer to 
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the “first two questions was ‘I do not know,’ – the answer to third was ‘indifferences’ 
and the fourth ‘Send someone to stir us up.’”701  
Mary H. Ellis, the League’s treasurer and the wife of Professor A. Caswell Ellis, 
oversaw the printing and distribution of 200,000 flyers titled “Why Pay Poll Tax,” 
10,000 posters called “The Eyes of Texas Are Upon You,” 6,000 window cards and 
2500 other posters, which were sent to the League’s county chairmen.702 President Ames 
also embarked on a speaking tour to encourage women to pay the poll tax, visiting the 
State Federation of Women’s Clubs Convention, the Congress of Mothers, the San 
Antonio League of Women Voters, as well as Dallas and the “Rio Grande Valley where 
she spent two weeks speaking two and three times a day including Sunday.”703 The 
TLWV also employed speaker Lavinia Engle, the suffragist from Washington DC who 
had toured the state for woman suffrage in previous TESA campaigns. Engle 
campaigned encouraging women to pay their poll taxes throughout January 1920.  
Senator Westbrook also wondered if the Anthony Amendment would be ratified 
by the 36 necessary states to make it law.704 Cunningham replied that she and TESA, 
which was in the process of becoming the TLWV, were also gearing up for the 
campaign. She wrote, “we are laying out plans for a big state wide campaign on this 
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subject,” but they did not want to begin that campaign until the injunction suit filed in 
Waco had been settled.705 Cunningham told Westbrook that not only did she think the 
Anthony Amendment would be added to the Constitution, she thought it would happen 
in time for women to vote in the 1920 presidential election. As of her writing in 
September, sixteen states had already ratified, and multiple states were set to hold 
special sessions in December to vote on the issue. She believed the last two votes would 
be secured in January, but asked Westbrook to keep this confidential.706 
A politician named Tom Hamilton had filed an injunction against the primary 
suffrage law in Waco, Texas (and McLennan County). Hamilton argued that the woman 
primary suffrage law was unconstitutional and that women should not be allowed to vote 
in the primary until such time as they were legally able to vote in general elections.707 
Hamilton sued to prevent tax collectors from accepting the poll taxes of women, and 
Cunningham considered the legal challenge to be a test case.  
On September 27, 1919 Cunningham wrote Catt that Hamilton’s injunction had 
not been granted. The judge ruled that he personally believed the primary woman 
suffrage law to be unconstitutional, as it enfranchised a group of voters in the primary 
who were not legally able to vote according to the Texas Constitution in the general 
election. However, the judge also ruled that Hamilton did not have a case, as the election 
was too far out to tell if Hamilton would actually be a candidate, much less if women 
voters would affect his candidacy. Hamilton appealed the decision and Cunningham 
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wrote Catt, “it is possible that we will still have to try the case out on the 
constitutionality of the law before the Supreme Court.”708 Ames maintained that the 
injunction suit against hurt the TLWV poll tax campaign, even though 90,000 Texas 
women either paid the poll tax or obtained the required exemption enabling them to vote 
in 1920.709  
While Texas had ratified the Anthony Amendment, the amendment was still not 
guaranteed to garner the required thirty-six state ratifications needed to make it a part of 
the Constitution. After approving the bill themselves, the Texas Senate and House both 
passed resolutions strongly encouraging the legislature of Louisiana to follow suit. In the 
third called session the House adopted the following resolution: 
Be it resolved by the House of Representative, the Senate Concurring, That we 
send greetings of respect and esteem to the Legislature of the State of Louisiana, 
and express the hope that the Louisiana Legislature may ratify the amendment to 
the Federal Constitution providing for equal suffrage for women –First, because 
it is right and just. Second, because we are anxious to have a Southern State 
claim the honor of making this amendment effective, thereby making it possible 
for the women of all the States to take part in the coming national elections.710 
 
While some suffrage historians have argued that Texas’ limited woman suffrage 
successes as evidence that the state was not southern, the state legislature appealed to 
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Louisiana on the grounds that both states were southern states.711 While parts of Texas 
were certainly more southern than others, dry reform Texas Democrats viewed 
themselves and Texas as southern. They reached out to a fellow southern state with this 
understanding, and asked the Louisiana legislature to pass the Nineteen Amendment, 
which they deemed in keeping with their southern traditions of reform.712 Catt also 
viewed Texas as southern and when discussing which southern states to send 
Cunningham to aid in ratification campaigns argued, “You are the one to deal with the 
South and I hope you will be free to go.”713  
Southern progressives did not consider suffrage a right of all Americans, but of 
those white, educated and, as they saw it, qualified to use it correctly.714 White women 
were held in high esteem and strengthened the dry southern, middle-class vote. 
Louisiana did not ratify the Anthony Amendment. In fact, the governor of Louisiana 
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called on the 13 southern states to stand solidly against the Anthony Amendment.715 If 
all thirteen southern states had voted against the Anthony Amendment, it would have 
failed as thirty-six of the forty-eight states were needed to ratify to make it law.716  
Only four southern states, including Texas, ratified and all of them were southern 
border states, or states that bordered the south and a non-southern region of the United 
States.717 Suffrage historian Elna Green contends that Texas and the southern border 
states not being “completely ‘southern’… is an insufficient answer” to explain the 
limited but crucial successes woman suffrage achieved in these states, and suggests that 
perhaps more open political situations in these particular southern states better explained 
the limited suffrage victories.718 Buenger concurs arguing “in part, women achieved 
greater political success and changed their roles more quickly because the planters and 
industrialists never controlled Texas or Northeast Texas with the same death grip as in 
North Carolina, Virginia, and other southern states.”719 He maintains that “less severe” 
restrictions on white suffrage in Texas may have aided the cause of reform candidates as 
well.720 While some southern suffragists lamented the fact that they had achieved the 
vote through primarily non-southern men, they expressed pride that the southern state of 
Tennessee was the final state to ratify.721 On August 26, 1920, the Anthony Amendment 
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became part of the U.S. Constitution. Governor Hobby declared September 4, 1920 a 
holiday on which people should “honor the indomitable spirit of American 
womanhood.”722   
Cunningham and the newly enfranchised Texas women began preparing for the 
1920 election. Conservative former Senator Joseph Weldon Bailey announced his 
candidacy for governor. He was one of the old enemies of woman suffrage and 
prohibition, who Cunningham had faced many times with varying results. Bailey 
accused the Wilson administration of violating states’ rights and being too soft on racial 
issues. Cunningham and her supporters derisively discussed Bailey’s platform. Senator 
Westbrook wrote Cunningham that Bailey “recently made a speech in Sherman in which 
he attacked Pres. Wilson, the League of Nations, Prohibition and Equal Suffrage, and in 
the same breath, took occasion to compliment this party.”723 Westbrook questioned if the 
Democratic Party endorsed any of Senator Bailey’s positions. It was a pertinent 
question. Bailey represented the conservative wing of the party that was more dominant 
during Governor Ferguson’s administration. The reform wing had racked up successive 
victories under Governor Hobby, albeit with some setbacks like the failure of the 1919 
state woman suffrage amendment. Both wings believed their values to be the true values 
of the state’s Democratic Party. The 1920 gubernatorial election would largely be a fight 
between these factions.  
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Bailey supported an anti-Wilson delegation to the Democratic National 
Convention, but was countered by progressive Democrats under the leadership of 
Governor Hobby, Thomas B. Love and Thomas Watt Gregory. The three progressive 
Democrats won the selection of pro-Wilson delegates in May 1920, but Bailey remained 
in the gubernatorial race.724 Cunningham wrote to a fellow suffragist that the 
gubernatorial campaign against Bailey would be more difficult than the convention 
campaign against him, “for the reason that with a secret ballot such as used in our 
Primaries many persons will vote for Mr. Bailey who did not care publicly to espouse 
his cause.”725  
Ferguson and Bailey controlled much of the Texas Democratic Party before 
Ferguson’s fall from grace, but historian Walter Buenger calls theirs “an uneasy 
alliance,” based mostly on shared opposition to progressive causes.726 Bailey added to 
his traditional conservative policies a call for “open shops” in his 1920 gubernatorial 
campaign. The labor movement was working for a closed shop law, which would allow 
unions to demand that all employees at a particular company become union members. 
Additionally, Galveston longshoreman had gone on strike in March of 1920 demanding 
a closed shop. Governor Hobby responded by placing the city under martial law for a 
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brief time and leaving Texas Rangers in place to help local authorities combat union 
activism.727  
Bailey’s opposition to a closed shop law was quite popular. Cunningham wrote 
Westbrook that “In the matter of position of the gentleman from Fannin [Bailey]… we 
know, of course his record on prohibition which is ‘on both sides of the creek’ I believe, 
and on equal suffrage which has been in effect absolute opposition in spite of his 
statements which I thank you for sending me.”728 She suspected that Bailey would 
support the League of Nations if Wilson won that fight, but that “it would be entirely 
characteristic if he avoids making a record on these matters which will be available for 
our information…”729 
Bailey’s competition included two seasoned politicians with strong records of 
reform. At age 31, Pat Neff became the youngest Speaker in Texas history in 1903, and 
he presided over the House as the Terrell Election law was passed. In his gubernatorial 
campaign, Neff reiterated his support for prohibition and woman suffrage, while going 
on the record in support of segregation and the poll tax. He remained neutral on the labor 
issue hoping to appeal to conservatives leery of the more controversial Bailey.730 Neff 
was a moderate reformer, a candidate of the political middle between Bailey’s 
conservatism and the third candidate, R.E. Thomason’s more progressive reform 
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platform. Neff’s campaign was unusual in that he did not employ a campaign manager or 
maintain political headquarters. However, Neff campaigned by automobile over 6,000 
miles of Texas, personally visiting thirty-seven counties that no gubernatorial candidate 
in Texas history had toured.731  
Candidate R.E. Thomason had also served as Speaker of the Texas House. He 
was a representative from El Paso during the Ferguson impeachment and the woman 
suffrage campaigns. He reiterated his longstanding support for prohibition and woman 
suffrage. However, Thomason added to his reform platform the repealing of the state 
poll tax system in an effort to encourage more white Texans to vote. He argued that the 
poll tax affected more poor white voters than blacks and that the Democratic white 
primary was sufficient to restrain black voting without the poll tax.732  
Thomason may have been correct, particularly after white women were added to 
the electorate. Historian Sarah Wilkerson-Freeman argues that the Arkansas poll tax led 
to a significant disfranchisement of white women.733 She criticizes the renowned 
political scientist V.O. Key for his assumption that southern women were “slower to 
develop a political consciousness than elsewhere.”734 Wilkerson-Freeman argues that 
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although the poll tax predated the enfranchisement of American women, it weighed on 
women more heavily than men because of economic inequality between the sexes.735 
Wilkerson-Freeman concludes that historians must “recognize that the Nineteenth 
Amendment failed to enfranchise large numbers of southern women, white and black, 
[and] begin to reject the fallacy that the woman suffrage movement ended in 1920.” She 
maintains that the movement continued in the form of anti-poll tax campaigns.736  
In an argument familiar to all white woman suffragists, Neff accused 
Thomason’s plan of likely increasing black voter participation. While both Neff and 
Thomason supported woman suffrage during their respective tenures as Speaker, their 
opponent, the conservative Joseph Weldon Bailey, was as staunchly against woman 
suffrage as he was for states’ rights.737   
Cunningham was out of the state working for the ratification of the Anthony 
Amendment when the gubernatorial race began. She was understandably loyal to the 
Speaker of the Texas House who had presided over ratification of the Nineteenth 
Amendment, and had supported woman suffrage and prohibition since he was first 
elected in 1916. Thomason was a member of the House committee that investigated 
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Ferguson, leading to his impeachment and conviction.738 Cunningham had invited him to 
be a guest speaker at the 1917 TESA annual convention, although he declined the honor 
citing a need to return to El Paso on business.739 Thomason wrote Cunningham a note of 
congratulation in January 1918 when the United States House of Representatives passed 
the Anthony Amendment.740 Cunningham replied asking Thomason to “consider taking 
the leadership of our [primary woman suffrage] bill in the [Texas] House?”741 
Cunningham noted that Thomason had put forth a citizenship bill the year before, and 
appealed to his nativist sentiment to secure his support of the 1918 primary woman 
suffrage bill arguing that “we American women, the wives, sisters and mothers of those 
[soldier] boys are thinking very hard that we ought to be allowed to vote in the primaries 
to offset that enemy vote.”742  
Satisfied with Thomason’s help in securing the primary woman suffrage law, 
Cunningham participated in the successful “R.E. Thomason for Speaker Campaign” in 
August 1918.743 The campaign manager assured Cunningham that Thomason was only 
committed to “statutory Prohibition, Women’s Suffrage, and pure elections, with their 
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kindred subjects,” and concluded, “he is the progressive, up-to-date, wide awake, able, 
fearless, experienced Speaker we need…”744 Thomason was one of the few politicians 
who campaigned for the state woman suffrage amendment in 1919, even asking 
Cunningham to send him “a good speech and some speech making literature on 
suffrage,” to help him draft more persuasive speeches.745 Cunningham sent the requested 
information but assured Thomason that “the best [speech] I ever listened to was the one 
you made for us when you closed the debate for our side in the House in 1917.”746 
Thomason had loyally backed suffrage for four years, and Cunningham chose to back 
him in the gubernatorial campaign. She also agreed with his platform, which included 
his stance on “Americanization- I want America and Texas run by American citizens –
either native or naturalized…None but American citizens should have a voice in our 
governmental affairs or a vote in our elections.”747  
Thomason wrote that hearing Cunningham was returning to Texas in spring 1919 
for the campaign, “pleases me beyond measure.”748 He told her “the fight is on and we 
just as well begin digging the front line trenches.”749 Thomason was primarily concerned 
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with the opposition from Senator Bailey’s campaign, arguing that whoever that 
campaign focused upon would actually win. Thomason thought candidate Ben F. 
Looney, who served as the state attorney general from 1913 through 1919, and oversaw 
legal advice on the primary woman suffrage law and its literacy test, had some strengths 
but could not win. Thomason believed Neff had “no particular strength” besides the 
“Baptist church people and some of his lodge friends.”750 Thomason relayed a list of 
political enemies Neff had made by taking certain positions, which Thomason believed 
weakened his campaign as well. In particular, Neff’s refusal to “take a stand on 
suffrage” one way or the other when it was being fought over in Texas was common 
knowledge among women voters.751  
Upon returning to Texas, Cunningham reached out to friends asking them to join 
a “Thomason for Governor Committee.” Many wrote back that they would be glad to do 
so but had already committed to supporting Neff’s candidacy.752 Cunningham persisted 
in organizing the Thomason Campaign Women’s Committee, telling Thomason that she 
was “receiving [a] perfectly magnificent response.”753 Cunningham lined up a solid 
women’s committee, but even some of Thomason’s supporters feared that they were 
organizing too late in the campaign to be effective. Lily T. Joseph agreed to be on the 
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committee, but questioned “why the League is delaying so dangerously long a time 
before announcing to Texas women that if we expect to join, we must line up and 
concentrate upon Mr. Thomason’s candidacy! Delays are dangerous.”754 
Cunningham sent her advice to Thomason’s campaign manager, A.M. Frazier. 
She suggested that in addition to literature committees that would distribute campaign 
material, the campaign should organize telephone committees. These committees of 
women would “partition the County Poll Tax list among themselves and systematically 
check upon the vote by phoning them, making a list of the Thomason voters and call 
them all to remind them to go to the polls either the day before election day or on the day 
itself.”755 The Thomason campaign relied on Cunningham for advice on how to best 
spend their finite literature budget and how to incorporate women into the Thomason 
clubs.756 
While many progressive-leaning Texans saw Neff as the most viable candidate, 
Cunningham remained unconvinced. When Neff’s platform was printed in the 
newspaper, Cunningham wrote critical notes all over it, “Entire speech is a scintillating 
compendium of brilliant words and…phrases; shows no study of conditions underlying 
causes and offers no solution of any problem; appears to be put together loosely joining 
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other people’s research and work with glittering clauses all his own.”757 In another 
section she wrote “Sentimental Bosh and Rubbish! Not even planks for a platform but 
merely a spring board from which he hopes to jump into office.”758 Cunningham’s 
primary critique of Neff’s platform was that he did not suggest how he would 
accomplish specific goals. Frazier agreed with her. When the TLWV issued fliers listing 
the positions of the three major candidates, Frazier mistook one for a Thomason flier.759 
In one of his first speeches actually attacking his competitor’s record or stance, 
Thomason criticized Neff for “the policy of conducting a campaign without a definite 
platform, evidently alluding to Mr. Neff’s repeated assertions that he would not be 
bound by platform promises, preferring to handle issues as they arise, if elected 
governor.”760 
The TLWV, with Jessie Daniel Ames as its president, organized and distributed 
non-partisan educational information in the 1920 gubernatorial election. They sent their 
members Bailey’s voting record in May, Thomason and Neff’s in June, and B.F. 
Looney’s a few weeks later. Ames advised her members to “be guided in your choice by 
each man’s standing in his local community and his record in general on all moral 
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questions.”761 She did not believe they should imitate the standard in 1919 when each 
candidate was questioned on his stances on prohibition and woman suffrage, as she 
considered these issues to be “settled.”762 She concluded that each woman should 
“determine the man who most nearly measures up to the needs of the office for which he 
offers himself and then back him with your entire strength.”763 
However, Ames did not stop at just issuing non-partisan literature as president of 
the TLWV. She and Cunningham attended a mass meeting of Democrats opposed to 
Bailey’s candidacy in February of 1920. Both women and four men served on the 
Resolutions Committee of the group, which Bailey later referred to as “six sissies and 
two sisters.”764 While Ames was hospitalized after a medical procedure that March, 
Cunningham organized the Committee against Bailey, headquartered in Dallas. The 
organization consisted of men and women, but “the work of organizing the women was 
placed entirely in the hands of Mrs. Ames.”765 She admitted that the “during this 
campaign the entire machinery of the League, built up in the poll tax campaign, and the 
funds of the League of Women voters were diverted to this work.”766 The TLWV’s 
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Executive Council even condemned Bailey’s candidacy that April. The League printed 
thousands of copies of Bailey’s political record and distributed them throughout the state 
using the local leagues.767 While the copies of Bailey’s record could be considered non-
partisan, the intentions of Ames, Cunningham and other members of the Committee 
Opposed to the Candidacy of Senator Bailey were certainly partisan in nature. 
Cunningham had to leave the state for a brief time in the midst of the 1920 
gubernatorial campaign to attend the Democratic National Convention (DNC) in San 
Francisco that June. Ames maintained that “as a result of the League’s activities, four of 
its active members were elected delegates-at-large…” including Ames, Cunningham, 
Mrs. Spell and Miss Margie Neal.768 These women were part of the pro-Wilson 
delegation sent to the DNC despite Bailey’s efforts in May to seat a conservative 
delegation. Former suffragists made a strong showing in the delegation, much to the 
chagrin of Senator Bailey.769 The National League of Women Voters (LWV) lobbied all 
delegates at the DNC. The LWV sent circular fliers to delegates of both major political 
conventions and urged “all presidents of the state branches of the National League of 
Women Voters…to send deputations to the delegates and alternates of both parties in 
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support of the planks” supported by the LWV.770 These planks included the Sheppard-
Towner Bill for maternal and infant care, and the Rogers Bill, which would provide 
independent citizenship for women.771  
The LWV emphasized that the “present law may deprive many American-born 
women of their professional opportunities in districts where legislation forbids the taking 
on of aliens as teachers in public schools, in civil and federal positions, and in the 
practice of law.”772 They further argued that citizen women who married non-citizens 
also stood to lose land they owned or public benefits such as mother’s pensions. The 
LWV also believed that “To admit to the electorate people wholly ignorant of our 
government whose residence has given them no knowledge of national, state, or local 
problems may prove an injury to the nation.”773 The LWV’s fight for this and other 
reform legislation would continue in the early 1920s.  
On September 21, 1920 the thirty-sixth Texas legislature convened a fourth 
called session at the request of Governor Hobby. Hobby sent his assistant secretary 
Annie Houghton to both the House and the Senate where she explained that the governor 
had called on the legislature “to take immediate action because of the situation which 
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has arisen since the adoption of the Nineteenth Amendment.” After the Anthony 
Amendment became law, Hobby sent two inquiries to the Texas Attorney General’s 
office: “1. Will all women in this State be qualified voters at the next general election. 2. 
If all women, including, of course, those who have not paid poll taxes, are qualified to 
vote at the next general election, are all men who have not paid poll taxes likewise 
qualified to vote at said election?” Much to the Governor’s dismay, Assistant Attorney 
General E. F. Smith responded in the affirmative to both questions. Acting Attorney 
General W.A. Keeling concurred.774 
Smith explained that while the poll tax remained constitutional, and requiring 
those subject to the tax to pay it before being allowed to vote remained constitutional, 
requiring it only of men and not of women was unconstitutional under the Nineteenth 
Amendment. Legally it was a discriminatory practice against male voters, which held 
them to prerequisites not required of female voters. The Nineteenth Amendment did not 
just protect women; it protected any citizen from being discriminated against on the 
basis of their sex while exercising their right to vote.  The primary woman suffrage law 
only required women to pay poll taxes in order to participate in primary elections and 
nominating conventions. It did not require women to pay poll taxes to participate in 
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general elections as it was written two years before the Susan B. Anthony Amendment 
became law and its authors did not foresee this problem.775 
Hobby warned the legislature that “In the opinion of the Attorney General all 
male persons who have not paid poll taxes may likewise vote in the general election in 
November, as a result of the adoption of the Nineteenth Amendment.”776 By ratifying the 
Anthony Amendment, the legislature had inadvertently invalidated the poll tax for 1920. 
Woman suffrage, intended in Texas primarily to enfranchise white women, had 
inadvertently eliminated the poll tax, one of only two Jim Crow voting laws limiting 
black voting in the state. Governor Hobby informed the legislature of the problem 
regarding the enforcement of the poll tax on September 21, 1920, just six weeks before 
the presidential election and gubernatorial elections. 
Hobby’s notice to the legislature referred to the crisis that would result from “an 
attempt to hold a wide open election.”777 He maintained, “The election in November is 
the most important of all elections… As a safeguard the election of all these officers 
[President, Vice President, Governor, and State officers] should be by a vote of record, 
not by a wide open election.”778 As progressives and southerners, the dry Democrats 
feared a “wide open election.” They desired an educated, middle-class, white voting 
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body, and greatly feared the results of any further widening of the electorate beyond 
educated, middle-class white women, as the de facto literacy test and the all-white 
primary demonstrated. In the words of Governor Hobby: “To throw the election in 
November wide open to every person in Texas over twenty-one years of age without 
limitation, without an official record of the name of each person voting or the payment 
of the customary tax, whether it be a poll tax or a suffrage tax by another name, is too 
dangerous to think of.”779 
 Ironically, Hobby cited concerns of “a discrimination unjust to those who have 
paid poll taxes” if the election was allowed to proceed without the state having the legal 
power to enforce the poll tax.780  Of course, the poll tax affected impoverished Texans 
and disproportionately hurt black, Mexican American and Mexican immigrant voters, as 
it was intended to do. The poll tax or inversely holding a “wide open election” mattered 
precisely because of racial discrimination in Texas.  
Antisuffragists regularly used the specter of black suffrage against white 
suffragists. The suffragists’ tactic in the twentieth century remained the same: to 
downplay race as much as possible and at all costs.781 Cunningham and her band of 
suffragists understood that they would lose on suffrage if race dominated the debate.782 
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Hine argues, “women’s suffrage and the white primary were two sides of the same 
coin.”783 Both expanded the power of the dry progressive Democrats. However, giving 
women the vote had unintended legal consequences. As the Texas legislature learned, it 
was impossible to either extend or restrict the voting rights of one group without 
affecting the rights of others. The suffragists’ argument that all measures in place to 
prevent black men from voting before ratification would be sufficient to keep black men 
and women from voting afterwards proved false.784 If woman suffrage was to reinforce 
white supremacy at the polls, the poll tax and the all white primary would need further 
bolstering from the legislature. The legislature acted to restrict minority-voting rights 
both in this legislative session and the next.  
Hobby further explained to the legislature some of the discrepancies that could 
arise from the legislature not passing a suitable fix in time. He expressed concern that 
some election officers would not abide by the ruling of the Attorney General and allow 
the election to be thrown “wide open.” This would create discrepancies and 
inconsistencies between districts, call into question the validity of the election, and 
possibly even lead to the state’s electoral votes for president being declared invalid. 
Hobby argued, “For this reason, the necessity of a plan to bring about equality and 
uniformity is obvious. This can only be accomplished by a Statewide law or by a court 
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decision. It is too late to obtain the latter.”785 Ames summarized the purpose of the 
session: “to enact laws regarding the payment of poll taxes by women as a protection to 
the state against a possible influx of all kinds of voters” as a result of the 19th 
Amendment.786  
Hobby explained that while women had not been subject to the poll tax, “such 
may be required, however, by legislative act, according to the opinion of the Attorney 
General, and will result in placing all men and women alike on an equal basis as 
voters.”787 However, the poll tax issue proved to be more difficult to solve than Hobby 
anticipated. The legislation passed to fix the issue was seven pages long and contained 
fifteen sections. It concluded with a declaration of an emergency allowing the bill to 
become law immediately, because the election was far less than ninety days away.788  
The new poll tax law applied to men and women between twenty-one and sixty 
years of age who were residents in the state and not exempt for age or disability. The tax 
had to be paid between October 1 and February 1 to qualify for voting privileges. It also 
required certificates of exemption to be issued in applicable situations.789 It required that 
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voters pay the tax and show the poll tax receipt or an exemption certificate if required 
when voting.790 This seemed simple enough but it would not fix the problem for the 
November 1920 election as the poll tax window had closed nine months prior. 
The law ensured access to the ballot for men and women who had already paid 
their poll tax before February 1, 1920, although this was before women were required to 
pay the poll tax in order to vote in general elections. The law also created an additional 
poll tax window, similar to the registration window for female primary voters in 1918: 
All persons, male and female, who possess the qualifications of a voter with 
this State under the Constitution and laws of the United States, but who have 
not heretofore paid a poll tax within the time prescribed by the laws…are 
hereby granted until the twenty-second day of October, A.D. 1920, in which to 
pay the poll tax of the same amount heretofore collected from male persons 
only as a prerequisite to voting in elections held in this State prior to February 
1, A.D. 1921, which tax when so paid shall entitle the persons paying the same 
to a poll tax receipt and shall entitle the holder thereof to vote in the general, 
special, municipal and primary, held within this State prior to the first day of 
February, A.D. 1921, subject, however to all other rules and restrictions now 
provided by the laws governing elections.791 
 
The legislature kept the verbiage gender neutral, because they were aware that 
under the Anthony Amendment all voting requirements had to be equal between the 
sexes. After the bill passed, women had approximately twenty days, until October 22, 
1920, to pay the required poll tax in order to legally vote. Women were also able to 
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obtain exemption certificates if applicable to their circumstances during this window.792 
Obtaining either the poll tax receipt or an exemption certificate allowed those who were 
qualified to vote in the November 1920 presidential election. The legislature had to bear 
in mind any inadvertent consequences of the new law and try to maintain control of the 
electorate by reasserting the validity of all other election laws and requirements. Section 
fourteen stated “This Act shall be construed as being cumulative to the election laws of 
the State now in force, except that in case of conflict this Act shall control.”793 Lastly 
section fifteen declared an emergency in order to have the bill pass and go into effect as 
soon as legally possible.794 After debating changes, the reconciled bill passed the Senate 
21:3 and the House 96:13, exactly one month before the 1920 election. The crisis of a 
“wide open election” was adverted by four short weeks. 
With the election approaching, B.F. Looney joined the already crowded field of 
candidates for the 1920 Democratic gubernatorial nomination. He was the most 
outspoken supporter of prohibition in the race. While he was not a major draw for voters, 
his candidacy ensured that no one candidate received a majority of the votes, and he 
siphoned votes away from Neff, allowing Bailey to come in first.795 Under the rules 
devised to ensure Ferguson would not be awarded the governorship with a plurality of 
the votes in 1918, the two candidates with the most votes, Neff and Bailey, entered a 
run-off primary for the gubernatorial nomination of the Texas Democratic Party. If the 
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legislature had not changed the law to require majority nominations in response to the 
threat posed by Ferguson’s candidacy in 1918, Bailey would have won the 
governorship.796  
Historian Walter Buenger argues that “women altered the dynamics” of the 1920 
election and future elections in the state. His study of Northeast Texas shows that “while 
fewer women voted in 1920 than in years to come, those that voted typically lived in 
towns and favored Neff, Looney, or Thomason.”797 Ames estimated that the primary and 
run-off campaigns “cost the League of Women Voters over a thousand dollars and 
postponed the League’s work on its own program.”798 It was successful in encouraging 
women to pay the poll tax or obtain an exemption and vote, and most Texas women 
voted against Bailey. In the August primary runoff, Neff was able to pick up most of 
Thomason and Looney’s supporters. Bailey’s inability to win over Thomason and 
Looney supporters cost him the Democratic nomination, and Neff was elected governor 
in November 1920. Ames claimed “it was the work of the League of Women Voters in 
this [campaign] that was most responsible for the defeat of Senator Bailey, both praise 
and blame was bestowed on the women in this campaign.”799  
Aided by organizing his campaign early, which limited the effect of 
Cunningham’s organizing for Thomason, Neff became governor in 1920. Bailey re-
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entered private life and started a law practice in Dallas.800 Thomason similarly returned 
to private life and a law practice in El Paso, until he was elected mayor of that city in 
1927. He won election to the U.S. Congress in 1930, where he served fourteen terms 
before being appointed as a federal district judge by President Harry S. Truman.801  
The suffragists’ old nemesis, James Ferguson, also suffered electoral defeat in 
1920. Trying to keep his name in the public consciousness while he awaited a planned 
run for Senate in 1922, Ferguson ran for president in 1920. Running on the American 
ticket, he won 47,968 votes in the state, compared to 288,767 for the Democratic 
candidate, James M. Cox.802  
The events of 1920 proved that changes to voting laws affected more than just 
the group(s) intended by the politicians, lobbyists and legislatures that wrote, pressed 
for, and passed those laws. The voting rights of one group could not be altered without 
altering, at least initially, the voting rights of other groups as well. The events of 1920 
also proved that women had irrevocably altered the electorate and would sway future 
elections in the state. This would be particularly important as the League of Women 
Voters continued to advocate for legal reforms on behalf of women voters. The year also 
assured Cunningham and the newly-enfranchised suffragists that their old enemy, Jim 
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Ferguson, would not go quietly into retirement after losing yet another round with 
reform Democrats.  
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CHAPTER VII  
“WE WERE DISAPPOINTED, BUT…WE FORGAVE HER”:  
THE SECOND RISE OF THE KLAN AND THE FERGUSONS 
 
In October 1920, a few short weeks before the national election, the Annual 
Reunion of the United Confederate Veterans was held in Houston, Texas. Leaders of the 
newly revived Ku Klux Klan including its founder Col. William J. Simmons, used the 
event to recruit new members to the Klan.803 Simmons and Nathan Bedford Forrest III, 
grandson of the leader of the original Klan formed during Reconstruction, persuaded 
participating Texans that the threat presented by the Houston Riot of 1917 at Camp 
Logan, which they remembered as a race riot, had not passed. Simmons and Forest 
stoked fears of black veterans returning from World War I and demanding rights denied 
them by the Jim Crow system and the State of Texas. Sam Houston Klan No. 1, the first 
chapter established in Texas, held its initiation ceremony, including a cross burning on 
October 8, 1920 near Bellaire, a suburb of Houston, Texas.804 Historian Walter Buenger 
concludes that within one year, the new Klan had over one hundred chapters in the state, 
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and by 1922, the Klan counted between 75,000 and 90,000 members in Texas.805 From 
1922 to 1924, the Klan replaced prohibition as the most important and divisive issue in 
Texas politics.806  
The Mexican Revolution, the stationing of black troops in segregated Texas 
cities, the Camp Logan Riot of 1917 in Houston, and the nativist rhetoric of WWI and 
the ongoing campaign to end non-citizen voting had all contributed to heightened racial 
tensions by the end of the 1910s. The Longview Race Riot was the second of twenty-
five major racial conflicts that occurred in the United States between May and October 
of 1919, known as the Red Summer of 1919.807 Buenger adds that at the end of WWI, 
Texans experienced a “fear of socialism, outrage at profiteering, anger over strikes, and 
alarm over the depopulation of the countryside.”808 One result of the Red Scare was that 
“tolerance for diverse political opinions diminished.”809 The resurrection of the Ku Klux 
Klan only added to racial tensions in the state. Historian Darlene Clark Hine concludes, 
“By 1921, the political climate in Texas had changed considerably.”810 White women 
voters contributed to the white political majority in the state. They took sides in these 
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issues and their votes helped pass legislation that further disfranchised black and brown 
voters.   
Historian Charles Alexander maintains that the second Klan was a nationwide 
organization, present in every state, with as many as five million total members. He 
argues that the 1920s Klan was not only white supremacist, but “was an enemy …of 
Catholics, Jews, radicals, immigrants, bootleggers, moral offenders, habitual criminals, 
modernist theologians, and assorted other types.”811 Alexander contends that the 1920s 
Klan in Texas, Louisiana, Oklahoma and Arkansas was distinctive due its “motivation, 
which lay not so much in racism and nativism as in moral authoritarianism.”812 That is 
not to say that the Klan abandoned racism or nativism; on the contrary, it simply added 
other groups to the list of those it hated and sought to control through violence and 
vigilantism.  
As the poll tax and the white primary were the only legal strategies in place in 
Texas to prevent minority voting and restrict the voting of poor whites, the legislature 
fought very hard to retain and strengthen both throughout the early twentieth century.813 
The effort to limit Mexican and German immigrant voting rights did not stop with the 
poll tax in 1920. The 37th Legislature convened the regular session in January 1921, and 
an amendment similar to the alien amendment put forth in 1919 was again approved. 
The amendment restricted voting rights to citizens only, disfranchising legal resident 
                                                
 811 Charles C. Alexander, The Ku Klux Klan in the Southwest (University of 
Kentucky Press, 1965), vi. 
 812 Alexander, The Ku Klux Klan in the Southwest, vii. 
 813 Hine, Black Victory, 86. 
  263 
aliens, and it went on the ballot for a statewide referendum. Like its 1919 counterpart, it 
also affected white women’s access to the ballot box.  
The bill included a clause allowing a person to pay the poll tax of their spouse 
and to collect the receipt for said payment. The law used gender-neutral language, but 
was intended to relieve middle-class married white women from having to pay the poll 
tax themselves. The legislature had learned that under the Nineteenth Amendment to 
create voting laws for one sex and not the other was unconstitutional and could 
jeopardize their tight control of elections.814 Earlier election laws had targeted political 
bosses who paid their constituents’ poll taxes. The Terrell laws initially made it illegal 
for tax collectors to deliver poll tax receipts or exemptions needed for voting to anyone 
other than the person whose name appeared on the certificate.815 Later in 1905, 
Representative Terrell added an amendment to the law specifically making it a 
misdemeanor to pay the poll tax of a black person.816 While these laws were intended to 
limit black, Mexican and German immigrant voting, the legislature felt it necessary to 
add an exemption for spouses so that middle-class married white women would not have 
to pay their poll tax and collect the receipt in person.  
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The Thomason Laws and other election reforms targeted black voters and boss 
rule. Anders argues that political boss James Wells’ opposition to prohibition resulted in 
a “constant clamor in the state legislature for election reforms to eliminate the 
manipulation of the Hispanic electorate.”817 These reforms had an unintended effect on 
women’s political participation. Earlier reform efforts had cleaned up Election Day and 
made it much easier for women to participate by removing alcohol and encouraging men 
and women to participate in the festivities. Historian Judith McArthur argues: “Liquor 
free election days…in conjunction with the poll tax and the white primary, helped make 
this public space potentially ‘safe’ for white women.”818 She maintains “neither the 
prohibitionists nor the disfranchisers had such a goal in mind, of course, but wherever 
the electorate was mostly white and entirely sober, the antisuffragist argument that 
women risked insult or moral injury by voting lost conviction.”819  
Segregation had made it safer socially for white women to vote. The 1921 
amendment further freed women to participate in elections by removing one of the more 
public tasks, which traditional or reserved women might feel uncomfortable performing. 
If the bill passed, legal resident aliens would lose the right to vote while white married 
women’s access to the polls would be increased. Women who shied away from paying a 
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poll tax and receiving the receipt in public could have their husbands do it for them. The 
bill had overwhelming support from the legislature; it passed the House 116:3 and the 
Senate 24:0.820  
The amendment also gave the state legislature the power to “authorize absentee 
voting.”821 While it did not lay out the specifics of such a system, if passed, the 
amendment gave the legislature power to design a system in which qualified voters 
would be able to participate in elections regardless of whether or not they happened to be 
in the state and in their respective counties and precincts on election day. Enacting this 
section of the law would make access to the ballot easier for those qualified voters, while 
the first section of the law placed further restrictions on who would be considered a 
qualified voter.  
The bill enjoyed support of the growing Texas Klan as well. Anders notes that 
the Klan’s “anti-Catholic, nativist bigotry appealed to the Mexican-hating Anglos along 
the border.”822 Historian Thomas R. Pegram similarly notes the Klan’s “hostility to 
seasonal Mexican workers and immigrants” in both South Texas and in Colorado.823 
Klan leaders supported disfranchising immigrant aliens, who were largely Catholic 
Mexican or German immigrants, and usually voted against prohibition. Dallas and 
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national Klan leader Hiram Evans identified “Mexican migrants as dangerous carriers of 
both Catholicism and communism, who were ‘waiting a chance to cross the Rio Grande’ 
and infect America.”824 While Klansmen tended to support disfranchisement and the 
control of minority populations, the presence of a large Mexican population did not 
necessarily lead Anglos to join the Klan. In El Paso, Historian Shawn Lay argues that a 
substantial Catholic and Mexican population discouraged the local growth of the 
Klan.825 
As an amendment to the state constitution, the 1921 bill had to be voted on in a 
special election. This time white women had been fully enfranchised and were able to 
vote on the effort to remove suffrage from legal resident aliens. The amendment had the 
support of the national League of Women Voters (LWV). The national LWV had 
officially organized in March of 1919 at the fiftieth annual convention of the National 
American Woman Suffrage Association (NAWSA). NAWSA, under Carrie Chapman 
Catt’s direction, had made ending non-citizen voting the center point of the Texas and 
North Dakota state suffrage amendment campaigns. The official program of the LWV’s 
Committee on American Citizenship listed as its purpose: “A country in which all voters 
speak English, read their own ballot and honor the flag.”826 The adopted program 
consisted of ten major points including more stringent qualification for citizenship, 
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“more sympathetic and impressive ceremonials for naturalization,” “direct citizenship 
for women, not citizenship through marriage, as a qualification for the vote,” 
“naturalization for married women to be made possible,” and “An oath of allegiance to 
the United States for every citizen, native and foreign born to be one qualification for the 
vote.”827  
The 1921 Amendment was one step closer to the voting prerequisites advocated 
by the LWV. It was also the culmination of the progressive election laws and nativist 
sentiment of the post-WWI era. On July 23, 1921, barely one year after full woman 
suffrage was achieved in Texas and in the United States, the measure to restrict voting in 
Texas to only native born or naturalized citizens was successful. It passed by 3,712 
votes; a far cry from the 25,000-vote margin, which defeated the measure in 1919.828  
White women made up a substantial portion of the 28,000-vote difference. In their first 
state election as voters, white women helped to disfranchise a sizeable Mexican 
immigrant population.  
The effort to limit the rights of immigrants while gaining or solidifying rights for 
white women continued on the national level as well. The national LWV pursued 
independent citizenship for women as part of its agenda. According to Candice Lewis 
Bredbenner, “the common law doctrine of coverture had begun its slow demise in the 
states decades earlier, but the laws forbidding a married woman to maintain an 
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independent nationality appeared to be a statutory reassertion of the single-identity 
theory of marriage.”829 Under coverture, women suffered civil death upon marriage. 
They ceased to have their own legal identity, and instead were subsumed by their 
husband’s identity. A feme covert (or a woman covered by the legal identity of her 
husband) was not able to “sue or be sued, sign contracts or wills, or possess property 
(including her wages and children).”830 When the law did allow women to own land, 
they could not manage it, receive profits from it, or bequeath it. Coverture was 
understood to affect women’s civil rights, but not their political rights. Of course, this 
distinction was made when women had few political rights to speak of.831 
Parts of the United States that were carved out of the old Spanish and French 
empires were more likely to allow married women to own property. Historian Woody 
Holton notes that “Texas wives had already enjoyed limited property rights as subjects 
of Spain and citizens of Mexico and the Republic of Texas,” so it was not unusual that 
the original state constitution in 1845 ensured them the same rights.832 Holton argues 
that Texas “adopted a hybrid legal system that gave wives less control over property 
than in Spain and Mexico but more than in regions governed by common law.”833  
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During the Jacksonian era of reform, many states passed laws protecting married 
women’s property rights, and surprisingly, Mississippi was the first to do so in 1839. 
Mississippi State Senator Thomas B. J. Hadley introduced the bill, which he intended to 
be a truly egalitarian piece of legislation. Over one hundred women attended the 
legislative session in which the bill was debated. Hadley’s colleagues altered the bill 
however, until it protected only a single type of property, slaves. Many other states in the 
Deep South followed suit and allowed slave owners to protect their slaves from being 
seized by creditors by putting them in the name of their wives.834 Wives then owned 
slaves in much the same way the common law allowed them to own land; they 
maintained ownership but could not manage slaves or receive the income they generated. 
The Republic of Texas passed a similar act in 1840. Holton notes, “true reform came 
only with the adoption of a second round of married women’s property acts.”835 Houston 
Equal Suffrage Association suffragist and lawyer Hortense Ward lobbied for the 1913 
Married Women’s Property Act in Texas commonly known as the Hortense Ward Law. 
This law allowed married women to manage their separate property within marriage, 
although their husbands had to be included in any sales or transfers. Ward later 
campaigned for the Texas woman suffrage and prohibition amendments.836 
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Although nineteenth century married women’s property acts were not 
particularly egalitarian, they did contribute to the slow erosion of coverture. However, in 
1855 the U.S. Congress passed a naturalization act giving women partially dependent 
citizenship. The act required that an alien immigrant woman marrying an American 
citizen be automatically naturalized by marriage, regardless of her desire to do so. The 
act gave “foreign wives of Americans the ambiguous distinction of being the first and 
only group of adults to receive United States citizenship derivatively.”837  
Few women’s rights advocates or politicians noted the law or its impact on 
women’s nationality rights until 1907 when, amidst a wave of anti-immigrant sentiment, 
Congress passed an act that “revoked a citizen woman’s ability to remain citizens after 
marriage to an alien.”838 Women’s rights advocates were enraged. Derivative citizenship 
challenged the most basic argument for woman suffrage. If women were not independent 
citizens, what right did they have to the vote and how could they be trusted with it? 
Scholar Yoosun Park argues that “If indeed ‘citizenship is generally understood to 
connote ‘full membership’ in a state…’ a woman’s membership in the United States was 
a partial one, an insecure status subject to change according to her marital standing.”839  
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Ensuring women’s independent citizenship by law was one of the original goals 
of the national League of Women Voters (LWV). The LWV’s first major success was 
ushering the Sheppard-Towner Maternity and Infancy Act through Congress in 1921, 
and convincing forty-two of forty-eight states, including every southern state except 
Louisiana, to accept the legislation and authorize matching appropriations. The funds 
were used to improve infant and maternal health by establishing maternal and pediatric 
clinics, training midwives, and investigating the causes of maternal and infant 
mortality.840 Cunningham served as the legislative secretary for the LWV’s Maud Wood 
Park from December 1920 through April 1921. She worked alongside Dorothy 
Kirchwey Brown, who chaired the LWV’s Child Welfare Committee, to get the 
Sheppard-Towner Act through Congress.841  
The LWV then turned to the next pressing matter, independent citizenship for 
women.842 The Married Women’s Independent Citizenship Act was introduced in early 
1922 by Representative John L. Cable of Ohio, and it became known as the Cable Act. 
Cable and the LWV intended the act to stop alien women from gaining citizenship upon 
marriage to citizens and to stop citizen women from losing their citizenship upon 
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marriage to aliens, which led some natural born American women, who married German 
immigrants, to be deemed enemy aliens in their own nation during WWI. The LWV 
secured pledges from both political parties to support married women’s independent 
citizenship in 1920. Minnie Fisher Cunningham, serving as the national LWV’s 
executive secretary, helped usher the Cable Act through the Senate in 1922.843  
The successful law did not guarantee completely independent citizenship to 
American women. The racist and nativist immigration policy of the United States also 
limited the effect of the law. Yoosun Park argues that the “interwoven laws of 
immigration and citizenship in the early part of the twentieth century constituted a 
complex web of hierarchical reckoning.”844 The Cable Act followed and contributed to 
this discrimination, and in “doing so, produced starkly different outcomes for women of 
different races.”845  Park argues that the law “was designed specifically to apply only to 
some women and to some marriages.”846  
Citizen women who married alien immigrants ineligible for citizenship, like 
Chinese immigrants, still lost their citizenship. The law allowed women expatriated 
through marriage under the old laws to apply for naturalization, but women deemed 
ineligible for naturalization due to race remained unable to do so. Expatriated women 
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whose race made them eligible were designated as naturalized citizens, and naturalized 
citizenship contained more restrictions and was easier to lose than natural born 
citizenship.847  
In effect, “while the Cable Act separated marriage from citizenship, it re-
inscribed the significance of race to both.”848 As intended, the law prevented immigrant 
alien women from automatically becoming citizens upon marriage to a citizen. 
Historians Judith McArthur and Harold L. Smith note this section of the law was 
particularly popular with “congressmen concerned about the immigrant vote.”849 These 
nativist congressmen favored making citizenship more difficult for immigrants to obtain, 
while also limiting immigrants’ political rights.  
The issue of women’s independent citizenship points to the multitude of 
problems women faced fitting into a classic liberal framework of citizenship based in 
individual rights. When the founders limited voting rights to propertied white men, they 
argued that only independent citizens, white men with property, should possess the 
privilege of voting. They also based universal rights in natural law. As historian Estelle 
Freedman points out, “however, the principle of natural law drew biological distinctions 
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between the sexes and among the races. The flip side of natural rights was natural sex 
and natural race.”850  
Historian Rosemary Zagarri argues that even the definitions of natural rights 
were gendered. Male citizenship rights equated with the Lockean definition and were 
“open-ended and expansive, they were capable of reinterpretation and renegotiation.”851 
Meanwhile women’s citizenship rights were equated with the Scottish Enlightenment 
theories, which “emphasized the close, even intimate relationship between individual 
rights and individual duties.”852 In this theory, “mutual obligations and the preservation 
of social harmony took precedence over individual prerogatives and freedom of choice. 
Hence in doing their duties, people [women] exercised their rights.”853   
Zagarri argues that Americans “consistently began to make a distinction,” 
applying “the more open-ended concept of rights, associated with Locke, to men and the 
more duty-bound theory, associated with the Scots, to women,” leading to a “gendered 
division of rights.”854 Zagarri further argues that racial distinctions based on natural law 
contributed to a hierarchy in which white women, though lacking political rights, 
enjoyed “many civil rights and liberties that black people, free or slave, did not have.”855 
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She concludes, “scientific racism and gender essentialism forged racial and gender 
hierarchies that reinforced and complemented one another.”856 
When universal male suffrage became the norm in the Jacksonian Era, women’s 
lack of rights was made more apparent by contrast. While men without substantial 
money or property could argue that they were still independent citizens, women were 
more likely to be considered either the property or dependents of their husbands, with 
similar rights as children. Women’s societal obligations to the home and family were 
often used to limit their political rights. Freedman argues that “historically, homemaking 
has been set in contrast to full citizenship,” noting that under coverture, “wives legally 
owed domestic and reproductive service to their husbands.”857 She continues, “the 
expectation that family responsibilities come first has justified women’s exclusion or 
exemption from military service and jury duty.”858  
Even after the ratification of the Susan B. Anthony Amendment, ideas of 
“‘women’s political non-entity,’” in the words of Jane Addams, limited the success of 
female demands for equality in representation and in politics.859 Historian Rebecca 
Edwards questions how “gendered campaign arguments shape[d] access to political 
institutions.”860 Edwards maintains that everything political was gendered as it was 
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related to the proper gender (and race) relations within the home. This included 
legislation that affected race and gender relations directly, like relaxed divorce laws or 
married women’s property rights, and larger issues of federal government power in 
relation to the state, which were seen by late nineteenth century Democrats as a 
usurpation of each white, male patriarch’s power within his home.  In the conservative 
climate of the early twentieth century, “women found that appeals grounded in their 
social identities as mothers were effective levers on the men in power.”861  
While the national LWV fought for married women’s independent citizenship, 
Texas women continued to be active in local and state politics as they had been in the 
decades prior to 1920. With the vote in hand, they now wielded more power to directly 
affect legislation. In 1922, former Dallas Equal Suffrage Association organizer and 
suffragist Edith Wilmans, was the first woman elected to the Texas House of 
Representatives. Wilmans had studied law and been admitted to the bar in 1918. During 
her tenure in the legislature, she endorsed child support and childcare legislation and 
fought for the establishment of the Dallas County District Court of Domestic 
Relations.862  
The first annual meeting of the Texas League of Women Voters (TLWV) was 
considered a failure due to poor attendance, likely as a result of holding the conference 
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in the western part of the state, far removed from the larger cities of the east. However, 
the convention passed several resolutions including support for a Joint Legislative 
Council comprised of the League of Women Voters, the Parent Teacher Association, and 
the Federated Women’s Clubs.863 The group was similar to the Women’s Joint 
Congressional Committee (WJCC) formed by ten national women’s rights organizations 
including the General Federation of Women’s Clubs and the Woman’s Christian 
Temperance Union, at the invitation of the national LWV in late 1920.864 
Like the WJCC, the Texas women’s organizations joined together to lobby for 
the Sheppard-Towner Bill. After the Texas group was successful, “the Joint Legislative 
Council was formally organized after this venture of cooperation.”865 The Council 
became commonly known as the “Petticoat Lobby,” and included the TLWV, Federation 
of Women’s Clubs, and the Mother’s Congress, which later became the Parent-Teacher 
Association.866 The Lobby eventually consisted of six women’s groups who combined 
their strength in order to achieve increased funding for education, prison reform, stricter 
prohibition enforcement, maternal and child healthcare, and the end of child labor, 
among other reforms. Former suffragists assumed positions of leadership in the Petticoat 
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Lobby. In 1923, Jane McCallum became the Lobby’s executive secretary and Helen 
Moore served as her first vice president.867 McCallum had served as the publicity 
chairman for the Education of Better Schools Amendment, as the publicity chair for the 
TLWV and one term as its vice president.868  
While suffragists continued to press for social reforms, the Klan showed its 
strength in Texas in 1923, when it arranged for Klan Day at the Texas State Fair. 
Approximately 150,000 fair goers participated in “Klan-themed rodeo events and Klan 
speeches in addition to the fair’s usual rides and displays,” as the Klan tried to present 
itself as a charitable and reputable organization.869 Dallas Klan No. 66, led by Zeke 
Marvin, worked with the Dallas Welfare Council to raise funds for Hope Cottage, a 
foundling home, which had fallen into disrepair. Klan No. 66 raised $85,000 to restore 
the home and presented their accomplishment to the city of Dallas on Klan Day at the 
Texas State Fair. Historian Thomas Pegram argues that the “Dallas Klan’s effort to place 
infants in established families conformed with the secret order’s interest in moral 
regulation and stable patriarchy.”870 The move also improved the public image of the 
Dallas Klan.  
                                                
 867 Texas League of Women Voters Letterhead sample, Box 2-23/1142 Ames 
(Jessie Daniel) Papers, Texas State Archives.  
 868 Handbook of Texas Online, Roberta S. Duncan, "McCallum, Jane Legette 
Yelvington," accessed February 08, 2017, 
http://www.tshaonline.org/handbook/online/articles/fmc07.  
 869 Pegram, One Hundred Percent American, 31. 
 870 Pegram, One Hundred Percent American, 41. The Klan was unable to 
maintain the home, and after a few years turned Hope Cottage over to the city. It remains 
in operation today. 
  279 
The charitable efforts to repair Hope Cottage stood in stark juxtaposition with 
Imperial Wizard Hiram Evans’ speech at the State Fair, which was one of his “most 
notable public articulations of bigotry against African Americans, Jews, Catholics, and 
immigrants.”871 The former leader of the Dallas Klan, Evans had been appointed the 
Klan’s national secretary and later led their foray into politics.872 He ranted to the Texas 
State Fair crowd that “blacks [were] racially incapable of civilization at the ‘Anglo-
Saxon level’” and that citizenship involved a “racial understanding of Americanism. 873 
Pegram summarizes, “the Klan’s racial doctrine taught that universal suffrage was a 
weapon mistakenly placed in the hands of strangers who held no reverence for American 
institutions and who were likely to inflict fatal injury to the republic.”874 
The Klan remained under the radar for the first few months of its existence in 
Texas. Then, in February 1921 the violence began with the whipping, tarring and 
feathering of a Houston lawyer named B.I. Hobbs for defending black clients and repeat 
offenders.875 The Houston Klan also kidnapped and castrated J. Lafayette Cockrell, a 
black dentist who had been convicted and fined for being sexually involved with a white 
woman.876 The Beaumont Klan publicly whipped a doctor they suspected of having 
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performed abortions and a man who allegedly would refer female clients to him.877 
Violent Klan actions continued for the next two and half years throughout the state.878 
Pegram argues, “the controversy over Klan violence, in combination with the Invisible 
Empire’s internal disorder, clearly influenced the decline of the hooded order.”879 He 
maintains, “vigilante action that escalated to mutilation offended mainstream Southern 
white sensibilities…[and] Houston’s dominant institutions rebuked the Klan, [with] 
some prominent voices even calling for its dismantling.”880 However, Pegram notes the 
crucial distinction that the white majority in the state did not disagree with the Klan’s 
assertion of white supremacy, but in its violent and illegal enforcement. It was this 
reaction against Klan vigilantism that in part persuaded Hiram Evans to attempt to 
contain Klan violence and instead pursue political power. 
While the most brutal Klan attacks were directed at African Americans, the 
Klan’s emphasis on enforcing its own brand of morality and attacking whites who 
violated their code of ethics, led to its reputation as a prohibition enforcement ring. 
Texas Klans attacked a German picnic, which served beer leading to a gunfight and the 
death of four people.881 One journalist reported that even “black community leaders” 
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considered the Klan to be primarily concerned with the enforcement of prohibition.882 
Pegram notes that of the fifty-two vigilante attacks recorded in Texas between February 
and August of 1921, approximately fifty were assaults on white people.883 While assaults 
on blacks may have been underreported, the numerous assaults on whites that violated 
Klan morality added to its reputation as an enforcer of prohibition and white Protestant 
morality.  
While the Petticoat Lobby and progressives worked toward many goals of social 
reform that the Klan also advocated, like stricter enforcement of prohibition laws, these 
reformers came to resent the violent and illegal tactics of the Klan. They instead 
preferred to pursue their goals of social reform through legislation and law enforcement. 
Charles Alexander argues that while many Texans “might offer no objection to the 
Klan’s nativism and racism, …[they] could not accept the order’s arrogation to itself of 
the function of moral arbiter.”884 In response to the violence associated with the Klan 
and its brand of vigilantism, reformers organized in opposition. Reeling from the Klan’s 
campaign of terror against blacks, immigrants, “bootleggers, moral offenders, gamblers 
and wife beaters,” Texas Representative Wright C. Patman “introduced a resolution 
attacking the Klan, which…[was] tabled indefinitely by a vote of 69 to 54.”885 District 
                                                                                                                                           
Prohibition in the German Settlements of Eastern Texas,” Southwestern Historical 
Quarterly 112 (July 2008), 60, 62-63. 
 882 Pegram, One Hundred Percent American, 67. 
 883 Pegram, One Hundred Percent American, 67. 
 884 Alexander, The Ku Klux Klan of the Southwest, 56. 
 885 Alexander, The Ku Klux Klan of the Southwest, 46. 
  282 
judges in multiple Texas cities instructed grand juries to investigate the Klan’s wave of 
violent attacks as early as 1921, although no jury returned an indictment until 1923.  
In Waco, Texas, home of the infamous lynching of sixteen-year-old Jesse 
Washington, the sheriff attempted to stop a 1921 Klan parade. A gunfight broke out and 
Klan members shot the sheriff, stabbed one of the men standing with him, and injured 
several bystanders. Klansmen, who called themselves knights, showed no remorse and in 
fact blamed the sheriff for the violence.886 The Mayor of Houston, briefly a member of 
the Klan, left the organization after discovering the Klan had infiltrated the Houston 
Police Department and promptly hired officers from West Texas to handle Klan 
violence.887  
Multiple Klan attacks on “vulnerable-appearing women” in 1922 and 1923 
further cost the Klan public support. Twelve to fifteen Texas knights in Goose Creek, 
Texas, “burst into the household of an ailing woman in which small children 
played…dragged [a] half-dressed woman out of her sickbed and at gunpoint forced her 
and the man who was visiting her into an automobile.”888 Both she and her visitor were 
whipped, and the knights cut the woman’s hair off, likely as punishment for having a 
male visitor when her husband was away. However, the woman’s husband defended her 
and repudiated her attackers calling them “murdering cowards.”889 Twenty-five knights 
were fined although they maintained it was a small price to pay in order to clean up their 
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town. The incident ended eighteen months of Klan vigilantism in Goose Creek. Attacks 
against women who were humiliated and sometimes stripped by their Klan attackers, 
“left it unclear, especially to prim moralists, which party had committed the greater 
moral infraction.”890 
The Texas Chamber of Commerce publicly criticized the Klan. Progressive 
Democrats like former State Attorney General and member of TESA’s Legal Defense 
Committee, Martin M. Crane, and Senator Charles Culberson “attacked the divisive 
character of the order.”891 Fed up with the Klan’s secrecy, violence and terrorism, and 
particularly upset with police officers and politicians who were complicit or participated 
in Klan violence, the Dallas County Citizens’ League formed on April 4, 1922 to oppose 
the Klan. It’s founding 5,000 members chose Crane as their chairman.892 As part of the 
Klan’s effort to improve its public image, to gain political power, and in response to the 
growing backlash against it, Hiram Evans oversaw an attempt to distance the group from 
its more violent elements. The national Klan publicly denounced chapters caught 
engaging in violence and forbid the use of robes and hoods for any reason other than 
official functions.893 
While white progressives organized against the Klan, the National Association 
for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP), which had been all but run out of 
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Texas under Governor Hobby, worked to end the pervasive myth of black on white rape 
as a justification for the lynching of black men. The claim that lynching was requisite to 
control black men and their alleged attraction to white women had been accepted as fact 
by most of American society since historian Phillip A. Bruce first published his thesis, 
The Plantation Negro as a Freeman, in 1889.  
Bruce argued that emancipation had removed blacks from the civilizing influence 
of white society, and that they had reverted to a more primitive state than their enslaved 
ancestors. According to Bruce, black men also “found something strangely alluring and 
seductive in the appearance of White women,” and middle class blacks were even more 
of a threat to white women than poor blacks in Bruce’s opinion.894 Harper’s Weekly 
agreed arguing that middle class African Americans were “most likely to aim at social 
equality and to lose the awe with which in slavery times, Black men had learned to 
respect the women of the superior race.”895 Harper’s Weekly named this lack of respect 
and alleged propensity for interracial rape “The New Negro Crime.”896 It was often used 
as an excuse whenever a black man was lynched regardless of if he was even accused of 
sexual assault. According to historian Estelle Freedman, “by the 1920s the NAACP 
waged a multipronged campaign to redefine rape and undermine lynching.”897 Freedman 
maintains, “changing the definition and prosecution of rape has challenged the very 
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meaning of citizenship in American history.” This is due to the fact that “on a rhetorical 
level, the constructions of black women as always consenting, white women as 
duplicitous, and black men as constant sexual threats all justified the very limitations on 
citizenship that reinforced white men’s sexual privileges.”898  
Black women continued to interrogate this myth as they organized against 
lynching. In 1922, they formed the Anti-Lynching Crusaders within the NAACP. The 
Woman Citizen, formerly the official organ of the NAWSA and now associated with the 
LWV, praised the NAACP for “making terrible facts known” regarding lynching and the 
accusations of rape used to justify it.899 That same year Texas suffragist Jessie Daniel 
Ames joined the liberal white Texas Commission on Interracial Cooperation (CIC) to 
encourage Texans to improve educational and economic opportunities for black 
Texans.900 Ames served as the commission’s vice-chairman alongside University of 
Texas President Dr. Robert.E. Vinson and longtime suffrage supporter and former 
president of the Texas Federation of Women’s Clubs, Anna J. Pennybacker.901 Ames 
served as the Director of Woman’s Work for the CIC. Her job involved leading the 
women’s work of the general commission and coordinating with other “organizations of 
women, religious and civic.”902 
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As more and more Texans organized against the Klan and its violent tactics, 
Governor Neff faced criticism for his reluctance to take decisive action against the 
growing organization.903 He faced several opponents for the Democratic gubernatorial 
nomination in 1922, but he managed to overcome his competition, winning both the 
Democratic primary and the governorship.904 That same year, James Ferguson reentered 
political life, and ran a legally questionable campaign (due to his impeachment and 
conviction) for U.S. Senate as an anti-Klan candidate and reformer. Looking to unseat 
the aging Senator Charles Culberson, the Klan ran Railroad Commissioner Earle B. 
Mayfield for Senate.  
The Texas Klan ran “elimination primaries” to select Klan-backed candidates 
ahead of the Democratic primary assuring the concentration of Klan voters would back a 
single Klan candidate.905 In Dallas, Klan No. 66 maintained a campaign headquarters 
throughout the Democratic primary campaign and charged members one dollar for 
election expenses.906 The National Anti-Saloon League was familiar with Ferguson’s 
previous life in Texas politics, and endorsed his prohibitionist, Klan-backed rival 
instead.907 Pegram maintains that sometimes, “hooded strategists allowed several reputed 
Klansmen to populate a ticket so as to misdirect anti-Klan activists from the authentic 
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hooded candidate.”908 In the 1922 Texas Senate race, Hiram Evans allowed one 
candidate to publicly announce his Klan affiliation to draw the opposition away from 
Mayfield, who did not officially acknowledge his allegiance to the Klan.909 With the 
opposition confused, the Klan then distributed bulletins listing the officially approved 
Klan candidates to members immediately before the election.910 
Mayfield won a plurality of the votes ahead of James Ferguson, with Culberson 
placing third. Under the law intended to prevent Ferguson from winning the 1918 
gubernatorial campaign with a plurality of the vote, Mayfield and Ferguson were forced 
into a runoff campaign, which Mayfield won, making him the first Klan-backed U.S. 
Senator. Democrats tried running a moderate Democrat, George E.B. Peddy, on the 
Republican ticket as a “fusion” candidate, but failed to unseat Mayfield. Machine boss 
James Wells, a devout Catholic, even set aside party loyalty to support Peddy as opposed 
to the anti-Catholic, Klan-backed Mayfield. However, the emerging Anglo majority in 
Well’s Cameron County supported Mayfield, as did most of the state.911 In a last ditch 
effort, Peddy alleged election irregularities and sought to overturn the outcome of the 
election. Despite producing more than thirty witnesses, he was unable to convince the 
Senate Committee on Privileges and Elections to alter the outcome.912  
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While reformers actively worked against the Klan due to their illegal, violent 
tactics, many of those same reformers pursued legislation with similar goals as the Klan. 
Both groups sought to “purify” elections by reducing corruption, which many of them 
considered to include non-Anglo voting. While most African Americans in Texas were 
disfranchised through “violence, intimidation, economic sanctions, and county white 
men’s associations,” the all white primary and the poll tax were the only Jim Crow 
election laws specifically legislated by the state.913 The poll tax had excluded the poorest 
voters since it was passed in 1902. In 1905, the state required political parties to hold 
direct primaries if they drew a certain amount of support in the preceding election year. 
While the parties were allowed to decide membership requirements themselves, the 
Democratic party barred black Texans from participating in its all white primary.914 
However, this was seen as too lenient and ineffective as membership requirements were 
not universally enforced at the local level.  
In 1921, the City of Houston, dubbed the Star Klan City, prohibited black 
Houstonians from voting in non-partisan municipal elections that February. The 
executive committee of the Houston Democratic party passed an all white primary 
resolution, further eliminating the participation of black Houstonians in the city’s 
municipal elections. Not only were blacks barred from participating in the city’s 
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Democratic primary, but election officials were instructed by law to enforce the 
Democratic party’s ban.915   
In 1923, under Governor Pat Neff, the Texas legislature passed a similar law: “in 
no event shall a negro be eligible to participate in a Democratic Party primary election 
held in the State of Texas…”916 The law also instructed officials, “should a negro vote in 
a Democratic primary election, such ballot shall be void and election officials are herein 
directed to throw out such ballot and not count the same.”917 Effectively, the state 
legislated the Democratic all-white primary. Hine argues, “For black Texans, the 1923 
statute ended their already limited involvement and influence in state and local 
politics.”918  
R. A. Baldwin was the only representative to vote “present” instead of “yes” on 
the proposed white primary bill. He did so because he doubted the constitutionality of 
the act and saw it as an opening for “serious legal complications and many contests of 
primary elections.”919 History proved him right. In passing the 1923 white primary law, 
the Texas legislature forgot the lesson of Reconstruction, when Black Codes were 
overturned under the Equal Protection Clause of the 14th Amendment for singling out 
citizens on the basis of their race. However, the white primary law may have had a 
further unintended effect on minority voters. Hine concludes, “The most important factor 
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responsible for maintaining high levels of political interest and activity among rank-and-
file blacks…became the fight against the Democratic white primary.”920 Historian 
Merline Pitre concurs arguing, “This assault on the ballot not only resulted in the 
mobilization of blacks, but also created black solidarity and fueled the modern civil 
rights movement in Texas.”921 With the backing of the NAACP, black Texans 
challenged the statute; fighting the state all the way to the Supreme Court multiple times 
until eventually the Supreme Court ruled the all-white primary unconstitutional in 
1944.922  
As the legislature worked on the all white primary law, Klan violence briefly 
surged again in the spring and summer of 1923. Lieutenant Governor T.W. Davidson 
responded by ordering the Texas Rangers to secure the areas where increasingly 
unpopular Klan violence erupted. He gave the Rangers orders to investigate, identify and 
apprehend the masked floggers harassing Texans. With the help of a handful of 
determined prosecutors, the Rangers were able to secure convictions against a few 
Klansmen.923 A Klansman in Williamson County was convicted for assaulting a 
traveling salesman. In Amarillo, a Klansman was convicted of “whitecapping” or 
“threatening a person while disguised” and received a two-year sentence, although this 
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was later overturned on appeal.924 In response to law enforcement’s crackdown on the 
Klan in Texas and a public scandal about Klan murders in Mer Rouge, Louisiana, the 
national Klan worked harder to limit violent actions in favor of political action. Pegram 
notes one newspaper reporting on the “suspiciously sudden cessation of floggings,” after 
the Klan instituted a short-lived effort to curtail vigilantism.925  
In states like Indiana, Ohio, and Pennsylvania, the Women of the Klan had 
become almost equal in strength to the men’s organizations in the early 1920s. However, 
the Women of the Ku Klux Klan never enjoyed the same strength in Texas or the other 
southwestern states.926 To try to increase its reach, the Women of the Ku Klux Klan tried 
getting other Protestant women’s organizations to join their ranks. They petitioned the 
League of Protestant Women to affiliate with them in the summer of 1923. The League 
of Protestant Women’s national officers refused the offer, and their decision was 
unanimously upheld by the League’s membership in a vote, which took place in a Ku 
Klux Klan hall in Texas. One of the League’s officers, former suffragist Mrs. G.A. 
Young explained, “Our loyalty is to a principle, rather than to any man or organization, 
and the delegates did not think they could consistently take the oath of the Women of the 
Ku Klux Klan. This does not mean, however, that we oppose the principles of the 
Klan.”927 
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In 1924, the Klan ran Judge Felix D. Robertson for Governor. Robertson’s 
closest competition was none other than Miriam A. Ferguson, wife of the impeached 
former Governor. When the courts declared Jim Ferguson permanently ineligible to hold 
an office of trust in the State of Texas, the Fergusons decided that Miriam should run for 
governor in James’s stead. She was largely considered his proxy. Due to her initials and 
the fact that she had spent most of her life devoted to her husband and children, her 
supporters called her “Ma Ferguson.”928  
When no candidate won a majority of votes in the primary, the two candidates 
with the most votes, Robertson and Miriam Ferguson, were forced into a run-off 
election. Ferguson embraced her husband’s past with slogans like “Two governors for 
the price of one,” and capitalized on anti-Klan resentment: “A bonnet and not a hood.” 
The Robertson campaign replied with its slogan: “Not Ma for me. Too much Pa.”929 The 
Texas Anti-Saloon League (ASL) superintendent Atticus Webb supported the dry, Klan-
backed Robertson over the historically wet Fergusons. Adding intrigue to the campaign, 
ASL national executive committeeman W.J. Milburn publicly charged Webb of being 
under the influence of Texas Klan leader Zeke Marvin, a former ASL member. Milburn 
declared: “There is no place in Texas for Lenins and Trotzkys and emperors and grand 
dragons and titans.”930 
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The 1924 gubernatorial campaign put former suffragists in an odd predicament. 
They had to choose to support the wife of James Ferguson, whom they hated, or to 
support Robertson, the candidate backed by the Klan, which they hated even more. 
Miriam Ferguson denounced the Klan and went on record opposing the passage of any 
new liquor legislation. As prohibition was already in place, this made her candidacy 
easier for prohibitionists to support.931  
Former Houston Equal Suffrage Association President Hortense Ward publicly 
supported Ferguson, arguing that she supported prohibition and opposed the Klan. Ward 
served as a representative of Miriam Ferguson in Maine where she campaigned against 
another Klan candidate for governor in that state.932 Former TESA Treasurer and 
suffragist Jessie Daniel Ames later recalled that Ferguson was opposed to the Klan and 
prohibition, but she “figured the Ku Klux Klan was worse than drink.”933 She publicly 
supported Ferguson’s candidacy as well. When her fellow Methodist women publicly 
wrote her a letter asking how she could bring herself to support the Fergusons and liquor 
suppliers, she responded in a letter to the editor of the Dallas News that “the issue is not 
prohibition.”934 She maintained that both the Fergusons and Felix Robertson had been 
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active anti-prohibitionists before the federal amendment passed, but under the current 
laws neither candidate was a threat to prohibition. She reiterated: “The Ku Klux Klan is 
alone the issue.”935  
Ames’ letter to the editor was an effort to persuade those who were reluctant to 
vote for Mrs. Ferguson:  
Women of Texas have two political traditions, one of which is the ‘anti-
 Ferguson’ tradition. The question which [confronts] many of us is whether or not 
 we can ever be justified in voting against this tradition. We have taught ourselves 
 to look askance at anyone who has ever voted for Ferguson and now that we are 
 torn between [convictions] and tradition, we are weekly considering a 
 compromise by not voting at all. We would disfranchise ourselves at a time when 
 our State and Nation need most of all its liberty-loving citizens. We would 
 assume by this course greater responsibility for the domination of the Ku Klux 
 Klan than those who actively espouse it. There is no middle-ground that we can 
 occupy. Those who choose to think so will find after the election is over that they 
 are without standing among their own people.936 
 
In August 1924, Perley Orman Ray, a professor of political science at 
Northwestern University wrote Ames asking for her views on the gubernatorial race. He 
had initially opposed Ferguson’s candidacy but the editor of the Tulsa Tribune asked 
him to reconsider his position. The editor, Mr. Jones, claimed that “Mrs. Ferguson is a 
woman of great force and strength of character, and that she would not be dominated by 
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her husband; in fact, that the state will be the gainer by her success in the primary.”937 
Ray asked for Ames’ view of “this most interesting political situation…Of course, I 
understand that much of Mrs. Ferguson’s support comes from the fact that she is anti-
Klan, while her opponent is the Klan candidate.”938 Ames replied that she supported 
Ferguson although she was “not at all sure that the University might not be damaged.”939 
She went on to link the two leaders of the Texas Klan to the anti-prohibition movement 
as well and explained how Robertson could present an equal threat to the University as 
the Fergusons:  
The Klan had taken over the Democratic Party in Texas, which means of course 
 the state of Texas. The appointive power of the Governor is immense. In four 
 years he would have appointed six of the nine Regents of the University and the 
 same number of all [o]ther state institutions. Following the tactics of the Klan in 
 the past, no one but Klansmen would be appointed and no one but Klansmen 
 would be permitted on the faculty.940 
 
Ames went on to say that the Fergusons had announced they would only seek 
one term and would not make any fight on the schools of Texas. Ames concluded, “She 
is seeking vindication, not vengeance… “Mrs. Ferguson will be our next Governor, or 
rather Jim will through her. We cannot avoid that. But if the best people will get behind 
them and help and advise until it is no longer possible to do so, then I believe it will 
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come to be the people’s government.”941 Ames reached this conclusion although she 
believed the cuts proposed by Mrs. Ferguson would end state funding of the Sheppard-
Towner law, which Ames considered vital to women and infant health. However, Ames 
was convinced, that it “is and was a question in my mind, as to the greater evil –the Klan 
or Ferguson.”942 For Ames, the Klan was by far the greater evil. Texas LWV president 
and former TESA officer Helen Moore agreed with Ames and publicly supported 
Miriam Ferguson as well.943 
Ferguson benefitted from a majority of voters who, while they were lukewarm 
about her candidacy, came to fiercely oppose the violence associated with the Klan and 
its candidates. She beat Robertson by almost 100,000 votes in the Democratic run-off 
primary election. However, the state’s Democratic party was divided about supporting 
Ferguson, and some members broke away to form the Good Government Democratic 
League of Texas, which campaigned for and supported Republican George C. Butte for 
Governor. In response to the threat to his wife’s candidacy, James Ferguson launched his 
typical demagogic campaigning and accused all of his wife’s detractors of being 
Klansmen or their supporters. Likely in response to James Ferguson’s vitriolic speeches, 
Cunningham, who had only begrudgingly supported the Fergusons’ campaign, changed 
her mind and came out in support of the Republican Butte as well.944 
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 Miriam Ferguson went on to beat her Republican challenger in the general 
election by more than 127,000 votes, but Butte polled four times the votes as the 1922 
Republican gubernatorial candidate.945 Texas had elected its first female governor in 
order to defeat the Klan only four short years after Texas women received full voting 
rights and while many non-white Texas women remained disfranchised. As Governor, 
Miriam Ferguson appointed Emma Meharg, the first woman Secretary of State in 
Texas.946 The state Democratic convention that September passed an anti-Klan plank 
condemning the organization as an “un-democratic, un-Christian and un-American 
organization.”947  
Robertson’s defeat signaled the downfall of the Klan in Texas. In 1925, at 
Miriam Ferguson’s insistence, the Texas legislature made it illegal for members of a 
secret society to wear masks or disguises in public. James Ferguson is largely considered 
to have shared power with his wife during her governorship and in February 1925, the 
legislature voted to restore his political rights. Miriam Ferguson signed the bill granting 
her husband amnesty that March, although the law was reversed in 1927, one year after 
Daniel J. Moody Jr. unseated Miriam Ferguson. Moody ran a campaign against 
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“Fergusonism,” with the help of the Texas Woman Citizen’s Committee chaired by Jane 
McCallum.948  
Women in Texas continued to advocate for reform and for women’s rights even 
as they contended with the old guard intent on keeping women reformers from gaining 
power. Jane McCallum, Jessie Daniel Ames and Minnie Fisher Cunningham, all former 
TESA officers, served on the Texas Committee on Prisons and Prison Labor (CPPL) 
advocating prison reform.949 In a 1965 newspaper article, Ames recalled a meeting 
scheduled to discuss prison reform, a home for African American delinquent girls and an 
African American orphanage with Governor Miriam Ferguson, “but when we arrived, 
there was Jim Ferguson sitting in the governor’s chair.” She continued, “We were 
disappointed, but it seems Mrs. Ferguson was in the mansion, making strawberry jam. 
We forgave her. It was strawberry season, and perhaps jam was Jim’s favorite dish…”950 
                                                
 948 Handbook of Texas Online, Norman D. Brown, "Texas In the 1920s," 
accessed February 06, 2017, http://www.tshaonline.org/handbook/online/articles/npt01; 
Pegram, One Hundred Percent American, 201-207; Handbook of Texas Online, Judith 
N. McArthur, "Women and Politics," accessed February 06, 2017, 
http://www.tshaonline.org/handbook/online/articles/pwwzj.  
 949 McArthur and Smith, Minnie Fisher Cunningham, 120-121. 
 950 Newspaper clipping, “Suffragette recalls her 1918 vote fight,” Austin 
Statesman, May 24, 1965, Box 2-23/1142 Ames (Jessie Daniel) Papers, Texas State 
Archives.  
  299 
CHAPTER VIII 
CONCLUSIONS: “A GUARDED GOOD”:  
WOMEN REFORMERS’ CONTINUED FIGHT FOR FULL CITIZENSHIP 
 
Connections existed between the voting rights of different groups, even when the 
state legislature failed to realize it. Changes to one group’s rights impacted other groups 
even when this was not the intention of the legislature. The Texas legislature was able to 
pass seemingly race-neutral voting laws that affected people of color in other ways than 
they affected white women, because the same law affected people differently based on 
specific aspects of their identity, like race or citizenship status. Although the primary 
suffrage law avoided mentioning race, it ensured white women’s access to the polls but 
not black women’s because of the all white primary. It was passed alongside a primary 
alien suffrage law to ensure that legal resident alien women were not enfranchised 
alongside white, citizen women.  
The legislature had to deal with the unintended consequences of altering election 
laws, which often required them to work harder to ensure that only the intended 
populations were enfranchised. The unforeseen effects of altering election laws 
sometimes extended suffrage in unanticipated ways. The Susan B. Anthony Amendment 
was an unforeseen threat to the poll tax, because that particular disfranchising tool had 
never specifically applied to women. To limit the possibilities of the Anthony 
Amendment enfranchising groups other than white women, the legislature applied the 
poll tax, meant to disfranchise poor Texans, to women as well as men.  
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The two Jim Crow voting restrictions of the all white primary and the poll tax 
always allowed some voter participation by men the legislature would have liked to bar 
from voting. After the success of woman suffrage, the few women of color able to 
bypass the disfranchising laws led the state legislature to further restrict suffrage and 
reinforce those disfranchising laws in new ways. Newspaper coverage of black women 
suing poll tax collectors for not allowing black women to register to vote, even though 
they would not have been allowed to participate in the all white primary, still caused 
concern about maintaining white control of politics. Black women who participated in 
municipal elections or the general election in 1920 caused a backlash in cities like 
Houston, where the impetus to legislate the white primary emerged.951  
While woman suffrage eventually enabled reformers to ratify the Anthony 
Amendment and eventually to end alien suffrage, first it resulted in an expansion of 
suffrage to Mexican American women in Texas. These were the women San Antonio 
suffragist Rena Maverick Green encouraged to participate in the election of 1918, and 
these were the women who participated in voting education classes covered by Spanish-
language newspapers in 1920.952 Woman suffrage initially caused unforeseen expansions 
of voting rights to black and brown Texan women, which the legislature responded to by 
further consolidating white control of politics by ending alien suffrage, legislating the all 
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white primary, and maintaining the poll tax for all voters.953 In this manner, the initial 
expansion of voting rights to (white) women led to a retraction of voting rights and 
opportunities for people of color both in Texas and in the United States.  
 The fight for woman suffrage, and black and brown suffrage, in Texas also 
shows the difficulty of fitting women and racial minorities into the classical liberal 
framework of citizenship based on individual rights. The history of derivative citizenship 
in particular shows the ways in which certain groups, like women, were denied the 
protections of full citizenship, even when they were natural born citizens of the United 
States. Legal scholar Karen Knop defines citizenship as “full membership within a 
state.”954 Yoosun Park argues that even in the twenty-first century, “the idea that full 
membership to the nation should be a guarded good available only to the select few- 
remains intact.”955 The provisions that women who married immigrant aliens ineligible 
for citizenship forfeited their own citizenship and that women married to those ineligible 
for American citizenship could not become naturalized were both rescinded when the 
Cable Act was amended in 1930 and 1931. The final law actually provided married 
women with independent citizenship, although American women continued the fight for 
equal rights.956   
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This study reveals the multitude of ways that the meaning of citizenship was 
altered during and by the First World War. Most significantly, citizenship defined by 
obligation, especially where it concerned women and racial minorities, increasingly gave 
way to citizenship defined by rights.957 Voting, long considered a privilege of some, but 
not all, citizens, came to be argued as a right. Judith Shklar, a renowned political 
scientist and scholar, argues “There is no notion more central in politics than citizenship, 
and none more variable in history, or contested in theory. In America, it has in principle 
always been democratic, but only in principle.”958 Shklar concludes that the right to vote 
and the right to work define citizenship in the United States.959 From the start of World 
War I through the early 1920s, full citizenship was increasingly defined by the ability to 
vote. Texas suffragists were well aware of the solidifying link between citizenship and 
voting. Describing the eagerness with which suffragists embarked on reform as full 
voting members of society in 1920, Jane McCallum wrote, “With what high hopes and 
enthusiasms women stepped forth into a world in which they were citizens at last!”960 
The many changes to election laws when it benefited the governor or the 
governor’s supporters in the legislature, and the stubborn resistance to enfranchising 
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groups like servicemen, show that governments pass enfranchising legislation when it in 
some way benefits those already in power. President Wilson failed to support suffrage 
until it was necessary for his foreign policy mission. Governor Hobby did not support 
even primary woman suffrage until it benefitted his 1918 re-election campaign. 
Progressive Texas Democrats passed the 1919 state woman suffrage amendment against 
the will of suffragists who would have rather waited to ratify the federal amendment, 
because it benefitted those politicians’ own campaigns and the legislation they 
supported. The Texas legislature failed to fully enfranchise servicemen, many of whom 
were overseas without a system of absentee balloting, which could not have been 
developed in time to directly benefit the current legislature. While social movements like 
the woman suffrage movement or the civil rights movement can create the impetus, 
politicians and governments do not enfranchise voters unless it profits the political 
leadership in some way.  
The wartime experience and the rise of the second Ku Klux Klan also changed 
how the rights of citizenship were protected or defended. To avoid negative press, ensure 
economic prosperity, and to live up to their own ideals, Texans worked to end vigilante 
violence and lynching. Historian William Carrigan argues that “after the nationally 
condemned lynching of [Jesse] Washington in 1916, local leaders reconsidered their 
support and tolerance of mob action.”961 Carrigan continues, “Washington’s brutal 
murder embarrassed the civic-minded leaders of the region…[and] over the next several 
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decades, white central Texans not only abandoned public lynching spectacles but also 
made a conscious effort to strike lynching from the region’s historical memory.”962 The 
same could be said of lynching, both of black and brown Texans, throughout the state of 
Texas. While the dominant political culture distanced itself from such acts of violence, it 
also worked to erase the memory of these acts. 
Most Texans moved away from enforcing white supremacy primarily through 
violence. They instead turned to the laws and the courts to do so, but activists 
increasingly turned to the legal system to address the denial of rights as well. As the 
Texas and the United States expanded suffrage to include women, the Texas legislature 
passed additional laws to limit that expansion solely to white women. These measures 
included legislating the all white primary and ending alien suffrage. In seeking measures 
to further restrict the citizenship and voting rights of racial minorities after 1920, the 
state created rallying points for the civil rights movements of the mid-twentieth century. 
Much like universal white male suffrage and efforts to remove women from politics led 
to the first wave of suffrage activism in the nineteenth century, woman suffrage and 
efforts to completely remove racial minorities from politics led to the early civil rights 
movement in the twentieth century. 
Darlene Clark Hine and Merline Pitre have said as much of the all white primary. 
The unintended effect of legislating the white primary was that it inspired everyday 
black Texans to focus on its removal and to support the activists and groups working 
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relentlessly to that end.963 With the support of black Texans, the National Association for 
the Advancement of Colored Peoples (NAACP) fought the measure all the way to the 
Supreme Court multiple times until the Court ruled in Smith v Allwright in 1944 that the 
white primary in any form was unconstitutional.964  
With the end of non-citizen voting in Texas in 1921 and across the country when 
Arkansas ended the practice in 1926, the rights traditionally ascribed to the liminal 
category of legal resident alien were diminished.965 Further efforts to prevent Mexican 
immigrants from obtaining citizenship and to limit migration compounded their legal 
discrimination .966 Historian Natalia Molina argues that in the 1920s, the Supreme Court, 
immigration officials, judges, and others made numerous attempts to broaden the 
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category of “non-white” peoples, as only blacks and whites were legally entitled to 
naturalize. She maintains, “once firmly categorized as non-white, Mexicans would not 
only be excluded from applying for citizenship-they would be excluded from 
immigrating as well, since section 13 of the Immigration Act [of 1924] restricted 
immigration to persons eligible for citizenship.”967 The changes in immigration law 
combined with efforts to end derivative citizenship for women change our perspective of 
Mexican women’s naturalization experiences in the 1920s as well.  
Molina argues that the 1930s saw two major turning points for Mexican and 
Mexican Americans in the U.S.: the great depression and the “rise of second generation 
Mexican Americans as a politicized group.”968 This second generation “increasingly 
turned to U.S. institutions, joining unions, demanding their rights as U.S. citizens, and 
using organizations like the Congress of Spanish Speaking Peoples to channel their 
voices and give them greater political weight.”969 Once legal resident alien voting ended 
and the eligibility of Mexicans to naturalize was under attack, the League of United 
Latin American Citizens (LULAC) formed in 1929 and responded to the legal 
discrimination and assault on Mexican voting rights with a strategy that emphasized 
American citizenship and all the rights that they argued should accompany it.970  
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There is a historiographical argument between Chicano historians and whiteness 
studies scholars as to the motivations for LULAC to assert Mexican Americans’ 
citizenship and their whiteness, as a legal strategy in civil rights cases in the mid-
twentieth century. Whiteness studies scholars like Neil Foley and Michael Phillips study 
the construction of whiteness, which groups were considered white and when, and how 
race worked to divide the working class against itself. They maintain that “a tiny number 
of Mexican Americans, if they were wealthy, light skinned, and sufficiently fluent in 
English, might have occupied the margins of whiteness, but most found their working-
class and poor backgrounds consigned them to a status at times indistinguishable from 
that of African Americans.”971 Whiteness studies scholars claim that some Mexican 
Americans “entered into a ‘Faustian Pact’ by embracing racism toward African 
Americans in the course of trying to avoid de jure discrimination.”972 
Chicano scholars like Carlos Blanton are critical of whiteness scholars and argue 
that they emphasize racism against blacks within LULAC and the Mexican American 
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community to an unreasonable and unrepresentative degree.973 Blanton maintains, 
“whiteness [was] branded upon [Mexican Americans] by law and [they therefore] fought 
different kinds of civil rights battles from what African Americans fought.”974 He 
concludes that although “Mexican American leaders like [George I.] Sánchez pursued 
whiteness in the courts, they still believed in common cause with African Americans.”975 
In regards to Mexican immigrants, Blanton argues that Mexican American civil rights 
leaders faced a “nettlesome citizenship dilemma,” in which their “strategic emphasis on 
American citizenship rhetorically placed them shoulder-to-shoulder with other U.S. 
minority groups. It also marginalized immigrant Mexicans.”976 Blanton argues that 
Mexican American activists “emphasized citizenship over culture and citizenship over 
race.”977 The longer history presented here, of Texas disfranchising legal resident aliens 
and attempting to categorize Mexicans as “non-white,” which would have prevented 
both their naturalization and immigration, supports Blanton’s assertions regarding 
LULAC’s legal arguments based on citizenship and whiteness as a strategy.  
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After gaining the right to vote, white women continued to work for reform. 
Women in groups like the Petticoat Lobby worked for strict enforcement of prohibition 
laws, surveys of Texas schools and prisons, for the right for women to serve on juries 
and be police officers, and for the funding of mother-infant health programs and public 
schools.978 White women also increasingly worked in interracial alliances or in white 
organizations meant to be allies to the black community. Jessie Daniel Ames became the 
director of the Texas Council of the Commission on Interracial Cooperation (CIC) in 
1924, and became the national director of the CIC Woman’s Committee in 1929. In 
1930, she founded the Association of Southern Women for the Prevention of Lynching, 
an all white organization that fought racial and vigilante violence.979  
Enfranchised women affected the outcome of elections as well. Walter Buenger 
argues that northeast Texas women supported more moderate and less conservative 
candidates in the 1920 gubernatorial race.980 This trend was not isolated to northeast 
Texas, or to the 1920 election. It is unlikely Miriam Ferguson could have successfully 
run for governor before the Susan B. Anthony Amendment was ratified, and many of her 
supporters were former suffragists and moderate women voting against the Klan-backed 
candidate Felix Robertson. Suffragists continued to work for reform and for the 
betterment of women after 1920. In 1926, Jane McCallum led the Petticoat Lobby in its 
                                                
 978 Handbook of Texas Online, Sherilyn Brandenstein, "Joint Legislative 
Council," accessed March 21, 2017, 
http://www.tshaonline.org/handbook/online/articles/wejfg.  
 979 Handbook of Texas Online, Jon D. Swartz, "Ames, Jessie Harriet Daniel," 
accessed March 21, 2017, http://www.tshaonline.org/handbook/online/articles/fam06.  
 980 Buenger, The Path to a Modern South, 200. 
  310 
support of Daniel J. Moody’s candidacy for Governor in his race against Miriam A. 
Ferguson. When he won, Moody appointed her secretary of state, a post she retained 
under Governor Ross Sterling as well. She is remembered for having discovered an 
original copy of the Texas Declaration of Independence and having it restored during her 
tenure. She continued to be active in service and politics for the rest of her life.981  
Women’s continued activism and the incredibly important changes to voting 
rights after 1920 reiterate the point that the suffrage movement did not end in 1920. The 
Anthony Amendment removed one impediment between women and the ballot box. 
However, for women of color; poor women; and women the Amendment did not apply 
to, like those in Puerto Rico, other obstacles remained.982 Even the Anthony Amendment 
itself was not settled in 1920.  
When two Maryland women registered to vote in Baltimore City, Judge Oscar 
Leser filed suit to have their names removed as the Maryland constitution restricted 
suffrage to men. The Supreme Court accepted the case against the Amendment in which 
Leser and other claimants who joined him argued that the power to amend the 
Constitution did not extend to an amendment of this kind; that states like Texas, whose 
constitutions prohibited women from voting, could not legally ratify a federal 
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amendment in dispute with their own state constitutions; and that the ratifications of 
Tennessee and West Virginia were invalid because they did not follow the laws 
concerning the ratification of federal amendments in those states. In 1922, the Supreme 
Court ruled unanimously in Leser v. Garnett, that the Amendment was indeed valid, and 
that the Fifteenth Amendment established the precedent for it being so. They further 
ruled that states could ratify an amendment which was in contention with their own state 
constitutions, and that the ratifications of Connecticut and Vermont made the 
ratifications of Tennessee and West Virginia moot points.983  Historians of the long civil 
rights movement have encouraged scholars to consider that the suffrage movement did 
not truly end in 1920. Indeed, historians would benefit from considering the ongoing 
challenges to women’s voting rights as well as the multitude of legal changes concerning 
citizenship, immigration and voting rights in the early 1920s. The addition of white 
women to the franchise made the exclusion of racial minorities more explicit, which 
when conflated with new measures intended to strengthen existing restrictions on 
minority suffrage led to renewed efforts from black and brown Texans to gain access to 
the ballot. Many of these laws set the stage for the civil rights movements of the mid-
twentieth century.  
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